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Judicial activism is gaining iniportanLe in the present days. In the form of 
Public Interest litigation ( P11.) citirens are getting access to justice. 
Judiciary has become the center oC controversN. in the recent past, on 
account of the sudden level of judicial intervention. the area of judicial 
intervention has been steadily expanding through the device of public 
interest litigation. "rhe judiciary has shed its pro-status-quo approach and 
taken upon itself the duty to enforce the basic rights of the poor and 
vulnerable sections of society, by progressive interpretation and positive 
action. The Supreme Court has de eloped new methods of dispensing 
justice to the masses through the public interest litigation. Former Chief 
Justice P N. 13hat?wat. attained a new dimension comments that The 
supreme court has developed several new commitments. It Judicial 
Activism in India has carried forward participative justice. It has laid just 
standards of procedure. It has made justice more accessible to citizens." The 
term 'judicial activism' is intended to Teter to. and cover, the action of the 
court in excess of. and beyond the po er of judicial review. From one angle 
it is said to be an act in excess 0C. or Without jurisdiction. The Constitution 
does not confer any authority or jurisdiction for 'activism' as such on the 
Court. Judicial activism refers to the interference of the judiciary. In the 
legislative and executive fields. It rnainl occurs due to the non-activity of 
the other organs of the government. Judicial activism is a way through 
which relief is provided to the di-,,ozsantaged and uggric\gid citizens. 
Judicial activism is providing it base of p►►licy making in competition with 
the legislature and executive. Judicial activism is the rendering of decisions, 
which are in tune with the temper and tempo of the times. In short, judicial 
activism means that instead of judicial restraint, the Supreme Court and 
other lower courts become activists and compel the authority to act and 
sometimes also direct the _government regarding policies and also matters of 
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administration. Judicial activism has arisen mainly due to the failure of the 
executive and legislatures to act. Secondly. it has arisen also due to the fact 
that there is it doubt that the legislature and executive have failed to deliver 
the goods. Thirdly. it occurs because the entire system has been plagued by 
ineffectiveness and inactiveness. The violation of basic human rights has 
also led to judicial activism. 
Finally, due to the misuse and abuse of some of the provisions of the 
constitution, judicial activism has gained significance. The aim of this 
research is to provide the reader with sonic entry points into the worlds of 
human rights thinking, activism, and law. This study concentrates on the 
power of ideas to mobilize people against injustice and indignities. Judicial 
Activism and Human rights do not rcall resolve the tension between 
competing interests and various visions of how the world should be, rather. 
human rights ideas provide the vocabulary for arguing about which interests 
should prevail and how best to achieve the ends we have chosen. This study 
actually looks at the judicial activism and protection of human rights. 
The specific inclusion among the purposes of the United Nations of 
promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and or 
fundamental freedoms for all was primarily due to the events which 
occurred immediately before and during the Second World War. The 
human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter reflect the reaction of the 
international community to the horrors of the war and the regimes which 
unleashed it. This is very Much evident from the preamble of the U.N. 
Charter. The experience of the two wars led to a firm conviction that the 
international protection Of human rights was an essential condition of' 
international peace and progress. It was this conviction that led to the 
drafting of human rights provisions in the l U.N. ('harter and also the 
International Bill of Human Rights. li\ cell these developments. 
international standard for the protection and promotion of human rights has 
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been established. The modern notion of human rights describes them as 
"three human rights generations". The first human rights generation consists 
of "negative rights" which represent the "civil and political rights" as 
enshrined in articles 2 to 21 of the Universal [)eclaration. These rights are 
aimed to ensure freedom from any curtailment of individual liberty. The 
second human rights generation consists of "positive rights" which 
represent the "economic. social and cultural rights" as set forth in articles 22 
to 27 of the Universal Declaration of Uuntan Rights. These rights are aimed 
at ensuring social justice to all and their participation in economic, social 
and cultural life. The "third generation" of human rights consists of certain 
"collective rights" which are embryonic all', indicated in article 2K of the 
Universal Declaration of human Rights. In an increasingly interdependent 
world, the recognition of the interdependence of the three human rights 
generations is gaining momentum. Although human rights are enshrined in 
separate international instruments, they are perceived as forming a whole. 
In the present era, it is necessary for peace, security and human 
development that human rights should be given prime importance not only 
in international instruments but also they should receive due recognition at 
the national level. All the three generations of human rights find a 
prominent place in most of the constitutions of the world. Indian 
Constitution is one such example where human rights find reflection in the 
preamble and Parts III and IV dealing with fundamental rights and directive 
principles of state policy. In fact, the Indian Constitution has also added in 
1976 a new fart IV - A which deals With fundamental duties of the citizens. 
These fundamental duties are nothing but a charter of human duties which 
helps in promoting the human rights. India as also a party to the Universal 
Declaration of f Iuman Rights and has ratified the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights as well as the International Covenant on 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Ri4~hts, Ilowever, it has not ratified the 
Optional Protocols to the Covenant and Cis i1 and Political Rights. 
In order to find answers to the above mentioned questions, the present work 
has been divided in different Chapters, the scheme of which is as under: 
The First Chapter is "Introduction". It acquaints us with what is proposed 
to he done and how it is proposed to he done. It also deals with the 
importance of the research problem. the objective,, of the study. the 
hypothesis formulated and the methodology applied. 
Chapter II is related to the various provisions in the U.N. Charter relating 
to human rights. An attempt has also been made to study all the three 
generations of human rights as found in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and as they are further elaborated in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Right` and in the International Covenant 
on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights. The implementation mechanism 
under the said two Covenants has also been discussed; the two Optional 
Protocols to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have also been 
discussed. 
Chapter III is related to the constitutional scheme of human rights in India. 
An attempt has been made to show that how various provisions of the 
Indian Constitution correspond to the International Bill of Iluman Rights 
and to show further that all the three generations of human rights have 
been raised to the status of suprema lex. The need and role of the national 
institutions such an Ombudsman and National Iluman Rights Commission 
has been highlighted. The provisions of Iluman Rights Protection Act 
1993, have been analyze. 
Chapter IV is related to the role of Judicial S\ stem in India and Judicial 
Activism. This starts with the discussion of the position of the India 
judiciary in relation %k ith the socio-political development of the country. It 
vii 
explains the areas where the Supreme Court and also the Subordinate 
Courts can contribute. 
Chapter V depicts the judicial activism and human rights in India. In this 
Chapter, an attempt has been made to shark the judicial interpretation has 
made it possible for the people to enjoy the human rights. 
The Sixth and last chapter titled "Conclusions and Suggestions" evaluates 
the entire study and also proposes an agenda in the Corm cat suggestions 
and recommendations to the policy makers for better promotion and 
protection of Hunan Rights. 
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Chapter - I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Background 
India lies largely on the Indian Plate, the northern portion of the lndo-
Australian Plate, whose continental crust forms the Indian subcontinent. The 
country is situated north of the equator between 8°4' and 37°6 north latitude 
and 68°7' and 97°25' east longitude. [II It is the seventh-largest country in the 
world, with a total area of 3.287 24O square kilometers (1 269,21O sq mi).[2] 
India measures 3,214 km (1.997 rni) from north to south and 2,933 km ( 1.822 
mi) from cast to west. It has a land frontier of 15,20O km (9,445 mi) and a 
coastline of 7.517 knl (4.671 mi).(3j 
Many of lawful and institutional organs have tremendous influences of the 
formal British colonial ruler as well as of its historical background. The 
Constitution of India is the Supreme I.aw of India. It lays clown the framework 
defining fundamental political principle, establishes the structure, procedures, 
powers. and duties of government institutions, and sets out fundamental rights. 
directive principles, and the duties of citizens. It is the longest [41  written 
constitution of any sovereign country in the world, containing 444 (Note I) 
articles in 22 parts, 12 schedules and 1 I8 amendments. Besides the Hindi 
version. there is an official English translation. Dr R.R. Amhedkar is widely 
known as the father of the Indian Constitution. The Constitution was adopted 
b}' the Constituent Assembly on 26 November 1949, and came into effect on 
26 January 1950. (5] The date 26 January was chosen to commemorate the 
Purna Swaraj declaration of independence of 1930. With its adoption, the 
Union of India officially became the modern and contemporary Republic of 
India and it replaced the Government of India Act 1935 as the country's 
fundamental governing document. To ensure constitutional autochthony. the 
constitutional framers inserted Article 395 in the constitution and by this 
Article the Indian Independence Act, 1947 was repealed.[6J The Constitution 
declares India to be a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic. 
assuring its citizens of justice, equality, and liberty, and endeavors to promote 
fraternity among them.171 The words "socialist" and "secular" were added to 
the definition in 1976 by constitutional amendment(mini constitution).(8llndia 
celebrates the adoption of the constitution on 26 January each year as Republic 
Day.(91 However, the Constitution of India has declared in the preamble that. 
"it shall be a fundamental intend of the state to realize through the democratic 
process a socialist society, free from exploitation. A society in which, the rule of 
law, fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and justice, political, 
economic, and social rights will he secured for all citizens." The human 
rights protection of India has its root in the commitment of its independence 
movement, which directly relates with the liberation of Indian people as they 
had faced enormous exploitation by the British ruler. More or less, it is the 
center point of creation of the State is to realize the rights of the citizens. So, 
the Constitution itself has declared human rights provisions very expressly 
with human rights provisions those are taken from international human rights 
documents. Rather the state is duty bound to realize those rights progressively, 
which are basically economic, social, and cultural rights. I-Ience. there is no 
time barrier for the state to realize those rights. This is creating a scope for the 
state to act as violator of those rights rather protector. As these are not 
judicially enforceable, so the victims cannot get the remedies in this case. It is 
comprehensible that Indian Constitution is very expressive to make the human 
rights and the fundamental rights under the Constitution. means rights are 
inviolable. These rights are to be enforced by the Supreme Court of India. 
The thesis will explain the nature of implementation of these rights by the 
judiciary to assess its role to protect human rights. The research will explain 
the influence of judiciary on good governance since human rights protection is 
only effective in an environment where good governance is ensured. It is 
undeniable that an efficacious judiciary plays a vital role in good governance. 
To be efficacious the judiciary must be fully independent to discharge its 
duties with complete impartiality or without fear or favor. This thesis will 
argue that the Supreme Court of India with its Constitutional authority and 
broad jurisdiction can play the vital role to address the human rights issues 
more than any other governmental organ in terms of effectiveness and 
innovativeness. however, there are limitations towards its effectiveness, 
including political influences, conservative interpretation of legal provisions, 
and lack of judicial independence. So the aini of this thesis is to identify the 
potentials and the barriers towards reaching these potentials. It could he done 
through the active role of the Supreme Court of India expanding its legal 
authority by making the broad interpretation of the Constitutional provisions. 
The Constitutional history and the development of the jurisprudence suggest 
that the judiciary has played quite an impressive role in a democratic 
government. It has also developed its jurisdiction so as to play a proactive role. 
Firstly this thesis will focus on the role of the Indian Judicial System and 
secondly to try to assess its effectiveness to protect human rights. In doing so, 
certain structural concepts will be investigated, Such as problems in 
organizational structure of the judiciary. appointment of judges, judicial 
independence, and delay in settlement. On the other hand, this thesis will 
explain the problems that the Supreme Court in India is facing in certain areas 
of human rights protection. In this regards apart from the above structural 
problems. this thesis will bring up issues such as limited access for the poor, 
the position on international human rights standards, and also address human 
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rights norms in national laws. Moreover, this thesis will explain the efficiency 
of the Supreme Court in protecting the rights of the marginalized section of 
society, the right to sate environment, and public health. Furthermore, the 
reasons of such protection find support in explaining the grounds of flexible 
interpretation of constitutional provisions. To this end, in order to explaining 
the comprehensive glance at the Judiciary's role in human rights protection and 
judicial activism, this research will also cover the historical development of the 
Indian judiciary system. judge's motivation in the application of laws, and 
initiatives from civil society and media. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Creswell (1994) and Pajares (2007) stated that problem statement is the issue 
that exists in the literature, theory or practice that leads to the need for a study 
and when put clearly should answer the question: 'Why does this research need 
to be conducted'?' [ 10111 11 
Today world's faces one of the great problems called as the violation of human 
rights. In present scenario the life of human beings is threatened by various 
types of human rights violations both at the individual level as well as at the 
international level. Ilu►nanity is suffering from mental tension, mutual distrust. 
dissatisfaction and scarcity of peace and pleasure in life. In this age of 
globalization, increasing competition, materialism, and loss of spiritual and 
moral values have turned man into egoist, brutish, selfish and violent. Violence 
caused the denial of the most fundamental human right, the 'right to life', in 
other words, the right to live with peace. Today the increasing violence in the 
society destructs the peace of individual and social life. The more recent 
phenomenon of terrorism has brought the world to the edge of destruction. It is 
one the great causes of human rights violation in the contemporary world. 
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Most of the people are still living in terror in many parts of India and the world 
because terrorist attacks can break out at any time and from any corner. People 
have no security in their lives. Why this situation is going on in a democratic 
set up? All persons have the right to live with peace so that they can fully 
develop all their capacities, physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual, without 
being the target of any kind of violence. Violence breeds violence and leaves 
behind a legacy of bitterness, hatred, ill-will, revenge, enmity, suppression and 
oppression and gives rise to counter violence. Hence violence must be 
eradicated from the individual and the society to restore the human rights of 
all. Although the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights came into 
existence about 56 years ago. but till date we can't say that every citizen of 
India enjoys the rights contained in this declaration'? Even today millions of 
people in the world are left without enough food, proper clothing and secure 
shelter. 
Thousands of unemployed youth are looking for a job. In India too, the 
condition is not better. The majority of the people were denied even the 
fundamental rights. Labourers are treated as slaves; their women are molested 
and exploitation of the masses is rampant. The foundation norm governing the 
concept of Human Rights is that of the respect for human personality and its 
absolute worth, regardless of colour, race, sex, religion, or other 
considerations. These rights are essential for the full development of the human 
personality and for human happiness. Undoubtedly the concept of human 
rights has always been regarded as the backbone of every democratic set up. 
To assure the fundamental rights Of the people is the fundamental duty of a 
democratic system. The area of human rights violation is mainly focused on 
women and children and the downtrodden people of the society such as dalits 
and tribals. For the protection and promotion of human rights, we have human 
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Rights Protection Act. SC/ST Atrocities Act, Practice of Untouchability Act, 
Protection of Civil Liberties Act, etc. But the problem is that, the people are 
not acting according to the Act.l 12 y Why such a situation still exists in the 
present day society? Ilow can we restore our Fundamental inalienable right, 
the right to live with dignity? 
The present study is concerned with Judicial Activism and Protection of 
Human Rights. The Judicial activism and protection of human rights and also 
to discuss the problems faced by Judicial system to protect the human rights 
and to stop the violation of human rights in all areas. Thus the main focus is on 
judicial activism and through this protection of human rights violations and 
measures needed to solve these problems come under the purview of this 
study. 
1.3 Objectives of the Research 
This research has the specific objective to analyze the relationship of the 
judicial activism and protection of human rights in India. In order to analyze 
the relationship there is a need to focus on a broader area. 
1. To analyze the role of the Supreme Court of India to protect human 
rights. 
2. To determine the limitations of the Judiciary of India to protect human 
rights, from the perspective of legal and socio-political realities. 
3. To find the possible ways through which the Judicial Activism of India 
could ensure the human rights of under-privileged individuals or groups. 
4. To specify the influencing factors that affect the role of the Judicial 
Activism in protecting human rights. 
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5. To evaluate the effectiveness of the remedy provided by the courts in 
cases of violation of human right. 
6. To find out, imperfections. if any in the present court practices and 
make suitable suggestions for better protection of human right. 
1.4 Research Questions 
This study focuses on the judicial activism and protection of human rights in 
India, and will address the following research questions: 
1. What are the procedures established by law or by the Judiciary system 
to protect human rights? 
2. What are the fair procedure and public interest litigation to protect 
human rights, from the perspective of legal and socio-political 
realities? 
3. What are the possible ways to protect human dignity and protection 
against exploitation through the Judicial Activism of India and could 
ensure the human rights of bonded labour and children? 
4. What are the influencing factors that affect the Judicial Activism in 
protecting human rights'' 
5. What are legitimate and legal efforts to ensure the Right to Live in 
Healthy Environment? 
The above mentioned points have been examined for the purpose of study. The 
researcher intends to find out an applicable solution to the above mentioned 
problems. Analytical study of the above mentioned problems has been carried 
out for this study on protection of Human Rights. 
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1.5 Relevance of the Study 
In today's world people's lives are constantly and rapidly deteriorating below 
decent subsistence. The vast majority of humanity is crawling in poverty, 
economic backwardness and oppression. There is more violence and there are 
more jobless, poor, sick, hungry and illiterate in this era than in any tune in 
history. In a democratic set up violence causes deterioration of the dignity of 
life of the people. Every citizen has the right to dignity in life. The growing 
unemployment, economic insufficiency, poverty etc, are the challenges 
threatening the dignity of life of the people. How many people know that they 
have acquired by birth precious fundamental freedoms and rights which cannot 
be denied to them even by the mighty slate? The reality is that there are 
thousands of people who have not even heard of them. It is imperative to create 
awareness on human rights among the oppressed and exploited as it is the 
strongest defense against human rights violations. Violation of human rights 
remains as a blot on democracy. Who can remove the blot and cleanse the 
democracy through the restoration of the rights of all? The state or the laws 
alone cannot protect the rights of the people. But the moral citizens can play an 
important role in this regard. For that, there is need for restructuring the .social 
system on the basis of love, non-violence, truth, freedom and equality. Without 
these moral principles, no society can safeguard the rights of all. The 
implementation of human rights is closely related the betterment of the human 
condition individually and collectively. These are essential for human progress. 
Rights may be justified as being inalienable, transcendental, and absolute. 
Without them a man cannot realize his sell or contribute to the good of the 
society in which he lives. The legal provisions regarding human rights only 
cannot protect human rights, but the law with morality and the interpretation of 
the law must change with changing times can safeguard the rights of all. In this 
VJ 
context. the Gandhian perspective on human rights is very relevant in the 
modern world. 
1.6 Scope of the Research 
This research will mainly contribute to the understanding of the Judiciary's role 
in protecting human rights. It finds a wider discussion in the judicial activism 
in India. The research will give the socio-political background as well as its 
impact on the development of the judiciary in India. The broader discussion of 
the research will give a clear understanding about the current level of human 
rights violations that could he addressed by the judiciary. It will be useful to 
have knowledge about the unique role of the Supreme Court of India regarding 
human rights protection since it is working in a distorted political environment. 
Socio-legal analysis will show the continuous unorthodox practice of' the 
judiciary, the Bar and the Bench. 
This research will also discuss the available tools that are used by the Supreme 
Court for protecting human rights. The authority and area of the writ 
jurisdiction could be useful for this purpose and made understandable from this 
research. A writ is a type of suit or a tool of the Supreme Court through which 
people can claim their rights that could be declared by the authority of the 
Supreme Court. However, the evolution of the proactive role of the Supreme 
Court will be made explicable by this research in that it will show the obstacles 
towards pro-activeness. It will also provide information about the range of "suo 
muto" practice by the Supreme Court of India. This study will analyze the 
application of the human rights standards by the Supreme Court's decisions. In 
doing so, it will explain the authority of local tradition and practices in the 
judgments of the I ligher Judiciary. The increase in of Public Interest Litigation 
(PIL) in India and its importance will be interpreted in this research. The 
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importance of the protection of individual as well as group rights by the 
Judiciary of India will also be interpreted in this research. By in large, this is a 
contribution to the society. 
1.7 Research Methodology 
It is a doctrinal and exploratory research* based on the study of Books, 
Reports, Journals, Magazines, Legislative and Judicial pronouncements, 
declarations, conventions. treaties and information available on internet and 
with other databases of the organization and NGOs etc. For this researcher 
visited libraries of various institutions, to consult the journal and books of 
learned authors. 
* Exploratory research often relies on secondary research such as 
reviewing available literature and/or data, or qualitative approaches such 
as informal discussions with consumers, employees, management or 
competitors, and more formal approaches through in-depth interviews, 
focus groups, projective methods, case studies or pilot studies. The 
Internet allows for research methods that are more interactive in nature. 
Exploratory research is a form of research conducted for a problem that 
has not been clearly defined. Exploratory research helps determine the 
best research design, data collection method and selection of subjects. It 
should draw definitive conclusions only with extreme caution. Given its 
fundamental nature, exploratory research often concludes that a 
perceived problem does not actually exist. 
Sources of Secondary Data 
The sources of secondary data arc various documents that are used to support 
different perspectives. The nature of the research is legal. So. the documentary 
analysis includes an intensive overview of existing laws, literature related with 
to 
the Judiciary. judicial system of India and legal case. The research tends to 
focus on the scope of the judicial activism involvement in addressing the 
human rights issues and its protections. To this end. hooks and articles, both 
domestic and international, journals and speeches on Supreme Court and its 
activism, are included as the source of documents. Policy documents, existing 
national laws, jurisprudence, reports of the United Nations treaty bodies, and 
the concluding observations, are other documents used for the research. 
Researcher started the research with the selection of proper sources of the 
important documents. To this end, the availability of the document was the 
prime concern. Part of the research methodology required fieldwork in India 
especially northern part of India due to time constraints and financial scarcity. 
Sufficient time was spent in the field to find appropriate books and references. 
The potential sources of books, journals, case laws and judicial decisions are 
from the Public libraries and libraries of the INU, DU and AMU Aligarh. I 
also access the information held by NGOs. The Internet and proper 
equipment is also a part of the data collection process. Most of the United 
Nations (UN) documents are available on Internet and therefore easily 
accessible. 
Key Informants Interviews 
The interview acts as the source of the primary data. It is nearly impossible to 
get sufficient information on the role of the judicial activism as a human rights 
protector due to the nature of the data. Therefore interviews arc used as the 
primary source of data. Several interviews were conducted with people from 
different groups namely, judges and lawyers, media personals, members of 
civil society and NGOs', and victims. The judges and lawyers who have been 
interviewed are working in the Supreme Court of India. The media 
representatives deal with the court issues and do cover court reporting. Civil 
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society representatives and \GO members arc involved with PIL. In other 
words, they are well aware of the activities of the Judiciary and judicial 
system of India, especially about the protection of human rights that acts as 
the source of primary data. The interviews were semi-  structured. Questions 
were asked on specific topics rather than preparing a particular set of 
questions. Questions were adjusted according to the need in research, and also 
to match it with the nature of the research. The interviewees were mainly 
asked questions on the following topics together with supplementary questions. 
• The role of the Judiciary of India in protecting human rights. 
• The situations of representative suit and class action of the Supreme 
Court. 
• The problems that are faced by the Supreme Court to protect human 
rights. 
• The influencing factors that could make the Supreme Court an active 
court. 
• The accessibility and allordability of the Judiciary to people who are 
vulnerable. 
• Relationship of Judicial Activism and Protection of Human Rights 
Before interviewing, researcher explained the total issue of the research 
and its background. interviews were conducted with the full consent on the 
interviewees. 
1.8 Universe of the Study 
The universe of the study can be the entire world and all the human beings in 
it. But it is nearly impossible to conduct such an exhaustive study within a 
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stipulated time. We are mainly conecmcd about the people of India and their 
rights. More importance to the role of human rights and to promote of the 
dignity and worth in human life is given. Thus the interpretation of the law 
must change with changing times or judicial activism perspective for the 
protection of human rights is given importance. Hence researcher limits this 
study tojudicial activism to protect the human rights activities in India. 
1.9 Conceptual Definitions of the Study 
Distinguish between Judichil Activism in India and Judicial Review 
The interpretational and observer role of the Judiciary over the Legislature is 
called Judicial Review (JR). The judiciary is the final authority for the 
interpretation of constitution in India. The Judiciary can prevent it by 
declaring the act or action ultra-virus, if the Legislature transgresses the 
powers given to it by the constitution. This power is called JR. While Judicial 
Activism (JA) is the concept how actively and quickly the judiciary performs 
the act of JR. the readiness that the courts have achieved in exercising its 
power to uphold the values of the constitution have been generally come to 
the extent that JR has gradually acquired the form of Judicial Activism (JA) in 
India.113] 
JA is the extent and the vigour and the readiness with which courts 
exercise their power of JR. So, there is a marked difference between both of 
them. Courts have actively performed an interventionist role and that we have 
witnessed the phenomenon of JA. The courts have over thrown or at least 
liberalized the concept of locust stand to allow any public spirited person or 
organisation to bring to the notice of the court any matter of injustice and 
violation of constitutional rights of any downtrodden and unprivileged classes 
of society. The court has expanded the scope and amplitude of Article 21 to 
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cover many basic rights under it, so that giving them the status of fundamental 
rights; they can be enforced against the state also, even by PIL. Another factor 
which contributed to the JA was the expansive judicial interpretation placed 
on the expression life in Article. 
1lttmcut Rights 
For the purpose of present study, the definition of the term 'human Rights' as 
given under Section 2(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 of 
India is taken into consideration. Section 2(d) of the Act defines 'Human 
Rights' means the rights relating to life, liberty equality and dignity of the 
individual guaranteed by the constitution or embodied in the International 
Covenants and enforceable by courts in India".f 141 
1.10 Organization of the Study 
In order to find answers to the above mentioned questions, the present work 
has been divided in different Chapters, the scheme of which is as under: 
The First Chapter is "Introduction". It acquaints us with what is proposed to 
be done and how it is proposed to be done. It also deals with the importance 
of the research problem. the objectives of the study, the hypothesis formulated 
and the methodology applied. 
Chapter II is related to the various provisions in the U.N. Charter relating to 
human rights. An attempt has also been made to study all the three 
generations of human rights as found in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and as they are further elaborated in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and in the International Covenant on Economic. 
Social and Cultural Rights. The implementation mechanism under the said 
two Covenants has also been discussed, the two Optional Protocols to the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have also been discussed. 
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Chapter III is related to the constitutional scheme of human rights in India. An 
attempt has been made to show that how various provisions of the Indian 
Constitution correspond to the International 13111 of human Rights and to 
show further that all the three generations of human rights have been raised to 
the status of suprema Icx. The need and role of the national institutions such 
an Ombudsman and National Human Rights Commission has been 
highlighted. The provisions of Human Rights Protection Act 1993, have been 
analyze. 
Chapter IV is related to the role of Judicial System in India and Judicial 
Activism. This starts with the discussion of the position of the India judiciary 
in relation with the socio-political development of the country. It explains the 
areas where the Supreme Court and also the Subordinate Courts can 
contribute. 
Chapter V depicts the judicial activism and human rights in India. In this 
Chapter, an attempt has been made to show the judicial interpretation has 
made it possible for the people to enjoy the human rights. 
The Sixth and last chapter titled "Conclusions and Suggestions" evaluates the 
entire study and also proposes an agenda in the form of suggestions and 
recommendations to the policy makers for better promotion and protection of 
Human Rights. 
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Chapter - II 
THE INTERNATIONAL 
BILL OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
i HESIS 
2.1 Introduction 
With the increased attention for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the 
international human rights discussion takes a wider dimension and is gaining in 
depth. The modern human rights jurisprudence can be called as post World 
War Il phenomenon. The "monstrous violation" of human rights during the 
Second World War and the belief that some of these human rights violations 
could have been prevented if there had been some effective international 
system for the protection of human rights, formed the basis for inclusion of 
certain human rights clauses in the United Nations Charter. The events which 
occurred immediately before and during the Second World War were mainly 
responsible for inclusion of human rights clauses in the United Nations 
Charter. This is evident from the very first paragraph of the Preamble of the 
Charter of United Nations which says "WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS determined to save succeeding generations from the scour age of 
war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind." In 
other words, the human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter reflect 
the reaction of the international community to the horrors of war and the 
regimes which unleashed it. In fact, the experience of the Second World War 
resulted in the widespread conviction that the effective international protection 
of human rights was an essential condition of international peace and progress. 
This was evident from the various statements, declarations and proposals made 
while the war was still being fought. As early as 1941, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. in his famous "Four Freedoms" speech called for "a world founded 
upon four essential human freedoms". These he identified as (i) freedom of 
speech and expression, (ii) freedom of every person to worship God in his own 
way, (iii) freedom from want and (iv) freedom from fear. (1 I These 
fundamental freedoms had a tremendous effect in the framing of the United 
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Nations Charter. In the Atlantic Charter of 14 August 1941, which was later 
subscribed to and endorsed by 47 nations, the President of the United States of 
America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom expressed the hope "to 
see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling 
in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all 
men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want." 
In 1944, the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations took place between the 
then four super powers, i.e.. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United 
States of America, the United Kingdom and China. This was the first concrete 
step towards the creation of a general international organization. As a result of 
these conversations Dumbarton Oaks proposals were drafted which 
contemplated the establishment of an international organization under the title 
of "The United Nations" which would, among other things. "facilitate solutions 
of international economic, social and other,)"humanitarian problems and 
promote respect for human rights-and fundamental freedoms". These proposals 
formed the basis of the work of the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization, which opened in San Francisco on 25 April, 1945. The San 
Francisco conference added several new human rights clauses to the 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals in its preparation of the final version of the 
Charter. The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945 in San 
Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945. The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice is an integral part of the Charter. The human 
rights clauses which ultimately found their way into the Charter of the United 
Nations fell far short of the expectations that Roosevelt's vision and the 
wartime rhetoric had created. 121The reason was obvious. The main super 
powers which played a dominant role in the San Francisco Conference had 
1x 
human rights problems of their own. For example, the United Stated had the 
problem of racial discrimination, whereas United Kingdom had the problem of 
colonial empire. Nevertheless the United Nations Charter has laid down the 
foundation of modern international Human Rights Laws. 
2.2 U.N Charter and Human Rights 
The United Nations Charter refers to human rights in its Preamble and six 
other articles. In the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, the People 
of the United Nations expressed their determination "to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity, and worth of human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and........ 
"To promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom." 
Thus, the Preamble to the charter in most sonorous terms recognizes the human 
rights and the dignity and worth of the human being, which were most 
flagrantly violated (luring the two World Wars. The Preamble of' the United 
Nations begins with the words. "We the people of the United Nations". These 
words are neither superfluous nor have crept in the preamble incidentally. They 
are very meaningful. They indicate the objectives which the framers of the 
Charter wanted to achieve. 
The purposes of the United Nation's are proclaimed in article I of the Charter. 
Article 1(2) provides: "To develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self= determination of peoples, and 
to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace ". 
Article l (3) further provides: "To achieve international co-operation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian 
character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
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fitndumental freedoms for till without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion ". 
Thus, once again we find that the underlined purpose of the United 
Nations Charter is to promote and encourage human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The words "based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self 
determination of peoples" in article 1(2) and the words 'in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion" were not in the 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals but were introduced in Sari Francisco. Article 1 
puts the promotion of respect for human rights on the same level as the 
maintenance of international peace and security as a purpose of the United 
Nations. It is also recognition of the reality that the entire mankind is after all 
one organic whole and that a denial of human dignity and liberty, anywhere is 
a threat to peace and security everywhere. The basic obligations of the 
Organization and its Member States in achieving these purposes are set out in 
articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter. 
Article 55 of the U.N. Charter provides: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and wellbeing which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United 
Nations shall promote: 
(a) Higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of 
economic and social progress and development; 
(b) Solutions of international economic, social, health, and related 
problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; 
and 
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(c) Universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion. 
Article 56 provides: 
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth 
in Article 55. 
Thus, United Nations undertake to 'promote" universal respect for, and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. Under the 
Charter of the United Nations the responsibility of 'promoting' universal 
respect for and the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms is on 
the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. Under Article 56 
of the Charter, all Members "pledge" themselves to take joint and separate 
action for the purpose of article 55 of the Charter. 
The General Assembly is empowered under article 13(1) (b) to initiate studies 
and make recommendations for the purpose of: '`promoting international co-
operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and 
nsvisiins in the realization of human rights and fatdltmenrn! freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion ". 
Similar powers are conferred by the Charter of UN on Economic and Social 
Council under article 62 which provides: 
(I) The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and 
reports 	with respect 	to 	international economic, 	social, cultural, 
educational, health, 	and 	related matters 	and 	may make 
recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General 
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Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized 
agencies concerned.  
(2) It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. 
(3) It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General 
Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its competence. 
(4) It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United 
Nations, international conferences on matters falling within its 
competence. (Emphasis added) Further with regard to the 
recornmendations it is provided in article 64(l) of the UN Charter that 
the Economic and Social Council may take appropriate steps to obtain 
regular reports from the specialized agencies. It may make arrangements 
with the Members of the United Nations and with the specialized 
agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to its own 
recommendations and to recommendations on matters falline within its 
competence made by the General Assembly. 
Article 68 empowers the Economic and Social Council to set up, inter ilia, 
"Commissions" on human rights. It provides: The Economic and Social 
Council shall set up Commissions in economic and social fields and for the 
promotion of human rights, and such other Commissions as may be required 
for the performance of its Junctions". 
Consequent upon this provision the Economic and Social Council has. inter 
alto, established the. "Commission on Human Rights", the "Commission on the 
Status of Women" and the "Sub- Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities". In Chapter Xl relating to declaration regarding 
non-self-governing territories, articles 73 provides that the "Members of the 
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United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of 
territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-
government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these 
territories arc paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote 
to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established 
by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, 
and, to this end secure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples 
concerned, their political, economic. social and educational advancement, their 
first treatment and their protection against abuses." With regard to the 
dependent territories, article 76 of the U'' Charter provides that one of the 
basic objectives of the Trusteeship System in accordance with the purposes of 
the United Nations laid down in article I of the Charter shall be: 
(a)... 
(b)_. 
(c) to encourage respect for human rights and forfiinc1amenlulfi eedums for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language; or religion and to encourage 
recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world. 
It may be pointed out here that the Charter of the United Nations though 
makes reference to "human rights" and 'fundamental freedoms" in the 
preamble and various other provisions, as mentioned above, yet it did not 
define what is meant by "human rights" and "fundamental freedoms". 
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, under the Charter the responsibility for 
promoting the "human rights" and "fundamental freedoms" is assigned to the 
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council and their resolutions 
are not legally binding. This raised some doubts about the importance of 
mentioning "human rights" and "fundamental freedoms" in the U.N. Charter. 
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Monley Hudson was of the opinion that "the Charter was limited to 
setting out a programme of action for the Organization of the United Nations to 
pursue in which the members are pledged to co-operate. Ile went to the extent 
of asserting that an interpretation construing the relevant provisions of the 
Charter as imposing upon the members of the United Nations, the Legal 
obligation to respect human rights and freedoms may act in the direction of 
disintegrating the Charter. 141 According to Hans Keison. The Charter does 
not impose upon the members a strict Obligation to grant to their subjects, the 
rights and freedoms mentioned in the Preamble or in the text of the Charter. 
The language used by the Charter in this respect does not allow the 
interpretation that the members are under legal Obligations regarding the rights 
and freedoms of their subjects". [5] On the other hand, the significance of 
mentioning human rights in the United Nations Charter can be best described 
in the following words of Lauterpacht For its goals. the United Nations 
programme, is heir to all the great historic movements for man's freedom 
(including the British, American and French revolutions and the events they set 
in train to the enduring elements in the tradition of natural law and natural 
rights and in most of the world's great religions and philosophies, and to the 
interrelations of simple respect for human dignity and all other individual and 
community values". [6] 
Lauterpacht is of the opinion that since the provisions of the Charter of the 
human rights figure prominently in the statement of the purposes of the United 
Nations and it us, the members of the United Nations are under a legal 
obligation to act m accordance with these purposes. It is their duty to respect 
and. Observe fundamental human rights and freedoms. [7] It may he pointed 
out here that all the members of the United Nations, under article 56 of the 
Charter "pledge" themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation 
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with the Organization for the achievement of purposes set out in article 55 of 
the Charter which, inter a/ia, includes universal respect for, and observance of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. In a way every member state is 
under an obligation to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms not 
only of its own nationals but of all the people. In the view of Ian Brownlie. "as 
treaty provisions applicable to the Organization and its members these 
prescriptions are of paramount importance. 181 Thus, articles 55 and 56 of the 
U.N. Charter bind member States to observe and respect human rights and 
fundamental freedom for all. This view is also supported by the interpretation 
of these provisions as given by the International Court of Justice. [9] 
According to Justice Tanaka, "the repeated references in the Charter to 
fundamental rights and freedoms ... presents itself as one of its differences 
from the Covenant of the League of Nations. in which the existence of intimate 
relationships between peace and respect for human rights were not so keenly 
felt as in the Charter of the United Nations. However, the Charter did not go so 
far as to give the definition to the fundamental rights and freedoms nor to 
provide any machinery of implementation for the protection and guarantee of 
these rights and freedoms". He further expressed his view by observing: "From 
the provisions of the Charter referring to the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms it can be inferred that the legal obligation to respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms is imposed on member States". [ 101 
It was also argued that article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the United 
Nations "to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter". and thus reduces the role of the United 
Nations in the protection of Human Rights to a minimum. However this view 
does not seem to be correct and the question of "domestic jurisdiction" does 
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not arise in the case of implementation of the provisions of Human Rights 
Covenants.(ll] Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms have become the 
subject of a solemn international obligation and a fundamental purpose of the 
Charter. Thus, they are not any longer a matter which is essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the members of the United Nations. In the modern 
world it would be quite absurd to assert that a massive or systematic violation 
of human rights or fundamental freedoms by the State of its own national is a 
matter within its exclusive "domestic jurisdiction". Thus, one of the most 
important consequences of incorporating human rights clauses in the UN 
Charter was to "internationalize human rights. 
According to Buergenthal. the second consequence of having human 
rights clauses in the U.N. Charter was that the  obligation of the Member 
States of the U.N. to co-operate with the Organization in the promotion of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms provided the UN with the requisite 
legal authority to undertake a massive effort to define and codify these rights. 
That effort is reflected in the adoption of the International Bill of Human 
Rights and numerous other human rights instruments in existence today. [12] 
Today, if any Member State violates the internationally recognized human 
rights, it can be said that it is acting contrary to the U.N. Charter, The United 
Nations has sought to enforce the obligation of the Member States "to promote 
and encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms For all", 
with resolutions calling on specific states to stop such violations and by 
empowering the UN Commission on human Rights and its subsidiary bodies 
to establish procedures to review allegations of such violations. 
However, it is important to note that the Charter nowhere grants any right to 
the individual which he can maintain against an oppressor. Furthermore, the 
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Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is an integral part of the 
Charter, expressly provides that only States may be parties in cases before the 
Court. 113] Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, violation of the human rights of 
an individual is no more considered to be domestic affair. Now the protection 
and promotion of human rights have become art integral part of the modern 
international law and it has led to the development of anew human rights 
jurisprudence. At this place it may be relevant to refer '1503 procedure" 
which enables, an individual to complain to the United Nations' when his or 
her case is not covered by a United Nations treaty. In 1970, the Economic and 
Social Council passed Resolution 1503. which as implemented by the 1971 
Resolution of the Sub- Commission, does not establish an individual petition 
system. Although individuals have standing to file petitions, their cause of 
action is based on a showing of "a consistent pattern of gross and reliably 
attested violations". The procedure is thus applicable' to large-scale or 
systematic denials of human rights rather than to violations of one individuals' 
rights. However, if one or series of individual cases are systematic of the large-
scale violations taking place in a particular country, they would he covered 
under the "1503 procedure". Under the 1503 procedure, it is not necessary that 
the petitioner himself or herself is the victim of the violation of human rights. 
It is sufficient that he or she has "direct and reliable knowledge of those 
violations". Even Non-Governmental Organizations may also submit 
communications. However, it is necessary for the petitioner to show that 
domestic remedies have been exhausted unless it appears that such remedies 
would be ineffective or unreasonably prolonged. 
On 13 August, 1971. the Sub-Commission adopted Resolution XXIV/1, which 
establishes specific procedures for the application, of ECOSOC Resolution 
1503, The most important aspect of the Resolution is that it provides, in setting 
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standards and criteria admissibility of the petition which is asunder: " The 
communication shall he admissible only if ... there an reasonable grounds to 
believe that they reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of 
racial discrimination and segregation and of apartheid. in any country, 
including colonial and. other dependent countries and peoples". 
Thus, according to this procedure, whenever any complaint of human 
rights violation is received by the United Nations, the Sub-Commission is 
authorized to establish a small working group to examine the petition or 
complaint received by the U.N. and to identify whether it "appears to reveal 
consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms" within the terms of reference of the Sub-Commission. 
A copy of the complaint is forwarded to the government concerned which may 
submit a reply. The name of the complainant is withheld unless he or she has 
no objection to its being made public or known to the government. A Summary 
is made at the same time and sent confidentially to the members of the 
Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The reply of the government 
along with the complaint of human rights violation is then considered in 
private by a working group of the Sub-Commission. Those which appear to 
reveal consistent pattern of "gross and reliably attested violations are referred 
by the working group to the sub-commission itself .This In turn is forwarded to 
the Commission on Human Rights for information on gross violation of human 
rights. The Commission with the help of its own working group decides 
whether to car out a thorough study of the situation or to appoint a special 
committee rapporteur to investigate the violation of human rights as alleged in 
the complaint. 
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All the matters dealt with under this procedure are confidential until the 
ECOSOC decides otherwise. However, the names of the countries dealt with 
by the Commission in confidential meetings are announced each year. The 
confidentiality aspect of the 1503 procedure has been one of the greatest 
defects. Because the petitioner is not even, keep informed about the status of 
the communication beyond the initial acknowledgement of its receipt. 
However, thousands of letters complaining about the human right~ violations 
are received by the United Nations every year, where they are dealt with by the 
Commission on Human Rights under the 1503 Procedure. 
Thus, the provisions of the United Nation Charter concerning human 
rights provide a foundation for and Impetus to further improvement in the 
protection of human rights. 
2.3 The International Bill of Human Rights 
There are seven specific references in the Charter of the United Nations to 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. But the Charter nowhere defines or 
catalogues them. At the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization, held at San Francisco in 1945. the delegation of Chile, Cuba, 
Mexico and Panama had proposed that the Conference should adopt a 
"Declaration of the Essential Rights of Man". The Conference, however, did 
not deal with the proposal because it required a detailed consideration for 
which time was not available. The concern of the San Francisco Conference 
for the "International Bill of Rights" was evident from the closing speech of 
President Truman who stated: "We have good reasons to expect the framing of 
an international bill of rights; acceptable to all nations involved ... The Charter 
is dedicated to the achievement and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Unless we can attain those objectives for all men and 
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women everywhere--- without regard to race, language, or religion-we cannot 
have permanent peace and security'. [14] 
The San Francisco Conference did include in the Charter an article 68 by 
which the Economic and Social Council was instructed to set up a Commission 
for the promotion of human rights, and although there was no mention in the 
article of such a mandate it was generally understood that this Commission 
would draft an international bill of rights. [15] 
In accordance with the principles of the Charter, the competent organs of the 
United Nations strove to formulate an international bill of human rights and to 
define the scope and extent of the inherent rights of man. Because of the 
heterogeneous character of the United Nations, this task was not an easy one. It 
required an arduous work. At the first part of the first session of the General 
Assembly in 1946 in London, the General Committee decided not to include in 
the Assembly's agenda the proposal by Panama that it should discuss the 
question: of a "Declaration on Fundamental Human Rights and the Rights and 
Duties of the Nations", The representatives of Panama thereupon submitted a 
draft on "Declaration of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms" and 
requested that the same be placed on the agenda for the second part of the 
Assembly's first session.[16] 
The Economic and Social Council established the Commission on Human 
Rights on 16th February 1946, in pursuance of article 68 of the U.N. Charter 
and instructed it to submit proposals, recommendations and reports regarding 
"an international bill of human rights". The Economic and Social Council had 
further requested the Commission to submit "suggestions regarding ways and 
means for the effective implementation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. I t 71 
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The General Assembly, on I I December 1946, in its 35 h` plenary 
meeting, decided to refer the draft on "Declaration of Fundamental Human 
Rights and Freedoms" to the Economic and Social Council for "reference to 
the Commission on Human Rights in its preparation of an international bill of 
human rights." The Commission on Human Rights held its session from 27 h` 
January to tOth February, 1947 under the Chairmanship of Mrs. Roosevelt of 
the United States. The most important business of the Commission was to draft 
the international bill of human rights. So far no decision had been taken as to 
'the form and contents of the international bill of human rights. There were 
several possibilities regarding the form and contents of the bill which were 
discussed by the Commission. It could be drafted as a resolution of the General 
Assembly or in effect a declaration but then it was discussed that it would only 
have the character of recommendation and would not be binding in 
international laws. It was also discussed that it could be drafted as multilateral 
convention binding on all states which ratified it. But then an apprehension 
was expressed that this might delay the whole process. The other alternative 
was to make the bill a part of the UN. Charter. However/this solution had 
already been rejected at the San Francisco Conference. It may be noted here 
that the Indian delegates strongly favored the drafting of the hill in the form of 
a convention so as to have a binding effect of it on the states which ratify it. 
The Commission in its first session only held a general discussion on the form 
and content of the international bill of human rights and made no attempt to 
draft it. However it appointed a committee of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and 
Rapporteur to prepare a preliminary draft of the international bill of human 
rights with the assistance of the Secretariat. The committee was required to 
submit the draft of the bill to the Commission at its second session. However, 
this decision was criticized in the Economic and Social Council on the ground 
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that there was no proper geographical distribution of members of the informal 
drafting group. The Chairman of the Commission, Mrs. Roosevelt, with the 
approval of the Council, altered the procedure for the preparation of the 
international bill of human rights. A new Drafting Committee of eight 
members of the Commission from eight different states, with due regard to 
geographical distribution, was constituted. The eight states were: Australia, 
Chile, China, France, the Lebanon, the United States, the United Kingdom and 
the Soviet Union. The Council asked the Secretariat to prepare a "documented 
outline" of the bill and called upon the new drafting committee to prepare a 
preliminary draft of the international bill of human rights on the basis of draft 
supplied by the Secretariat. 
The new Drafting Committee considered the question about the form and 
content of the international bill of human rights. Again two views were 
expressed. One was that the draft, in the first instance should take the form of a 
declaration; the other was that it should be in the form of a convention. Finally, 
it was agreed upon and accordingly the Drafting Committee decided to attempt 
to prepare two documents, i.e., one in the form of a declaration which would 
mention general principles of standards of human rights, and the other in the 
form of a convention which would specify and define rights and the limitations 
or restrictions on their enjoyment. Thus, accordingly, the Drafting Committee 
prepared and submitted to the Commission on human Rights draft articles of 
an international declaration on human rights and draft articles of an 
international convention on human rights. The Drafting Committee also 
considered the question of implementation of human rights and transmitted to 
the Commission on Human Rights a memorandum of the subject prepared by 
the Secretariat. 
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The Commission on Human Rights hold its second session in Geneva from 2 
December to 17 December. The Commission decided to apply the term 
"International Bill of Human Rights" to the entire series of documents in 
preparation and accordingly established three working groups, i.e., one on the 
declaration; one on the covenant and one on implementation. On the basis of 
the reports of the first two working groups, the Commission drafted a 
declaration of human rights and a covenant on human rights. These drafts were 
sent to governments for their suggestions, proposals and comments. After 
taking into consideration, the suggestions, proposals and comments of various 
governments, the Drafting Committee revised the draft declaration and the 
covenant. 
The declaration was once again redrafted by the Commission at its third 
session from 24 May to 16 June 1948 but it did not have sufficient time to 
consider the covenant and the question of implementation. The declaration 
was, therefore, submitted to the General Assembly, through the Economic and 
Social Councils [18] meeting in Paris from 21 September to 12 December, 
1948. On 10Decenrber 1948, the General Assembly adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as the first of these projected instruments. The 
General Assembly proclaimed it as "a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations." Thus, one great milestone had been achieved. It did 
not purport to set out a law but rather an ideal, towards which "every individual 
and every organ of Society.., shall strive.[19] However, the General Assembly 
was not satisfied with a mere declaration of human rights which did not have 
the legal force of a treaty. The next task of the United Nations, therefore, was 
to formulate a precise definition of human rights which could be embodied in a 
regular treaty open to signature and ratification and, thus, capable of being 
enforced. In 1948, the General Assembly requested the Commission to 
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prepare. as a matter of priority, a draft covenant on human rights and draft 
measures for implementation, which could not be taken up earlier due to lack 
of time. 
In 1949. the Commission, in its fifth session from 9 May to 20 June examined 
the draft covenant. In 1950, it revised the first eighteen articles on the basis of 
comments received from the governments. The Commission also decided that 
a permanent body, a Human Rights Committee, should be established which 
would receive any complaint by a State party to the covenant. It was also 
decided to secure the co-operation of specialized agencies in the drafting of 
articles on economic, social and cultural rights. 
In 1950, the General Assembly declared that "the enjoyment of civil and 
political freedoms and of economic, social and cultural rights is interconnected 
and interdependent. 1201  Thus, the General Assembly decided then to include 
in the covenant on human rights. economic, social and cultural rights and an 
explicit recognition of equality of men and wormer in related rights as set forth 
in the Charter. 
In 1951, the Commission at its seventh session, from 16 April to 19 May 1951, 
drafted 14 articles on economic, social and cultural rights on the basis of 
proposals made by the governments and suggestions given by the specialized 
agencies. It also formulated 10 articles on the measure of implementation of 
these rights under which State parties to the covenant would submit periodic 
reports regarding the observance of human rights. 
In 1952, the General Assembly, after a long debate, requested the Commission 
"to draft two covenants on human rights, one to contain civil and political 
rights and the other to contain economic, social and cultural rights". It was 
specified that the two Covenants should contain similar provisions as far as 
34 
possible, It was also decided to include in both the Covenants an article which 
provided that all  people shall have the right to self determination". 
The Commission began to work on two Covenants in 1952 at its eighth session 
from 14 April to 14 June and completed the two draft Covenants at its ninth 
and tenth sessions held in 1953 and 1954 respectively. The General Assembly 
reviewed the two draft Covenants in 1954 at its ninth session and the Assembly 
also decided to give the two Covenants widest possible publicity so that they 
might be studied by the governments and express their opinion freely. It was 
further recommended that its Third Committee start an article-by-article 
discussion of the texts at the tenth session, which continued until 1966 when 
the elaboration of the Covenants was completed. It was on 16 December. 1966 
that the General Assembly adopted and opened for signatures, ratification and 
accession of three instruments instead of the one originally envisaged. 1211 
These instruments were: (i) The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, (ii) the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and (iii) the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. The Optional Protocol provides machinery for handling of 
complaints from individuals in specified circumstances. It took another ten 
years before the three instruments came into force in the year 1976. [22] These 
International Covenants and the Optional Protocol constitute a realistic step 
towards protection of human rights. They deal with almost all aspects of 
human rights. [23]  
Thus, the Covenants, the Optional Protocol together with Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights constitute the International Bill of Human 
Rights. 
(a) The Universal Declaration of Hannan Rights 
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ncc Universal Declaration of Iluman Rights is the basic international 
pronouncement of the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the 
human family. This may he regarded as the first landmark in contemporary 
history in the development of the concept of human rights. The General 
Assembly adopted it on 10 December 1948 at its meeting in Paris. In the 
operative part of the Resolution. the General Assembly while adopting the 
Universal Declaration of Iluman Rights, proclaimed: 
This Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and 
every Organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive 
by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and 
by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal 
and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member 
States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction. 
While adopting the Declaration, forty-eight States voted in favors of the 
Declaration, none voted against, while eight states. i.e.. the six communist 
countries which were then members of the United Nations, Saudi Arabia and 
South Africa abstained. In a statement following the voting, the President of 
the General Assembly pointed out that the adoption of the Declaration, "by a 
big majority, without any direct opposition, was a remarkable achievement", a 
step forward in the great evolutionary process. It was the first occasion on 
which the organized community of nations had made a Declaration of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The document was backed by the authority 
of the body of opinion of the United Nations as a whole and millions of 
people----men, women and children all over the world-would turn to it for 
help, guidance and inspiration. 1241 
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The Declaration was drafted in pursuance of the dispositions of the U.N. 
Charter introducing the promotion of a respect for human rights as an 
international concern of primary importance. The Declaration, in fact, 
expresses the spirit of the Charter by setting out in detail what in the Charter 
was already included as one of the main aims and purposes of the United 
Nations. [25] The U.N. Charter contains a rather platonic expression in the 
absence of any indication as to the contents of human rights. The Declaration 
gives the answer. It elaborates on the Charter and gives a definition of 
substance. 126] In the process of the definition of human rights, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights may be accepted as the true Magna Carta of 
mankind. According to Buergenthal, "because of its moral status and the legal 
and political importance It has acquired over the years, the Declaration ranks 
with the Magna Carla, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
American Declaration of Independence as a milestone in mankind's' struggle 
for freedom and human dignity.[27] The Declaration consists of a preamble 
and 30 articles setting forth the human rights and fundamental freedoms to 
which all men and women, everywhere in the world. are entitled without any 
discrimination. 
The preamble spells out that the "recognition of the inherent dignity and 
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the, world". The preamble also 
refers to the "faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person and in the equal rights of men and women" which the 
peoples of the U.N. have reaffirmed in the Charter of the U.N. and their 
determination "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom". It also refers to the pledge taken by the Member States "to achieve in 
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co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms." 
The provisions of the Universal Declaration can be classified into four 
categories: (i) General (articles I and 2); (ii) Civil and Political Rights (articles 
3 to 21); (iii) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (articles 22 to 27) and (iv) 
Concluding (articles 28- 30). Thus, the Declaration basically proclaims two 
kinds of rights, i.e.. civil and political rights on the one hand; and Economic, 
Social and Cultural rights on the other Article 1 contain the philosophical 
postulates upon which the Declaration is based. It reads as under: All human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood". 
From the plain reading of article I, it is evident that the Declaration is based 
upon two basic assumptions i.e., (i) the right to liberty and quality is man's 
birthright and cannot be alienated; and (it) that because man is rational and 
moral being he is different from other creatures on earth and, therefore, entitled 
to certain rights and freedoms which other creatures do not enjoy. 
Article 2 of the Declaration proclaims the principle of equality and non-
discrimination as regards the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms without any distinction of any kind. such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. This article further says that no distinction shall 
be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the 
country to which a person belongs. As stated earlier, the next group of articles; 
i.e., from articles 3 to 21 contain civil and political rights. Out of all these 
articles, article 3 is of most fundamental importance as it proclaims that 
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"everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person", which is very 
essential for the enjoyment of all other rights. The other civil and political 
rights given in articles 4 to 21 are: freedom from slavery and servitude. [28] 
freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
[29] the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law; 
[30]equality before law and equal protection of the law [31] right to an 
effective remedy.[ 32] freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile 1331 the 
right to fair trial and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal 
[34] the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty; [35] freedom from 
arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence [36] 
freedom of movement [37] the right to seek asylum [3R] the right to nationality 
[39] the right to marry and found a family; [40] the right to own property [41] 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; [42] freedom of opinion and 
expression.[43] the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association [44] 
the right to take part in the government of the country and the right to equal 
access to public services. [45] Article 21 of the Declaration also declares that 
the "will of the people shalt be the basis of the authority of government" and 
requires periodic and genuine elections" by universal suffrage. 
The next group of articles. i.e., from articles 22 to 27 contains Economic, 
Social and Cultural rights. Article 22 is again of great importance. It provides: 
"Everyone, as a member of society, has a right to social security and is entitled 
to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in 
accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, 
social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free 
development of his personality". Front the perusal of article 22 it is evident 
that economic, social and cultural rights are indispensable for human dignity 
and the free development of personality It also indicates that these rights are to 
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be realized "through national efforts and international co-operation". At the 
same time article 22 also points out the limitations of that realization, the 
extent of which depends upon the resources of each State and of the 
international community. 
The economic, social and cultural rights enshrined in articles 22 to 27 are: the 
right to social security [46] the right to work and equal pay for equal work; 
[47] the right to rest and leisure [48] the right to a standard of living adequate 
for health and well-being of himself and of his family:[49] the right to 
education including education which shall he free at least in the elementary and 
fundamental stages [50Iand the tight to freely participate in the cultural life of 
the community 151] tt was indeed the inclusion of these economic, social and 
cultural rights in the Declaration which was one of the reasons for its great 
historical importance. In 1948, when the Declaration was adopted by the 
General Assembly, these rights were controversial in many countries. 
Article 28 recognizes that everyone is entitled to a social and international 
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can he fully 
realized. 
Article 29 lays stress on the point that everyone has duties to the community in 
which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible. 
Further in article 29 (2) it is recognized that the rights and freedoms 
proclaimed in the Declaration are'; not absolute. It permits the state to enact 
laws limiting the exercise of these rights and fundamental freedom provided 
their sole purpose is to secure due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public 
order and the general welfare in a democratic society". These rights and 
freedoms, in no case can be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles 
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of the United Nations [52] The authority of the government to impose 
restrictions or limitations on the enjoyment of these rights and freedoms is 
further limited by article 30 of the Declaration which provides: "Nothing in 
this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act which aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedom% set forth herein. Thus, no State 
can impose any restrictions which are outside the scope of this Declaration 
otherwise that would amount to violation of the Declaration". 
No doubt, the proclamation of Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a 
remarkable achievement of the United Nations in the area of human rights, yet 
there were certain omissions in the Declaration. For example, there is no 
provision in the Declaration regarding the proteedoo of minorities. It also did 
not recognize any right of petition even at the national Level-a right so 
fundamental that it is recognized even by some authoritarian countless. 
Nevertheless, the Declaration has become so important in the modern world 
that it has become a yardstick to measure the degree of respect for, and 
compliance with, international human rights standards. The provisions of the 
Declaration are cited as justification for actions taken by the United Nations. It 
may be noted that the Declaration is not a treaty. It was adopted by the General 
Assembly as a "resolution" having no force of law. From the Preamble of the 
Declaration, its purpose is evident. It was adopted to provide "a common 
understanding" of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are 
mentioned in the U.N. Charter and to serve "as a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations." 
There has been a great controversy regarding the legal significance of the 
Declaration. One view is that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not 
a legally binding instrument. The other view is that the Declaration since its 
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adoption in 1948 has undergone a dramatic transformation and has now 
become binding on all the states whether they have adopted it or not. There is 
still another view, according to which the Declaration is not binding on the 
States, yet it has great moral and political force behind it and it serves as a code 
of conduct for the promotion and observance of human rights world over. 
Sir H. Lauterpacht, who published a book shortly after the adoption of the 
Declaration, went to the extent of questioning even "moral authority" of the 
Declaration. According to him the moral authority and influence of an 
international instrument of this nature must he in direct proportion to the 
degree of sacrifice of the sovereignty of the States which it involves. The 
Declaration does not import to imply any sacrifice of the sovereignty of the 
state on the altar of the inalienable rights of man and, through them, of the 
peace of the world. In-this regard, Prof. John P. Humphrey has rightly 
observed: "Had this great lawyer, who was also a dedicated if impatient 
partisan of human rights, lived longer, he would have recognized not only the 
great moral authority of the declaration but, it is submitted, it's now binding 
character as part of the law of nations. Starke is also of the view that "the 
Declaration could not and did not purport to be more than a manifesto, a 
statement of ideals, a "path finding" instrument (531. According to Oppenheim, 
who also subscribes to this view, "the Declaration is not an instrument which is 
legally binding either directly or indirectly". However, Thomas Buergenthal 
has rightly pointed out that the process leading to the transformation of the 
Universal Declaration from a non-binding recommendation to an instrument 
having a normative character was set in motion, in part at least, because the 
effort to draft and adopt covenants remained stalled in the UN for almost two 
decades. During that time the need for authoritative standards defining the 
human rights obligations of UN Member States became even more urgent. As 
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the time went on. the Declaration came to be utilized with even greater 
frequency for that purposes. Even those writers who had earlier doubted the 
"legally binding" character of the Declaration, started conceding that it has 
gained 'Considerable authority as a general guide to the contents of 
fundamental rights and freedoms as understood by the members of the UN and 
it is important as providing connecting link between different concepts of 
human rights in different parts of the world.1541 Dr. Nagendra Singh has also 
expressed the view that the Declaration "was not mere a resolution of the 
General Assembly but a continuation of the Charter and had the dignity of the 
Chartcr.[55l There is another view which is gaining support at the international 
level due to repeated reliance and resort to the Declaration by the Governments 
and international organizations in matters of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. According to Richard 13. Lillich, it now may he argued persuasively 
that substantial parts of the Universal Declaration originally thought not to give 
rise to international legal Obligations, have become, over the past third of a 
century. part of customary international law binding upon all states. 1561 This 
view was first advanced by scholars but subsequently gained support by the 
statements of' international conferences, by State practices and even by Court 
decisions. McDougal and others have gone to the extent of suggesting that the 
Declaration has the "attributes of jus cogens. 1571 In the opinion of Richard 
B.Lillich, it may be difficult to say that all rights enumerated in the Declaration 
have the character of jus cogens However, there is a little doubt that many of 
the human rights mentioned in the Declaration not only reflect customary 
international law but also partake of the character of jus cogens. For instance. 
prohibition of slavery is just one example of the same. Genocide. 
disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment and systematic racial discrimination can be cited as 
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other examples. According to Lillich, this conclusion is particularly valid when 
the right in question appears in both the Universal Declaration and the Political 
Covenant. The latter, of course, is binding conventional law only between state 
parties to it, but many of its provisions now can he said to have helped create 
norms of customary international law including ones having jus cogens status, 
binding even states which have yet to ratify it. [58] 
It is submitted that over the years the Declaration has become most important 
document in the field of human rights. The following observations of Prof. 
Sohn seems to draw a reasonable conclusion: "There seems to be an agreement 
that the Declaration is a statement of general principles spelling out in 
considerable detail the meaning of the phrase "human rights and fundamental 
freedoms" in the Charter of the United Nations. As the Declaration was 
adopted unanimously, without a dissenting vote', it can be considered as an 
authoritative interpretation of the Charter of the highest order. While the 
Declaration is not directly binding on United Nations members, it strengthens 
their obligations under the Charter by making them more precise". [59] 
Whatever may he the legal status and significance of the Declaration, ever 
since its adoption in 1948, it has been and rightly continues to he the most 
important and far-reaching of all United Nations Declarations, and a 
fundamental source of inspiration for national and international efforts to 
promote and to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. It has set the 
direction for all subsequent work in the field of human rights. It has provided 
the basic philosophy for many legally binding instruments including the two 
international Covenants. The Declaration has formed the basis for enacting 
regional Conventions on human rights such as European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 1950 and American Convention on 
Human Rights 1969. The provisions of the Universal Declaration have also 
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influenced various national Constitutions which Rave been particularly enacted 
after its adoption in 1948. Indian Constitution can be quoted one such example 
in which Part III dealing with fundamental rights reflects the Civil and Political 
Rights mentioned in the Declaration in articles 3 to 21. Part IV of the Indian 
Constitution dealing with directive principles of state policy reflects the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights mentioned in the Declaration in articles 
22 to 28. It was perhaps the influence of the Declaration on the makers of our 
Constitution which tempted Dr. B.R. Ambedkar to make the following 
observations: 
"The Declaration of the Rights of Man ... has become part and parcel of 
our mental make up ... these principles have become , silent immaculate 
premise of our outlook.[60] The International Conference on Human Rights 
which met at Tehran from 22 April to 13 May 1968, proclaimed that "the 
Universal Declaration of human Rights states a common understanding of the 
peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights of all 
members of the human family and constitutes an obligation for the members of 
the international community" and urged "all people and Governments to 
dedicate themselves to those principles and to re-double their efforts to provide 
for all human beings a life consonant with freedom and dignity and conducive 
to physical, mental, social and spiritual welfare." Since its adoption in 1948, 
the Universal Declaration has stood as an international "standard of 
achievement for all people and all nations." It has formed the "basis for action" 
for various U.N. bodies. Nearly all the international human rights instruments 
adopted by the U.N. bodies since 1948. elaborate the principles enshrined in 
the Universal Declaration. So much so that even the judges of the International 
Court of Justice have invoked the principles contained in the Declaration as a 
basis for their opinion. [61] Such is the importance of this historical document. 
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(b) International Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights. 
The International Covenant of Economic. Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) were adopted by the General Assembly in 1966. It required 35 
ratifications to enter into force. These requisite ratifications were deposited on 
3 October, 1976 and the Covenant entered into force on 3 January 1977, i.e., 
after three months of depositing instruments of ratification. [62] The Covenant 
has a preamble and 31 articles divided into five parts. This Covenant contains a 
longer and much more comprehensive list of economic, social and cultural 
rights than the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The preamble to the Covenant serves as an introduction to the articles which 
follows. The first paragraph of the preamble is a statement of general principle 
that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world." This clause has been taken from the first para of the 
preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The second paragraph 
of the preamble to the Covenant recognizes the origin of human rights by 
stating that they "derive [tarn the inherent dignity of the human person." 
The third paragraph of the preamble recognizes that "in accordance with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human being 
enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are 
created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights 
as well as his civil and political rights". This paragraph of the preamble 
underlines the importance of not only economic, social and cultural rights but 
also of civil and political rights. In other words, this paragraph underline the 
unity of the two Covenants on the said rights and at the same time maintain its 
distinctive character. 
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In the fourth paragraph of the preamble, the States are reminded of Obligation 
under (he Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and 
observance of human rights and freedoms. 
Lastly. it is realized that each individual has duties to other individuals and to 
the community to which he belongs and it is considered the responsibility of 
each individual to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant. 
Article I of the Covenant states that the right to self determination is universal, 
and call upon States to promote the realization and the respect of that right. 
This article further states that "all peoples have the right of self-determination" 
and adds that "by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." It is further 
provided that "all peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources". It may be relevant to note here that this most 
important right is ntor contained in the Universal Declaration of I luman Rights. 
The obligations which a State Party assumes by ratifying this Covenant are 
given in article 2(1) which states: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and cooperation. especially economic and 
technical. to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the flit! rc'ali ation of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particu!ea-!v the ndoplirn of 
legislative measures. From the language of this article it is evident that the 
State Party ratifying the Covenant does not undertake to give "immediate 
effect" to the rights, guaranteed under the Covenant. Instead, the State 
obligates itself merely to take steps "to the maximum of its available 
resources" in order to achieve 'progressively the full realization" of these 
rights. The State Party undertakes to take step for achieving the rights 
guaranteed in the Covenant, individually and through international co-
operation or assistance. To achieve that purpose it will use all appropriate 
means including legislative measures. 
The reason for this is that economic, social and cultural rights cannot be fully 
ensured without economic and technical assistance, education and planning_ In 
many cases, international co-operation is required. Therefore, it would not be 
realistic to require immediate compliance of these rights. Keeping in view their 
nature and the specific problems each state must deal with them to ensure their 
full enjoyment. 163] These realities also explain why, as a practical matter, 
there can be no uniform standards by which to measure compliance under the 
Economic. Social and Cultural Covenant. Since each State will invariably face 
different problems and since no two states are likely to have the .came 
"available resources", different criteria will have to be applied to different 
States in determining whether they are living upto their treaty obligation. 
Article 2(3) of the Covenant specifically says that developing countries, with 
due regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine the 
extent to which they would guarantee the "economic rights" recognized in the 
Covenant to "no- nationals". This so because each developing nation has to 
first sees the national economy and the economic status of its own nationals. 
However, subject to this restriction the State Parties undertake to guarantee the 
exercise of these rights without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, 
sex, language, religion. political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. [64] Article 3 not only reaffirms the principle of 
equality of men and women as regards human rights, but also enjoins the States 
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to make that principle a reality. This article is also in consonance with the UN 
Charter. 
Article 5 is "saving clause" which is provided to prevent the destruction or 
limitation of the rights recognized in other articles, and to safeguard rights 
recognized independently of the Covenant. Article 5(l) is derived from article 
30 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and provides protection 
against misinterpretation of the Covenant to justify infringement of a right or 
freedom, or restriction of such a right or freedom to a greater extent than 
provided in the Covenant. Article 5(2) covers the possible conflicts between 
the Covenant and the laws, regulations, customs of the contracting states or 
arrangements other than the Covenant binding upon them; and prevents States 
from limiting rights already enjoyed within their territories, on the ground that 
such rights are not recognized, or are recognized to a kisser extent, in the 
Covenant. 
Part III of the Covenant from articles 6 to 15 contains a longer and much more 
comprehensive catalogue of economic, social and cultural rights than in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These rights are the right to work. the 
right to the enjoyment of just and favorable conditions of work and equal pay 
for equal work; the right to form and join trade unions; the right to social 
security including social insurance; the right to protection of the family; the 
right to adequate standard of living for himself and his family; the right to the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health including the 
improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene the right of 
everyone to 'education' and the right to take part in cultural life. 
It may be mentioned here that the Covenant does not merely list these rights 
but it also describes and defines them in considerable detail and set out the 
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steps that should be taken to achieve their realization. It may be further noted 
here that these rights are not absolute rights. The State Parties to The Covenant 
recognize that in the enjoyment of these rights, "the State may subject such 
rights only to such limitations as arc determined by law only in so far this may 
be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. Thus, a power has been 
given to the States to impose limitation on the enjoyment of these rights but 
such limitations have to be compatible with the economic, social and cultural 
rights and for promoting the general welfare of the people. The measures of 
implementation are contained in Part IV of the Covenant. This Covenant does 
not establish any inter-state or individual complaints system. Under article lb, 
the State Parties undertake to submit periodic reports on the measures adopted 
and progress made in achieving the observance of the rights contained in the 
Covenant. The reports are submitted to the Secretary General of the United 
Nations who transmits them to the Economic and Social Council and other 
specialized agencies [651 under article 19, the Economic and Social Council 
might transmit the reports to the Commission on Human Rights for study and 
general recommendation or as appropriate, for information. The State Parties 
and the specialized agencies concerned, might submit to the Economic and 
Social Council, comments on any general recommendation of the Commission 
on Human Rights. 
Article 21 of the Covenant provides that Economic and Social Council may 
submit to the General Assembly reports with recommendations of a general 
nature and a summary of the information received from the State Parties and 
..specialized agencies on the measures taken and the progress made in 
observance of the rights recognized by this Covenant. It may be noted here that 
the Covenant itself does not establish any special Committee to review the 
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reports. It merely stipulates that they are to be submitted to Economic and 
Social Council. Prior to 1976. the Economic and Social Council had delegated 
the task of reviewing the State reports to a working group of its members 
which was known as the "Sectional Working Group on the Implementation of 
the International Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights'. This 
Sectional Working Group reported its findings to the Council. the Commission 
on Human Rights and the specialized agencies. Starting in 1976, the Economic 
and Social Council adopted a series of resolutions which have resulted in the 
establishment of a "Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights". This 
Committee consists of eighteen experts elected in their personal capacities. 
This Committee, being a permanent body and consisting of independent 
experts. is more effective in supervising the measures taken and progress made 
in achieving the rights contained in this Covenant. 
State Parties to the Covenant agree that the international action for the 
achievement of the rights recognized under the Covenant includes such 
methods as the conclusion of Convention, the adoption of recommendations 
and furnishing of technical assistance and the holding of seasonal meetings for 
consultation and study. The Covenant also provides that nothing contained in it 
shall be interpreted as impairing the U.N. Charter provisions and of the 
Constitutions of the specialized agencies and also the inherent right of the 
peoples to enjoy and to utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and 
resources. 
(c) International Bill of'flcrntan Rights 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was adopted 
by the General Assembly in 1966. This Covenant also required 3S ratifications 
to enter into force. These requisite ratifications were deposited on 23 
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December. 1975 and the Covenant entered into force on 23 March 1976, i.e., 
after three months of depositing instruments of ratification. India acceded to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 10 April 1979 and 
it became effective for India on 10 July, 1979. The Covenant has a preamble 
and 53 articles divided into six parts. This Covenant contains a longer and 
much more comprehensive list of civil and political rights than the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. All the civil and political rights enshrined in the 
Charter have been drafted with specificity, the preamble and articles 1, 3 and 5 
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are almost identical with the 
preamble and articles 1, 3 and 5 of the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights. [661 
In the third paragraph of the preamble of the two Covenants, there is difference 
in emphasis and wordings. In the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the third paragraph states that the ideal of free human beings enjoying 
civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be 
achieved it conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and 
political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights." The 
difference in emphasis and wordings exist to underline the unity of two 
Covenants while at the same time distinctive character of the two Covenants is 
also maintained. 
The obligations which the State Parties assume by ratifying the Covenant are 
given in article 2(1) of the Covenant which states: 
"Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such 
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as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status". 
Article 2(2) of this Covenant further requires the State Parties 'to adopt 
such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the 
rights" guaranteed in the Covenant whenever such provisions do not exist 
already under the domestic law. Thus, if we compare the obligation clause 
given in article 2 of this Covenant with that of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. it is evident that unlike the Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights imposes an immediate obligation "to respect and to ensure" the rights it 
proclaims and to take whatever other measures are required to achieve that 
goal. 
Under article 2(3) each Slate Party to the Covenant further undertakes to 
ensure 41I persons "effective remedy" against violation of their rights or 
freedoms notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity. The right to remedy shall be determined by the 
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities or by any other 
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State and whenever 
such remedy is granted, it shall he enforced by the competent authorities. 
It may he mentioned here that the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
rightly imposes an "immediate obligation" to respect and ensure civil and 
political rights. The ensuring of civil and political rights of the people cannot 
be postponed indefinitely and as such there is no difficulty which comes in the 
way of their implementation. Also merely announcing the civil and political 
rights of the people without an "effective remedy" will be like a "rope of sand" 
which in no way will help in achieving the obligations of the States under the 
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Charter of the United Nations, i.e., to promote universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and freedoms. 
Part III of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is devoted to the 
traditional civil and political rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. However, the rights as given in the Covenant are in more 
detail. These rights are: the right to life: [671 prohibition of torture or cruel. 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. prohibition of slavery, the 
slave trade and forced labour; prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention right of the 
persons deprived of their liberty that they shall he treated with humanity and 
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person freedom form 
imprisonment on the ground of inability to fulfill contractual obligation; 
freedom of movement and choice of residence freedom of aliens from arbitrary 
expulsion right to equality before courts and tribunals, and right to a fair trial; 
protection against retroactive criminal legislation right to recognition as 
person before the law; prohibition of arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
privacy, family, home or correspondence and unlawful attacks on honour and 
reputation; freedom of thought. conscience and religion; freedom of opinion 
and of expression; prohibition of propaganda or war and incitement to national 
or religious hatred right to peaceful assembly right to freedom of association; 
right to marry and found a family rights of the child; right to take part in public 
affairs and to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections held by secret 
ballot; right to equality before law and equal protection of the law; and the 
right of the minorities. However, these rights enshrined in the Covenant are not 
absolute but are subject to certain limitations. While the formulation of 
limitations clauses differs from article to article, it may be said that in general 
the Covenant provides that the rights and freedoms with which it deals should 
not be Subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law and 
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are necessary to protect security, public order, public health or morals or the 
rights and freedoms of other. 
Article 4 of the Covenant contains a "derogation clause". Article 4(1) provides: 
"In times of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and 
the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the State Parties to the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights may take measures derogating from 
their obligations under the Covenant to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation. provided that such measures are not inconsistent 
with their other Obligations under international law and do not involve 
discrimination solely on the ground of race, color sex, language, religion or 
social origin". 
Thus. even the power given to the State Parties to the Covenant to take 
measures derogating from their Obligation is also not absolute but subject to 
certain conditions mentioned in article 4(1) of the Covenant. At the same time. 
some of the rights are considered by the Covenant's 1681 to be so essential that 
no derogation" from them may be made even in time of public emergency. 
These rights are the right to life: the right not to be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment the prohibition of slavery 
and servitude the prohibition of imprisonment merely on the ground of 
liability to fulfill a contractual obligation: 	the prohibition of retro-active 
criminal law the right of every person to recognition as a person before the 
law: and freedom of thought, conscience and religion Article 5(1) also 
prohibits the imposition of restrictions or limitations aimed at the 'destruction 
of the rights or "their limitation to a greater extent than is provided in the 
Covenant." 
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It may also be mentioned here that the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
lists certain rights which are not found specifically in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. These rights are: the right of the people to self-determination 
the right of all persons deprived of their liberty to be treated with humanity and 
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person the prohibition of 
imprisonment merely on the grounds of liability to fulfill a contractual 
obligation; rights of the child; and the rights of the minorities. 
At the same time there are certain important rights which are proclaimed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights but interestingly they do not appear in 
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These rights arc: the right to seek 
and enjoy Asylum the right to nationality and the right to own Property. 
The right to property was not included in the Covenant as there was no 
agreement on the scope and definition of this right. The main method of 
international implementation provided under the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Right is a "repotting procedure". under article 40 of the Covenant. the 
State Parties to it undertake to submit reports on measures adopted by them 
giving effect to the rights recognized in the Covenant and on the progress made 
in the enjoyment of those rights. [69]Thc reports are required to be submitted 
to the Secretary General of the United Nations who shall transmit them to 
Human Rights Committee consisting of eighteen members elected by the State 
Parties to the Covenant. The members serve in their personal capacity. 1701 
The Committee study the reports submitted by the State Parties to the 
Covenant and transmit its reports. and such general comments as it may 
consider appropriate, to the State Parties. The Committee may also transmit to 
the Economic and Social Council these comments along with the copies of the 
reports it has received from State Parties to the Covenant. The State Parties to 
the Covenant may also make observations on any comments made by the 
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Committee. The Human Rights Committee has developed a comprehensive set 
of reporting guidelines. But the main drawback is that it lacks the power to 
verify the State reports by undertaking its own investigations. However, the 
members of the Committee may require the representatives of the State to 
explain the contents of the report and ask for supplementary information. This 
enables the Committee to point out any problem in the compliance of the 
Covenant and the same may be brought to the notice of General Assembly of 
the United Nations. The Human Rights Committee is also not authorized to 
receive an individual communication directed against a State not a party to the 
Optional Protocol. 
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also provides for inter-state 
complaint machinery that enables one State Party to charge another State Party 
with a violation of the treaty. But this complaint machinery is optional. It 
operates only if a State Party declares that it recognizes the competence of the 
[Inman Rights Committee to receive and consider communications that a State 
Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the 
Covenant. Further, the optional system is based on the principle of reciprocity. 
Hence it operates only when a State which has made a declaration recognizing 
the competence of the Human Rights Committee in regard to itself is 
authorized to set the procedure in motion with regard to another State Party 
which has also recognized the competcnce of the Human Rights Committee. 
Article 42 of the Covenant provides for the establishment of an 
additional organ, i.e.. ad-hoc Conciliation Commission. If the matter referred 
to the Human Rights Committee under article 41 of the Covenant is not 
resolved Lo the satisfaction of the parties concerned, the Committee may with 
the prior consent of the State Parties concerned, appoint an ad-hoc Conciliation 
Commission of five persons acceptable to the State-Panics concerned. 
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However this system of dealing with the inter-state complaints is extremely 
weak. It provides neither for adjudication not quasi-adjudication, and 
establishes little more than formal conciliation machinery. The State-Parties 
are not formally required to accept the proposed solution, although their failure 
to do so may be called to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly 
by the Human Rights Committee in its annual report. 
(d) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and' Political 
Rights was adopted by the General Assembly in 1966. [711 The Optional 
Protocol required ten instruments of ratification to enter into force. [72] It 
entered into force on 23 March 1976 along with the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. [731 
This treaty was adopted as a separate instrument, but in fact it supplements the 
measures of implementation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The 
Optional Protocol provides machinery for the handling or complaints from 
individuals in specified circumstances. The Optional Protocol consists of a 
preamble and fourteen articles. 
From the preamble of the Optional Protocol, it is evident that it was adopted to 
further achieve the purposes of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and for this enabling the human Rights Committee to receive 
and consider communications from individuals claiming to be victims of 
violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. 
A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the Protocol recognizes 
the competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider 
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be 
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victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, no communication shall be 
received by the Human Rights Committee if it concerns the State Party to the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Right which has not ratified this Optional 
Protocol. [74] In other words, this method of implementation is available only 
to those individuals who are subject to the jurisdiction of the State Parties who 
have ratified the Optional Protocol. Before communicating with the Human 
Rights Committee, the individual who claim the violation of his rights 
enumerated in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights must first exhaust all 
domestic remedies. However, this shall not be the rule where the application of 
the domestic remedies is unreasonably prolonged. All anonymous 
communications or one which the Committee considers to be an abuse of the 
right of petition or to be incompatible with the Covenant provisions, are 
inadmissible. The Optional Protocol also provides that no communication shall 
be considered by the Human Rights Committee unless it has ascertained that 
the matter is not being investigated under another international investigatory or 
settlement procedure. 
The Human Rights Committee is required to bring any communications 
submitted to it under the Optional Protocol to the attention of the State Party 
concerned. The concerned State Party undertakes to provide the Committee 
written explanation within six months of the matter and the remedy, if any, that 
it might have taken. Thereafter, the Committee considers the communications 
received under the Optional Protocol in the light of all written information 
made available to it by the individual and by the State Party consutned. The 
Committee holds closed meetings when examining communications under the 
Optional Protocol. Then the Committee is required to forward its views to the 
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State Party concerned and to individual and will provide the General Assembly 
annually with a summary of its activities under the Optional Protocol. 
Since the entry into force of the Optional Protocol in 1976, the Human 
Rights Committee has dealt with a large number of individual 
communications. However, many of these have been found inadmissible under 
article 5(2) of the Optional Protocol 'either because domestic remedies had not 
been exhausted or because they involved the same matter that was being 
examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 
But on the whole, the activities of the Committee in protecting the human 
rights of the individual are praise-worthy. [75] 
(e) 	Second Optional Protocol to the International Coven ant on Civil 
and Political Rlghrs, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty 
It was on 25 November, 1981 that the General Assembly decided to consider 
the idea of elaborating a draft of a Second Optional Protocol to the 
lnlcntalional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming at the abolition of 
death penalty.[76] It was adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly on 
15 December. 1989.[77] This Second Optional Protocol required ten 
instruments of ratification to come into force.[78] The provisions of the Second 
Optional Protocol apply in addition to the provisions of Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. The Second Optional Protocol has a preamble and eleven 
articles. 
From the preamble to the Second Optional Protocol, it is evident that the State 
Parties to it believe that abolition of the death penalty contributes to 
enhancement of human dignity and progressive development of human rights. 
The State Parties recall articles 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights guaranteeing everyone right to life and note article 6(2) of the 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which refers to abolition 
of the death penalty in terms and strongly suggest that abolition is desirable. 
The State Parties feel convinced that all measure of abolition of the death 
penalty should he considered as progress in the enjoyment of the right to life. 
1791 
It has been agreed by the State Parties that no one shall be executed within 
their jurisdiction and that they shall take all the necessary measures to abolish 
the death penalty within their jurisdiction. 
No reservation is admissible to the Second Optional Protocol. However, there 
is one very important exception to this. State Party ratifying the Second 
Optional Protocol may make a reservation at the time of ratification or 
accession that provides for application of the death penalty in times of war 
pursuant to a conviction for a most serious crimes of a military nature 
committed during war time. The State Party making such a reservation is 
required to communicate to the Secretary General of the United Nations the 
relevant provisions of its national legislation applicable during war time. The 
State Party making such reservation is also required to notify the Secretary 
General of the United Nations of any beginning or ending of a state of war 
applicable to its territory. 
The State Parties to the Second Optional Protocol are also required to include 
in the reports they submit to the Human Rights Committee, in accordance with 
article 40 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, information on the 
measures that they have adopted to give effect to this Protocol. Article 41 of 
the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights also applies inutatis nrutanclis. 
With respect to the State Parties to the first Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted in 1966, the 
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competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider 
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction shall extend to the 
provisions of the present Protocol, unless the State Party concerned has made a 
statement to the contrary at the moment of ratification or accession. 
Presently there is trend in most of the countries for ahotishing the death 
penalty. And this Second Optional Protocol is a timely reminder to the 
humanity to abolish death penalty and respect the basic human right to life. For 
more details about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights please see the 
appendix I. 
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Chapter-III 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 
3.1 Introduction 
A Constitution means a document having a special legal sanctity which sets out 
the framework and the principle functions of the organs of the government of 
state and declares the principles governing the operation of those organs. 
Constitution is not to be construed as a mere law, but as the machinery by 
which laws are made. A Constitution is a living' and organic thing which, of all 
instruments, has the greatest claim to be construed broadly and liberally. [11 
Constitution of India is a suprenra lex. The Constitution of India was drafted by 
the Constituent Assembly which had its first meeting on 9th December 1946 
and finally the Constitution was adopted by the people of India on 26 
November, 1949. And it came into force w.e.f. 26 January, 1950. During this 
whole period the Constituent Assembly took serious note of various national as 
well as international developments, particularly in the area of human rights. 
The recognition of human rights had started taking place, one may say, from 
the Bill of Rights of 1688 followed by American Declaration of Independence 
of 1766 and French Declaration of Independence in 1789. Many anti-slavery 
laws were also enacted in the 19th Century. On 10th December. 1948, when 
the Constitution of India was in the making, the General Assembly proclaimed 
and adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which surely 
influenced the framing of India's Constitution. Viewed from the Indian 
standpoint, human rights have been synthesized, as it were, into an integrated 
fabric by the preambular promises and various constitutional clauses of the 
National Charter of 1950. [21 
In fact, the Indian desire for civil and political rights was very much implicit in 
the formation of Indian National Congress in the year 1885 in the words of 
Austin: "Indian wanted the same rights and privileges that Britisher masters 
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enjoyed in India and that Britain's had among them in England ... and wanted 
to end the discrimination ... of colonial regime. 131 
Perhaps the first explicit demand for fundamental rights appeared in The 
Constitution of India Bill. 1895 which was issued under the inspiration of 
Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak. The demand for declaration of fundamental 
rights in the future Constitution of India gained impetus at the hands of 
political leaders with the passage of time. The Congress Resolution of 1929 
also emphasised the theme of soeio-economic reconstruction when it declared: 
"The great poverty and misery of the Indian people are due, not only to foreign 
exploitation in India but also to the economic structure of the society, which 
the alien rulers support so that their exploitation may continue. In order, 
therefore, to remove this poverty and misery and to ameliorate the condition of 
Indian masses, it is essential to make revolutionary changes in the present 
economic and social structure of society and to remove the gross inequalities. 
[4] 
After the Karachi Resolution of 1931, the Sapru Committee in its 
"Constitutional Proposals" recommended that a declaration of fundamental 
rights in the Indian Constitution was absolutely necessary. It envisaged two 
sets of fundamental rights-one justifiable and the other non-justifiable. It was 
left to the constitution framing body to make a division between them. 
On 13 December 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru, moved the historic Objectives 
Resolution in the Constituent Assembly which was adopted by it on 22 January 
1947. The Objectives Resolution provided: 
(1) This Constituent Assembly declares its firm and solemn resolve to 
proclaim India as an Independent Sovereign Republic and to draw 
up for her future governance a Constitution; 
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(2) WHEREIN the territories that now comprise British India. the 
territories that now form the Indian States. and such other parts of 
India as are outside British India and the States as well as such other 
territories as are willing to be constituted into the Independent 
Sovereign India, shall be a Union of them all, and 
(3) WHEREIN the said territories, whether with their present boundaries 
or with such others as may he determined by the Constituent 
Assembly and thereafter according to the Law of the Constitution. 
shall possess and retain the status of autonomous Units, together 
with residuary powers. and exercise all powers and functions of 
government and administration, save and except such powers and 
functions as are vested in or assigned to the Union. or as are inherent 
or implied in the Union or resulting there from; and 
(4) \VH[RI?IN all power and authority of the Sovereign Independent 
India. its constituent parts and organs of government, are derived 
from the people; and 
(S) WHEREIN shall be guaranteed and secured to' all the people of 
India justice, social economic and political; equality of status, of 
opportunity. and before the law; freedom of thought. expression. 
belief, faith, worship, vocation, association and action, subject to law 
and public morality; and 
(6) WHEREIN adequate safeguards shall be provided for minorities. 
backward and tribal areas, and depressed and other backward 
classes; and 
(7) WHEREBY shall be maintained the integrity of the territory of the 
Republic and its sovereign rights on land, sea, and air according to 
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justice and the law of civilized nations; and sea, and air according to 
justice and the law of civilized nations; and 
(8) This ancient land attains its rightful and honoured place in the world 
and makes its full and willing contribution to the promotion of world 
peace and the welfare of mankind. 
This Resolution formed the basis for the incorporation of various human rights 
values not only in various provisions of the Constitution but also in its 
preamble. Nehru in' his concluding speech remarked that the Assembly was to 
free India through a new Constitution, to feed the starving people and clothes, 
the naked masses, and to give every Indian fullest opportunity to develop 
himself according to his capacity. In fact. Nehru had warned the Constituent 
Assembly in the following words: "If India cannot solve this problem soon, all 
our paper Constitution will become useless and purposeless ...If India goes 
down, all will go down; if India thrives. all will thrive, and if India lives all live 
Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, also emphasized that there must be a socio-economic 
revolution not only to satisfy the fundamental needs of a common man but to 
bring about a fundamental change in the structure of Indian society. 
Thus, it is evident that though the Constituent Assembly was mainly 
concerned with the welfare of the masses, yet there was considerable emphasis 
on the ameliorative role of the State. The tryst to make the India's Constitution 
a viable instrument of the Indian People's salvation, and to secure all persons 
basic human rights, is implicit from the preamble promise. fundamental rights. 
directive principles, and various other provisions of the Constitution. Most of 
the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 and two 
International Covenants are building blocks of any Indian Constitutional rights. 
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3.2 Preamble 
The words of the preamble to the Constitution of India have been taken from 
clauses 1, 5 and 6 of the Objectives Resolution. The preamble to the 
Constitution reads: 
WE, TIlE PEOPLE OF INDIA, were having solemnly resolved to 
constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens: 
JUSTICE, social, economic and political: LIBERTY of thought, 
expression, belief, faith and worship: 
EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them 
all 
FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and 
integrity of the Nation: 
In Our Constituent Assembly this twenty-sixth day of November 1949, 
do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS 
CONSTITUTION. 
Thus, the preamble concisely sets out quintessence of human rights which 
represents the aspiration of the people, who have established the Constitution. 
The preamble to the Constitution is of extreme importance and the Constitution 
should be read and interpreted in the light of the grand and noble vision 
expressed in the preamble. 
The word 'sovereign emphasizes that India is no more dependent upon any 
third outside agency or authority. It means that both internally and externally 
India is sovereign. India has been forthright and consistent in upholding the 
tradition of "self determination". The history of Indian freedom struggle for 
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total independence and self-determination from colonialism in itself provides 
the genesis of India's stand for self-determination of peoples and nations from 
colonial subjugation and foreign domination in favour of total independence-
political, economic, social and cultural. It has been the position of India ever 
since its independence that adherence to self-determination is co-existent with 
the principle of sovereign equality. This is in consonance with article I of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. 
The word 'socialist' was added in the preamble by the Constitution (Forty 
second) Amendment Act, 1976.   Although the amendment does not add 
anything new to the already existing constitutional commitment to the goal of 
socio-economic justice. it is significant in that it emphasizes the urgency of the 
achievement of the goals of socialism. In Sanjeev Coke M(. Co. v Bharat 
Coking Coal Ltd.,[5] Justice Chinnappa Reddy observed: " Though the word 
"Socialism" was introduced into the Preamble by late amendment of the 
Constitution, the Socialism has always been the goal is evident from Directive 
Principles of State Policy. The amendment was only to emphasize the 
urgency". [6] At different times, it has been emphasized that the preamble be 
amended to mention the Objective of socialism in it. B.R. Shukla, in this 
regard observed: "A developing country like India or any other developing 
country in the world cannot be emancipated from the centuries long poverty 
and ignorance ...unless socialism is accepted as a goal. Therefore, if this goal 
was not clearly spelt out in the Constitution. although in quintessence it was 
contained, it is our duty to make it unmistakably clear to everybody in this 
country that socialism is the only system wherein lies the emancipation of the 
people from centuries old shackles of poverty and ignorance and that no other 
system can deliver the goods". 
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The Constitution {Forty-fifth) Amendment Bill, 1975 sought to define the 
expression "socialist" to mean "a republic in which there is freedom from all 
forms of exploitation, social, political and economic", but the amendment was 
not accepted by the Council of States. 
The implication of the introduction of the word "socialist", which has now 
become the centre of the hopes and aspirations of the people a beacon of guide 
and inspire all that is enshrined in the articles of the Constitution, is clearly to 
set up a "vibrant throbbing socialist welfare society" in the place, of a "feudal 
exploited society". The word 'socialist" read with articles 14 and 16 of the 
Constitution has enabled the Court to deduce fundamental right to "equal pay 
for equal work". The same word, when red with article 14 enables court to 
strike down a statute which failed to achieve the socialist goal to the fullest 
extent. On the other hand, it enables the Courts to uphold legislations which 
are aimed to remove econotnic inequalities; to provide a decent standard of 
living to the working people and to protect the interests of wearer -sections of 
the society. (71 All the directive principles of state policy in Part IV of the 
Constitution are aimed at achieving this objective of socialism. 
The word "secular" was also added in the preamble by the Constitution 
(Forty-second) Amendment Act, 1976. This expression highlights that the 
State has, no religion of its own and all persons shall have the right to profess, 
practice and propagate religion of their own and they shall he equally entitled 
to freedom of conscience. Before this change, the liberty of "belief, faith and 
worship" was promised in the preamble. This has been further guaranteed by 
the fundamental rights in articles 25 to 28. Thus, secularism is given pride of 
place III the Constitution. {8] This is in consonance with the spirit of article 18 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 and also article 18 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. If the Constitution 
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requires the State to be secular in thought and action, the same requirement 
attaches to political parties as well. The Constitution does not recognize, it 
does not permit, mixing religion and State power. Both must be kept apart. 
This is the Constitutional injunction. 19] The Constitution (Eightieth 
Amendment) Bill, 1993 was introduced in the Parliament on 25.7.93 for 
separating the religion from politics. 
Secularism is thus more than a passive attitude of religious tolerance. It is 
positive concept of equal treatment of all religions. The concept of the secular 
state is. essential for successful working of the democratic form of 
government. There can be no democracy if anti-secular forces are allowed to 
work dividing followers of different religious faith flying at each other's 
throats. The constitutional culture and political morality based on healthy 
conventions are the fruitful soil to nurture and for sustained growth of the 
federal institutions like ours set down by the Constitution. Secularism enables 
the people to see the imperative requirements for human progress in all aspects 
and cultural and social advancement and indeed the human survival itself. It 
also not only improves the material conditions of human life, but also liberates 
human spirit from bondage of ignorance, injustice and oppressive exploitation. 
The term "democratic" indicates that the Constitution has established a 
form of government which gets its authority from the will of the people. 
Justice, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, which are essential characteristics of a 
democracy, are declared in the preamble to the Constitution. The expression 
"democratic republic" in the preamble assures the people of the right of equal 
participation in the polity. The quality of democracy envisaged by the 
preamble does not only secure the equality of opportunity but of status as well, 
to all citizens.[10] The goal of every civilized democratic society is 
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maximization of human welfare and happiness which would be best served if 
the human rights of the people are protected in the real sense. 
The preamble also contains the promise of promoting "Fraternity assuring the 
dignity of the individual and unity and integrity of the Nation". The words "and 
integrity" after unity were also added by the Constitution (Forty-second) 
Amendment Act, 1976. "Fraternity" means brotherhood, the promotion of 
which is absolutely essential for our country, which is composed of many 
races, languages and religions and which has so many disruptive forces of 
regionalism, communalism and linguist. It is also necessary to emphasize and 
re-emphasize that the unity and integrity of India can be preserved only by a 
spirit of brotherhood. [ 11 i The spirit or brotherhood assuring the dignity of the 
individual and unity and integrity of' the nation is sought to be achieved by 
abolition of un-touch ability, abolition of titles, prohibition of traffic in human-
beings and many other provisions in the fundamental rights. Having used the 
words "liberty and equality", the framers of the Constitution felt that the use of 
the word "Fraternity" in the Indian context would he more suitable and 
appropriate, particularly when they were thinking of a social order in which the 
human rights of all the people were to he respected and protected. It was not 
only to raise the status of the many that were looked down on by the privileged 
castes about also to bring about harmony and understanding between various 
segments of the Indian society so that the country appeared to be one for all 
intents and purposes.[12] 
It must be re-emphasized here that the preamble to the Indian Constitution 
assures all among other things "dignity of the individual". Human rights are 
part and parcel of human dignity. Individual dignity cannot be measured by 
single factor. It is the combination of all aspects-moral, economic, social and 
political etc. of life. Democracy starts with the basic tenet that every human 
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being is a moral entity. and. therefore. confers upon him both the freedom to 
develop his personality and the responsibility for doing so. It may also he 
mentioned that the importance of the concept of human "dignity" is well 
exemplified by its inclusion in the Universal Declaration of human Rights, 
1948. It mentions "dignity" twice in its preamble and thrice in its articles, i.e., 
in articles I. 22 and ?I. 
Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights. 
1966 has mentioned it twice in its preamble and also in article 10. The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 also mentions 
"dignity" twice in its preamble. It is heartening to note that democracy, 
secularism, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual, as they appear in the 
preamble, are considered as the basic feature of the Indian Constitution which 
cannot be taken away or amended, to deprive them of their significance, even 
by a constitutional amendment. 113! 
Thu;. the preamble to the Constitution of India is aimed at to protect 
and promote the human rights of all the people. Various objectives of the 
preamble find their elaborate expression in various provisions of the 
fundamental rights and the directive principles respectively. 
3.3 Fundamental Rights 
Many of the human rights and freedoms in the Universal Declaration of 
human Rights, 1948 and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 1966. are guaranteed in Part III of the Indian Constitution as 
fundamental rights. Recognition of the human dignity of the individual is 
elevated to the status of the fundamental rights. In fact. Part III of the 
Constitution is characterized as the Magna Carta of India. 1141 fart Ill 
embodies and sanctifies certain fundamental, individual, justifiable rights 
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which are primarily meant to protect and promote the basic human tights of the 
people and protect the individual against the state action by imposing negative 
obligations. They are limitations upon all the powers of the government, 
legislative as well executive and they are essential for the preservation of 
human right. The declaration of fundamental rights in the Constitution serves 
as reminder to the govcnuncnt in power that certain liberties and freedoms 
essential for by the people and assured to them by the fundamental law of the 
land are to be respected. Speaking about the importance of fundamental rights, 
Bhagwati, S. observed: "These fundamental rights represent the basic values 
cherished by the people of this country (India) since the Vedic times and they 
are calculated to protect the dignity of the individual and create conditions in 
which every human being can develop his personality to the fullest extent. 
The)' weave a 'pattern of ,guarantees' on the basic structure of human rights, 
and impose negative obligations on the State not to encroach on individual 
liberty in the various dimensions". [ 15] 
However, absolute and. unrestricted individual rights do not, and cannot exist 
m any modern State. Unrestricted liberty and freedom tends to become license 
and jeopardizes the liberty and freedom of others the result would be chaos, 
ruin anarchy. On the other hand, if the State has the absolute power to 
determine the extent of personal liberty the result would be tyranny. Hence it is 
very important make a just balance between the conflicting Interests of the 
individuals and of the Society. The Constitution of India permits the reasonable 
restrictions to be imposed on individual's liberty m the interest of the society. 
Thus, the State can limit It the freedom and liberty of the individuals on those 
grounds which are prescribed in the Constitution. Anything beyond that will be 
ultra virus of the Constitution. 
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The fundamental rights are guaranteed in Part III of the Indian Constitution 
consisting of articles 12 to 35. Since these rights are a guarantee against "state 
action", they have to be distinguished from violation of such rights by the 
private parties. Private action IS protected by the ordinary law of the land. 
Article 12 defines the expression "State" as under; '12 Definition-In this Part, 
unless the context otherwise requires, "the State "includes the Government and 
Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the 
States and all local or other authorities within the territory of the India or under 
the control of the Government of India". 
Thus, a very wide definition of the expression "State" has been given by 
article 12. The Supreme Court of India has further expanded the scope of the 
expression "Stale" by holding that any agency or instrumentality of the 
government will also be covered in the expression "other authorities" under 
article 12 of the Constitution.[30] The Supreme Court has held that with the 
changing role of the State from merely being a police state to a welfare state it 
is necessary to widen :the scope of the expression "other authorities" in article 
12 so as to include all those bodies which are, though not created by the 
Constitution or by the statute, yet are acting as agencies or instrumentalities of 
the government. Thus, the government may function through the legal device 
of corporation but by doing so the government cannot be allowed to play truant 
with the basic human rights of the people. 
Article l3 makes any law inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental 
rights as void to the extent of inconsistency. In this regard it is relevant to note 
the language of article 13(2) which. Provides: "The State shall not make any 
law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law 
made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be 
void". 
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This clause, in fact, provides for "judicial review" of all legislations in India. 
The main Object of article 13 is to secure the paramount of the Constitution in 
regard to fundamental rights which represent the basic human rights of the 
people. This is done by prohibiting the State from- making a law which either 
takes away totally or abrogates in part a fundamental right. However, article 13 
does not apply to the constitutional amendment and the validity of the 
constitutional amendment cannot be challenged under article 13. But, of 
course, any constitutional amendment can be challenged if it violates the "basic 
structure" of the Constitutional. 116] And most of' the human rights which find 
their reflection in Part III of the Indian Constitution such as right to equality, 
freedom and life constitute as the "basic structure" of the Constitution and 
hence they cannot be abrogated even by a constitutional amendment. 
The fundamental rights as incorporated in Part III of the Constitution can be 
classified as under: 
(a) Right to equality 
(b) Right to freedoms 
(c) Right against exploitation 
(d) Right to freedom of religion 
(e) Cultural and educational rights 
(t Right to Constitutional Remedies 
(Articles 14-18) 
(Articles 19-22) 
(Article 23-24) 
(Articles 25-28) 
(Articles 29-30) 
(Articles 32-35) 
(a) Right to Equality 
The right to equality is the faith and creed of our democratic republic; it forms 
the foundation of socio-economic justice. Article 14 embodies the idea of 
equality as expressed in the preamble. The succeeding articles 15, 16, 17 and 
18 lay down specific application of general rule laid down in article 14 of the 
Constitution. Article 14 provides: "The State shall not deny to any person 
equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of 
India". 
This provision is like the provisions of articles I and 7 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. Articles 2(2) and 3 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 also talk about 
equality among men and women. Articles 3 and 26 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also mention about the equal rights of 
men and women and equality before law and equal protection of laws 
respectively. The reference to the principles of equality and non-discrimination 
is also found in the Charter of United Nations.[ 171 Other basic instruments 
adopted by the United Nations and specialized agencies which expressly 
provide for equality and the prevention of discrimination are, International 
Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the 
International Covenant on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid: the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 
1958 (No. 1II) Of ILO; the Convention against Discrimination in Education of 
UNESCO. the Equal Remuneration Convention. 1951 (No. 100) of 11.0 and 
the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 
In article 14 of the Constitution the first expression "equality before the law" is 
somewhat negative concept implying the absence of any special privilege in 
favor of individuals and the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law. 
The other expression "equal protection of the laws" is more positive concept 
implying equality of treatment in equal circumstances. However, dominant 
idea common to both the expressions is that of equal justice. "Equality before 
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the laws" means that among equals the law should be equal and should be 
equally administered, that like should be treated alike. This can he equated 
with the Dicey's concept of "Rule of Law". In fact, the quintessence of our 
Constitution is the "Rule of Law". The executive officers of the State cannot 
interfere with the human rights of individuals unless they can point to same 
specific law which authorizes their acts. Rule of Law requires that no person 
shall be subjected to harsh, uncivilized or discriminatory treatment even when 
the Object is the securing of the paramount exigencies of law and order. [ 18] 
The Supreme Court of India has rightly pointed out what Dicey also remarked: 
"That the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of 
law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system
governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, 
must he confined within defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view 
means that decision should be made by the application of known principles and 
rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizens 
should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or 
without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis of a 
decision taken in accordance with the rule of law".[ 19] 
Rule of law also imposes duty upon the State to protect the human rights of the 
people and take special measures to prevent and punish brutality by police 
methodology. 
The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an 
essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness, pervades article 14 like a 
brooding omnipresence. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and 
ensures fairness in equal treatment. 1201  
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The principle of equality as enshrined in the Constitution is not a mere 
guideline or recommendation but a strict and fundamental provision which 
imposes on the judiciary the obligation to find out if the legislative, executive 
and administrative authorities have respected the equality of all individuals. If 
the Court finds that this principle has been violated then to order that such 
laws, acts, ministerial decisions or administrative regulations involved should 
not be imposed. [ 211 
However, equal protection of the laws guaranteed by article 14 does not mean 
that all the laws must be general in character. In certain cases the States are 
obliged to adopt laws or take administrative measures which differentiate 
between individuals and they cannot be said to be discriminatory, for example. 
national tax legislation, which must necessarily differentiate between taxpayers 
according to their capital or income. Thus, article 14 permits reasonable 
classification but prohibits class legislation. It must always be remembered that 
the classification must not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive but must be based 
on some real and substantial distinction having rational relation with the object 
to be achieved. 
Applying the general principle of equality, article 15 of the Indian Constitution 
specifically prohibits discrimination on grounds of' religion, race, caste, sex or 
place of birth. It provides: 
Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place 
of birth 
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of 
religion, race, caste, sex, and place of birth or any of them. 
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(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of 
birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, restriction or condition 
with regard to- 
(a)  access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of 
public entertainment; or 
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats. roads and places of 
public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State 
funds or dedicated to the use of the general public. 
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any 
special provision for women and children. 
(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent 
the State from making any special provision for the advancement 
of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or 
for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. 
This fundamental right is available to all the citizens. The corresponding 
provision to article 15(1) of the Indian Constitution can be found in article 2 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948; article 2(l) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and article 2(2) of 
the International Covenant on Economic; Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. 
Once the principle of equality is accepted, it becomes impossible to 
discriminate against any person or group of persons. The principle of non-
discrimination is based on equality and dignity. Discrimination can be said to 
be the denial of the fundamental and universally accepted rights of all human 
beings to persons or groups of persons who are excluded. It is submitted that 
the various grounds of discrimination mentioned in various international 
instruments' are not exhaustive, In the fast changing world, new grounds for 
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discrimination may also appear, for example. I-IIV/AIDS infection. Such new 
grounds have to be tackled carefully without violating, the principle of equality. 
Article 15(3) permits the state to make special provision for women (on the 
ground of sex) and children. This is so because women and children require 
special treatment on account of their very nature. Thus. the Constitution 
permits positive discrimination in the above two cases. The reason is that 
women's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place 
her at a disadvantaged position. Maternity Benefit Act of 1961 has been 
enacted to provide maternity benefit to women employees. 
Clause (4) of article 15 further permits the State to make special provision for 
the advancement of disadvantaged groups such as "socially and educationally 
backward classes" of citizens, "Scheduled Castes" or "Scheduled Tribes". In 
India this provision has been exploited by the politicians from time to time by 
making reservations in various educational and professional educational 
institutions. The issue of reservation saw many young students immolating in 
1990 when the Government of India implemented the Mandal Commission 
Report granting 27'c of reservation to the other backward classes. The real 
problem is in identifying the people who deserve the real benefit of this clause 
under the banner of "socially and educationally backward" classes. Also many 
castes are identified as such Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. So the 
real intended benefit does not reach the real deserving people. 
Article 16 of the Indian Constitution aims at providing equality of opportunity 
to all citizens in matters of public employment. Article 16 provides: 
16. Equality of opportunity in matters of emplolnient: 
(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating 
to employment or appointment to any office under the State. (2) No citizen 
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shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, 
residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in 
respect of any employment of office under the State. 
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law 
prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or 
appointment to an office under the Government or any local or other 
authority within, a State or Union Territory, any requirement as to 
residence within that State or Union territory prior to such employment 
or appointment. 
(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision 
for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward 
class of citizens which in the opinion of the State, is not adequately 
represented in the services under the State. 
(5) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which 
provides that the incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of 
any religious or denominational institution or any member of the 
governing body thereof shall be a person professing a particular religion 
or belonging to a particular denomination. 
Article 21(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 also says 
that "everyone has the right to equal access to public services in his country'. 
Under the Indian Constitution, equality of opportunity is assured to the citizens 
in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office. Article 16(4) 
permits the State for making any provision for the reservation in appointments 
or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which in the opinion of the 
State are not adequately represented in the services of the State. The issue of 
reservation has resulted in the conflict between the people and social milieu of 
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India. The politicians have been using reservation as a potent weapon for 
assuring their votes and paying little respect to the human rights. The Mandal 
Commission agitation in the year 1990 is a clear example of this. [221 Thus, 
article 16 emhodies the particular application of general rule of equality laid 
down m article 14 with special reference to appointment and employment 
under the State. 
Article 17 of the Constitution abolishes untouchability and forbids its practice 
in any form. Article 17 provides: 
Abolition of untouchability-"Untouchability is abolished and its practice in any 
form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of 
"untouchability" shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law. 
Thus, the enforcement of any disability arising out of untouchability has been 
made an offence punishable in accordance with Law. Article 17 is a very 
important and significant provision from the point of view of equality before 
the law. It guarantees social justice and dignity of man, the twin privileges 
which were denied to a vast section of Indian Society for centuries together. 
The word "un touch ability" occurring in article 17 of the Constitution has not 
been used in literal or grammatical sense but as understood by practice 
developed historically in India. [231 
Article 17 of the Constitution is on the lines of the provision of article 2 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Even article 15(2) of the Constitution 
helps in the eradication of un touch ability as on the grounds of un touch ability 
no person can he denied access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places 
of entertainment or the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of 
public resort which are maintained wholly or partly out of State fund. The 
Parliament of India, in exercise of the powers conferred by article 35(ii) has 
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enacted the untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955. The basic Object of this 
enactment is to ban the practice of untouchahility in any form. This Act of 
1955 was amended in 1976 by the untouchability (Offences) Amendment Act, 
in order to make the law more stringent for removing un touch ability from the 
Society. This Act has now been renamed as "The Protection of Civil rights Act, 
1955." Under the amended Act any discrimination on the ground of 
untouchability is considered as an offence. It imposes the duty on the public 
servants to investigate such offences. The expression "civil right" is defined as 
"any right accruing to a person by reason of the abolition of untouchability by 
article 17 of the Constitution". The Supreme Court of India' has held that the 
fundamental right under article 17 of the Constitution is available against 
private individual also and it is the constitutional duty of the State to take 
necessary steps and ensure that this fundamental right is not violated. 1241 
(b) Right faire edom 
Personal liberty is one of the most important of all human rights. Articles 19 to 
22 of the Indian Constitution deal with different aspects of this basic right. The 
principle that "all human beings are born free" is found in articles l and 2 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The next 19 articles of the 
Declaration deal with different fundamental freedoms. To be born free and 
having right to liberty pre-supposes that each human being has the freedom of 
choice in the conduct of his or her life. Freedom, next to life itself, is viewed as 
the most precious human value, closely linked to human dignity and to the 
worth of human life. Article 19 of the Indian Constitution provides six basic 
fundamental freedoms to all its citizens. It provides: 
Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech etc. - 
(1) All citizens shall have the right- 
(a) to freedom of speech and expression; 
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; 
(c) to form associations or unions; 
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; 
(c) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; 
(1) Freedom to acquire holds and dispose of property. This has been omitted by 
Constitution (Forty-forth) Amendment, Act, 1978 w.e.f. 20.6.1979] 
(g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business 
Freedom of speech and expression is indispensable in a democracy. In fact, 
freedom of speech and expression and of press lay at the foundation of all 
democratic organizations. Article 19(1)(a), which provides fundamental 
freedom of speech and expression to all the citizens, corresponds to article 
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. Similar provision is 
also found in article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 1966. 
The freedom of speech and expression also includes the freedom of press. 
which has not been specifically mentioned in the Indian Constitution. Because 
one can express his opinion through visible representation or by words of 
mouth, writing, printing or any other mode. However, no person can publish 
anything concerning the privacy of any other person, his family, marriage, 
procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education etc. Because every 
citizen also has a right to privacy. Recently the Supreme Court of India has 
held in R. Rajagopal vs. State of T.N [25] that publication in regard to above 
mentioned aspects becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon 
public records including court records. This is for the reason that once a matter 
becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it 
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becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press and media among others. 
However, the human rights conscious Supreme Court has further carved out an 
exception to the above mentioned rule. i.e.. a female who is the victim of a 
sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence should not be further 
subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident being publicized in 
press/media. The Supreme Court has further held that right to privacy is also 
not available with respect to acts and conducts of public officials relevant to 
the discharge of their official duties. This is so even where the publication is 
based upon facts and statements which are not true, unless the official 
establishes that the publication was made (by the defendant) with reckless 
disregard for truth. But where the publication is proved to be false and actuated 
by malice or personal animosity, the defendant would have no defence and 
would be liable for damages. So far as the government, local authority and 
other organs exercising governmental power are concerned, they cannot 
maintain a suit for damages for defaming them. It is submitted that this new 
approach of the Supreme Court has strengthen the hands of people and now 
they can ventilate their views on human rights violation more freely 
particularly when such violation is done by the officials of the government. 
This freedom of publicity will not only bring the guilty officials to books but 
also it will have deterrent effect on the public officials from indulging in 
human rights violation. Article 19(l) (b) of the Constitution guarantees all 
citizens freedom of peaceful assembly without arms. The corresponding 
provision is found in article 20(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 1948. The right of peaceful assembly is also recognized in article 21 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. The right of 
peaceful assembly is also implied in the very idea of the democratic 
government. 
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Article 19(1) (e) of the Constitution guarantees to all citizens right to form 
associations or unions. This right corresponds to article 23(4) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. Such a provision has also been 
incorporated in article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 1966 and article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic. Social 
and Cultural Rights. 1966. 
Corresponding to article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
1948, the Indian Constitution guarantees to all its citizens right to move freely 
throughout the territory of India in article 19(1)(d) and right to reside and settle 
in any part of the territory of India in article 19(1)(e). In this regard article 1 ? 
of International Covenant on- Civil and Political Rights. 1966 is also relevant. 
Right to acquire, hold and dispose of property under article 19(l) (f) has been 
deleted from the fundamental rights and it appears as a constitutional right 
under article 300-A of the Constitution. This newly inserted provision in the 
Constitution of India corresponds to article 17(2) of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, 1948. 
Article 19(1) (g) of the Indian Constitution gives its citizens right to practice 
any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. So the State 
cannot compel a citizen to carry on business against his will. 
But all the freedoms provided in article 19(1) (a) to (g) are not absolute. 
Absolute freedoms cannot be guaranteed in any modern state. If the people are 
given absolute freedom without any control, the result would be ruin. 
However, the Constitution of India does not leave the complete discretion of 
limiting these freedoms or imposing restrictions on these freedoms in the hands 
of the State. Article 19(2) to (6) of the Constitution mentions the grounds on 
the basis of which these freedoms can be restricted. Thus, the restriction of any 
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freedom on grounds other than those mentioned in the Constitution is simply 
not permissible. 
Article 19(2) to (6) provides as under: 
(1) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any 
existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as 
such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right 
conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and 
integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with 
foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to 
contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. 
Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any 
existing law in so far as it imposes. or prevent the State from making any law 
imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public 
order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said 
sub-clause. 
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation 
or any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from 
making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and 
integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions 
on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause. 
(3) Nothing in sub-clauses (d) and (c) of the said clause shall affect the 
operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the 
State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the 
exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said-clauses either in the 
interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of 
any Scheduled Tribe. 
(4) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation 
of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from 
making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, 
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the 
said sub clause, and in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall 
affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or 
prevent the State from making any law relating to,. 
(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing 
any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or 
(ii) the carrying on by the State or by a corporation owned or 
controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, 
whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or 
otherwise. 
The corresponding restrictions are also found in article 29 (2) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 and articles 12(3) and 19 (3) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 1966. 
The restrictions which can be imposed under article 19 (2) to (6) on the 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under article 19(l) (a) to (g) of the 
Constitution cannot be arbitrary. They must satisfy the following twin test: 
(1) They can be imposed only on the grounds mentioned in clauses (2) 
to (6) of article 19 of the Constitution. 
(ii, The restrictions must be reasonable restrictions. With regard to the 
standard of reasonable restrictions the Supreme Court laid down: 
The expression "reasonable restriction" signifies that limitations imposed on a 
person in enjoyment of the right should not he arbitrary or of an excessive 
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nature, beyond what is required in the interest of the public. The list of 
reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual 
statute impugned, and no abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness 
can he laid down as applicable in all cases. The restrictions which arbitrarily or 
excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of 
reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between freedom 
guaranteed in article 19(1)(g) and the social control permitted by cl.(6) of 
article 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality. 1261 
Thus, the phrase "reasonable restrictions" is wide in its scope and 
implies to intelligent care and deliberation which reason dictates. It is for the 
courts and not for the legislators to determine whether the restriction is 
reasonable or not. In other words, the word "reasonable" before "restrictions" 
widen the scope of judicial review. There is no exact standard or pattern of 
reasonableness which can be laid down for all cases. Each case has to be 
judged on its own merit. But the restriction must be reasonable from the 
substantive as well as' procedural point of view. The courts are also required to 
determine the reasonableness of restrictions by Objective standards and not by 
subjective one. A restriction to be reasonable must have a rational relation with 
the Object which the legislature seeks to achieve and must not be in excess of 
that Object. 
The courts have taken the view that if the restriction is imposed for securing 
the object laid down in the directive principles of state policy, given in Part IV 
of the Constitution, then that restriction may be regarded as a reasonable 
restriction."[271 While imposing restrictions under clauses (5) and (6) of article 
19 of the Constitution, it is also necessary that they are in the "interest of the 
general public" l2 I 
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From the language of clause (2) of article 19 of the Constitution it is clear that 
there are eight grounds on the basis of which restrictions' can be imposed. The 
term "security of State" refers to only serious and aggravated forms of public 
disorder and not ordinary breaches of public order and public safety. The 
words "in the interest of' before the words "security of the State" imply that the 
actual result of the act is immaterial. The ground of "friendly relations with 
foreign country" is unique to our Constitution. The object of this ground is to 
prohibit the malicious propaganda against a foreign friendly State. 
The terns "public order" is something more than ordinary maintenance of law 
and order. It is synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquility. It may be 
mentioned here that the meaninu and scope of the term "public order" was 
among the most controversial questions discussed during the elaboration of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on 
human Rights."[29] 
The words "morality or decency" are words of wide meaning. The ground of 
morality also appears in article- 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Morality being the noblest product of culture, it is the duty of all to 
respect it. 
The other grounds appearing in article 19(2) are contempt of Court. 
defamation, incitement to an offence and Integrity and sovereignty of India. 
Freedom under article 19(1) (b) can he restricted by Imposing restrictions on 
the ground of public order and' In the Interest of sovereignty and integrity of 
India. Freedom under article 19(1 )(c) can he restricted under article 19(4) on 
the grounds of public order, morality and the sovereignty and integrity of India, 
The .freedom of movement under article 19(1 )(d) and freedom of residence 
under article 19(1)(e) can he restricted under article 19(5) in the interest of 
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general public and for the protection of the Interests of Scheduled Tribes. The 
Object of restricting the light of movement in the interest of "Scheduled 
Tribes" is to protect the culture, language and customs of certain original tribes 
In India. It is feared that mixing of tribal people with other people from other 
areas in an uncontrolled manner might produce undesirable effect upon the 
tribal people. And right under article 19(1) (g) can be restricted under article 
19(1) (6) by imposing reasonable restrictions in the interest of general public. 
Thus, it is clear that the scheme of article 19 of the Indian Constitution 
considered as a whole furnishes a very satisfactory and rational basis for 
adjusting the claims of individual rights of freedoms and the claims of public 
good. 
Article 20 of the Indian Constitution contain certain safeguards to persons 
accused of crimes. It provides: 
Protection in respect of conviction for offences-(J) no person shall 
he convicted of any offence except for violation n of a law in force 
at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence nor he 
subjected to penalty greater than that which might have been 
inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the 
offence. 
(2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than 
once. 
(3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness 
against himself. 
96 
The corresponding provision is article 11(2) of the Universal declaration of 
Human Rights. A provision similar to article 20 (1) is also found in article 15 
(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Article 20 (I) of the Constitution of India provides protection against ex post 
facto law and thus prohibits the legislature to make retrospective criminal law. 
This clause protects the basic human right of the people that no person can be 
punished for an act which was not an offence at the date of its commission. It 
further protects the person by providing that no person could be subjected to a 
penalty greater than that which [night have been inflicted under the law in 
force at the time of the commission of the offence. On the contrary the accused 
can take advantage of the beneficial provision of the ex-post facto law. For 
example, if by a subsequent Act, the duration of the punishment is reduced, the 
accused can take the benefit of such reduced punishment. 
Under clause (2) of article 20 of the Constitution, protection is provided to 
persons against double jeopardy. This clause is based on the Common Law 
principle of nemo dehet vs vexari, which means that no man should be put 
twice in peril for the same offence. This protection is available to the person 
who is accused of an offence and who is prosecuted and punished for the same 
offence more than once by the court or judicial tribunal. If a person is 
prosecuted and acquitted, then subsequent proceedings are not a bar. In other 
words. to claim the protection of this article "prosecution" as well as 
"punishment" must be there in regard to the same offence. The object of this 
clause is to avoid the harassment which must not be caused to a person for 
succeeding criminal proceeding where only one crime has been committed. 
The fundamental rule of criminal jurisprudence against self-incrimination has 
been raised to a rule of constitutional taw in article 20 (3). This protection 
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extends to any person accused of an offence and prohibits all kinds of 
compulsions to make him a witness against himself. 
Thus, we find that article 20 is directly relevant to the criminal process. While 
article 20 (1) is concerted with the substantive law of criminal liability and 
penalty, article 20 (2) and (3) are concerned with the stage of procedure. 
Right to life and personal Liberty is most fundamental of aft fundamental rights. 
Article 21 of the Constitution secures this right to all persons. It provides: 
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to 
procedure established by law. 
This article advances the Object of article 3 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Similar provision is also found in article 6 of the International 
Covenant on CiviL and Political Rights. 
The right guaranteed under article 21 is available to citizens as well as non-
citizens. To begin with, the Indian Supreme Court interpreted the words 
"personal liberty" narrowly to mean nothing more than the liberty of the 
physical body, i.e., freedom from arrest and detention, from false 
imprisonment or wrongful confinement.[30] But in the later years the Supreme 
Court gave the widest possible meaning to the expression "personal liberty" so 
as to include within itself all the varieties of rights which go to make up the 
personal liberty of man other than those dealt with in article 19(1) of the 
Constitution. In other words, while article 19(1) deals with particular species or 
attributes of that freedom, "personal liberty" in article 21 takes in and 
comprises the residue. [31 ] 
In Mane/ca Gandhi vs. Union of India [321 Rhagwati, J. while expanding the 
scope and ambit of article 21 observed: The expression 'personal liherty. in 
Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go 
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to constitute the personal liberty of men and some of them have been raised to 
the status of distinct fundamental rights and given additional protection under 
Art. 19". 
He was further of the opinion that the attempt of the Court should he to expand 
the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights rather than attenuate their 
meaning and content by a process of judicial construction. [331 Justice 
Bhagwati also observed that the expression "procedure under "procedure 
established by law" must mean as "just, fair and reasonable" procedure. In 
other words, the "procedural due process" was interpreted as implicit in article 
21. Justice Krishna Iyer in the same case took the view that even the "law' 
under article 21 must also be "just, fair and reasonable'. Thus, according to 
Justice Krishna lyer, even "substantive due process" is also implicit in article 
21 of the Constitution. 
This new interpretation of article 21. expanding its scope and ambit has 
resulted in the development of a new human rights constitutional 
jurisprudence. Now a variety of rights are interpreted in article 21 of the 
Constitution and thus made enforceable in the court of Law. The right to 'live' 
is not merely confined to physical existence but it includes within its ambit the 
right to live with human dignity. This right is not restricted to mere animal 
existence. In Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi,1341 the Supreme 
Court observed that the right to 'live' is nol confined to the protection of any 
faculty or limb through which life is enjoyed or the soul communicates with 
the outsides world but it also includes "the right to live with human dignity" 
and an- that goes along with it, namely, the hare necessities of life such as, 
adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and 
expressing ourselves in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and 
communicating with fellow human beings. The Supreme Court observed: "The 
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expression "personal liberty" occurring in article 21 is of the widest amplitude 
and it includes the right to socialize with members of the family and friends 
subject, of course, to any valid prison regulations and under articles 14 and 21, 
such prison regulations must be reasonable and non-arbitrary. 
The Supreme Court has held that several un-enumerated rights fall within 
article 21 since "personal liberty" is of widest amplitude. The right to "personal 
liberty", inner-alia, covers the right to go abroad; [35] the right to privacy;[36] 
the right against solitary confinement[37] the right against bar fetters[38] the 
right to legal aid;[39] the right to speedy trial;[40] the right against handcuffing 
[411 the right against delayed execution.[42] the right against custodial 
violence[43]the right against public hanging[44] the right to doctor's 
assistance[451 right to shclter;[46] and protection against use of third degree 
methods by the police.I471 
The Supreme Court has also given very wide interpretation to the expression 
"life" in article 21 of the Constitution of India. The right to "livelihood" has 
been held to be implicit in the expression "life" in article 21 of the 
Constitution. In Olga Tel/is v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1481 the 
Supreme Court observed•. 
The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far-reaching. 
It does not mean merely that life cannot he extinguished or taken away as, for 
example, by the imposition and execution of death sentence, except according 
to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An 
equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because; no 
person can live without the means of living that is the means of livelihood. IJ• 
the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of Constitutional right to life, the 
easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of 
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his means of livelihood to the poinl of abrogation. Such deprivation would not 
only denude the hJe oJ its effective content and meaningfulness but it would 
snake life impossible to live. [49] 
The Supreme Court has also regarded as right to live in healthy environment 
[50] and right to maintenance and improvement of public health as a part of the 
right to live with human dignity enshrined in article 21 of the Constitution. [51] 
Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of Mohini Jain vs. Slate of Karnataka 
[52I has interpreted the "right to education" as implicit in right to life under 
article 21 of the Constitution. The Court observed: 
"Right to life" is the compendious expression for all those rights which 
the Courts must enforce because they are basic to the dignified enjoyment of 
life. The right to education (lows directly from right to life_ The right to life 
under article 2L and the dignity of an individual cannot be assured unless it is 
accompanied by the right to education. [53] 
This new interpretation of article 21 of the Constitution will help in achieving 
the objective of corresponding provision, i.e., article 26 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as enforceable right. The right to education is 
also recognized in articles 13 and 14 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. India is a party to the Covenant and the 
status of this new right will be a useful reminder of the problems inherent in 
any attempt to create a social right of this kind for individuals against their 
states. 
Thus, article 21 of the Constitution is the heart of human rights and has rightly 
received expanded meaning from time to time by the Apex Court. 
Article 22 of the Constitution deals with protections against arrest and 
detention in certain cases. In fact, article 22 of the Constitution supplements 
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article 21. Article 22 prescribes the minimum procedural requirements that 
must be included in any law enacted by the legislature in accordance with 
which a person may be deprived of his life, or personal liberty. Article 22 of 
the Constitution corresponds to article 9 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Article 9 and 14(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights also contain similar protections. 
Article 22 of the Constitution deal with two distinct matters clauses (I) and (2) 
of article 22 provide protection to persons arrested under the ordinary law of 
the crimes. These clauses provide: Article.22 
(1)No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being 
informed as soon as may not be. of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he 
is denied the right to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of 
his choice. 
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced 
before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such 
arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest 
to court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody 
beyond the period without the authority of a magistrate. 
Thus, there are four rights which are available to persons who are arrested 
under an ordinary taw. These rights are; 
(i) 	the right to be informed "as soon as may he" of grounds of arrest; 
(iii) 	the right to consult and to he represented by a lawyer of his own 
choice; 
(iii) the right to he produced before the magistrate within 24 hours; 
and 
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(iv) freedom from detention beyond the said period except by the 
order of the magistrate. 
These protections are available to all persons, i.e., to both citizens as well as 
non-citizens. These grounds afford a possibility, if not an opportunity, for 
immediate release in case the arrest is not justified. 
Clause (3) of article 22 of the Constitution provides two exceptions i.e. 
(i) These protections under clauses (1) and (2) of article 22 will not 
apply to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien, 
and 
(ii) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law 
providing for preventive detention. 
The "preventive detention" can be distinguished from "arrest". A person is 
arrested when he is "accused of an offence". But in detention a person is 
detained merely on suspicion in the mind of an executive authority. The 
preventive detention is thus based on suspicion or anticipation and not on 
proof. In such a detention the past act is merely the material for inference about 
the future course of probable conduct on the part of the detainee. The word 
"preventive" is also used in contradiction of the word "punitive". It is not a 
punitive but a precautionary measure. [54] The Object of preventive detention 
is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept him before 
he does anything and prevent him from doing it. The possibility of launching a 
criminal prosecution, or absence of it, is not an absolute bar to an order of 
preventive detention. Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to 
society. The compulsion of the primordial need to maintain order in society, 
without which the enjoyment of all rights, including the right to life and 
personal liberty would lose all their meaning, are the true justifications for the 
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law of preventive detention. The pressures of the day in regard to the 
imperatives of the security of the state and public order might, it is true, require 
the sacrifice of personal liberty of individuals. Laws that provide for preventive 
detention posit that an individual's conduct prejudicial to the maintenance of 
public order or to the security of State provides grounds for a satisfaction for a 
reasonable prognostication of possible future manifestations of similar 
propensities on the part of the offender. This jurisdiction has been called a 
jurisdiction of suspicion; but the compulsions of the very preservation of the 
values of freedom, or democratic society and of social order might compel 
curtailment of individual liberty. [551 In A.K Gopcdan v. State of Madras [561 
Patanjali Sastri, J., while explaining the necessity of preventive detention law, 
observed: " This sinister-looking feature, so strangely out of place in a 
democratic Constitution, which invests personal liberty with sacrosanctity of a 
fundamental right, and SO incompatible with the promise of its preamble, is 
doubtless designed to prevent the abuse of freedom by anti-social and 
subversive elements which might imperil the national welfare of the infant 
republic". 
The provision for preventive detention has not been unknown in other 
democratic countries like England and Canada. but only as a war-time, and not 
a peace-time measure. In spite of all the emphasis on individual liberty it has 
been found necessary in India to resort to preventive detention even during the 
peace time because of its unstable law and order situation. [57] 
Under the Constitution of India, a law for preventive detention can he enacted 
by Parliaments as well as State Legislatures of the different States. A law for 
preventive detention can be enacted exclusively by the Parliament under entry 
9 of list of (Union List), for reason connected with defense, foreign affairs, or 
the security of India. Under entry 3 of List III (Concurrent List), Parliament as 
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well as State Legislature can concurrently make a law for preventive detention 
for reasons connected with security of a State, maintenance of public order, or 
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.[58] From the 
above mentioned scheme it is evident that the Parliament has a wider 
legislative jurisdiction in matters of preventive detention as it can legislate or 
enact a law providing preventive detention for reasons connected with all the 
six heads mentioned in Lists I and Ill. Whereas State Legislatures can enact 
law for preventive detention only for reasons connected with the three heads 
mentioned in List III. Further, it a law for preventive detention for reasons 
connected with any of the heads mentioned in List 111 is enacted by the State 
Legislature as well as by the Parliament, then the Law enacted by the 
Parliament will override the State law in the event of a conflict between the 
two. [59] In addition to this, the Parliament is also having "residuary power of 
legislation" under Art. 248 read with entry 97 of list 1 (Union List) of the 
Seventh Schedule and hence can make any law (including a law providing for 
preventive detention) with respect to any matter on any other ground. 
Though the Constitution-makers had recognized the necessity of laws as to 
preventive detention which could be made by the Parliament or State 
Legislatures, it has also provided in clauses (4) to (7) of Art, 22 certain 
safeguards to mitigate their harshness by placing fetters on legislative power 
conferred on ParliamentiState Legislature and to prevent misuse of the power 
by the executive. Art. 22 clauses (4) to (7) provide for minimum procedure. 
which must be observed in any preventive detention matter. If any law 
providing for preventive detention or administrative action relating thereto 
infringes safeguardslprocedure prescribed in clauses (4) to (7) of Art. 22, then 
that law or action would be invalid as violating fundamental right of the 
detainee. It is immaterial whether this safeguards/procedure are incorporated or 
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not in the law providing for preventive detention because if they are not 
incorporated, they would still be deemed to be part of the law of preventive 
detention as a super imposition by the Constitution which is the supreme law 
of the land. Thus, some semblance of natural justice has been woven into the 
fabric of preventive detention by these constitutional provisions. [60] The 
intention of the framers of the Constitution in incorporating Art. 22 were 
actually to curtail the legislative powers to legislate on preventive detention 
and render them subject to certain specific limitations. 161 ] 
Clauses (4) to (7) of article 22 were amended by the Constitution (Forty-
fourth) Amendment Act. 1979. After the Amendment these clauses provide as 
under: 
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorize the 
detention of a person for a longer period than two months unless an 
Advisory Board constituted in accordance with the recommendations 
of the Chief Justice of the appropriate High Court has reported 
before the expiration of the said period of two months that there is in 
its opinion sufficient cause for such detention. 
Provided that an Advisory Board shall consist of a chairman and not less than 
two other members, and the Chairman shall be a serving judge of an 
appropriate High Court and the other members shall be serving or retired 
fudges of High Court; 
Provided further that nothing in this clause shall authorize the detention of any 
person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament 
under sub-clause (a) of clause (7). 
Explanation: In this clause, 'appropriate High Court" means._ 
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(i) 	in the case of the detention of it person in pursuance of an order 
of detention made by the Government of India or an officer or 
authority subordinate to that Government, the High Court for the 
Union Territory of Dclhi; 
(ii) in the case of detention of it person in pursuance of an order of 
detention made by the Government of any State (other than it 
Union Territory,) the 1-ugh Court for the State. and 
(iii) in the case of detention of a person in pursuance of an order of 
detention made by the administrator of a Union Territory or an 
officer or authority subordinate to such administrator, Such High 
Court as may be specified by or under any law made by 
Parliament in this behalf. 
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any 
law providing for preventive detention, the authority making an order 
shall, as soon as may be. communicate to such person the grounds on 
which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest 
opportunity of making a representation against the order. 
(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order 
as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority 
considers being against the public interest to disclose. 
(7) Parliament may he law prescribe 
(a) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or 
classes of cases be detained under any law for providing for 
preventive detention; and 
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(h) the procedure to he followed by an Advisory Board in any inquiry 
under clause (4). 
It may he pointed out hero that article 22 is not a complete and self-contained 
code. In fact, articles 21 and 22 constitute an integrated Code in matters 
relating to personal liberty and preventive detention. Article 22, to some extent 
advances in a way the purpose of article 21 when it specifies certain procedural 
safeguards which are available to a person who is arrested or detained. The law 
of preventive detention is also subject to other constitutional limitations 
enumerated in Part III of the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights. Any 
law of preventive detention can he tested on the grounds of "reasonableness" in 
articles 14 arid 19 of the C'crnstitution. 
The following protections/safeguards have been provided to the detainee in 
clauses (4) to (7l of article 22 of the Constitution. 
(i) No person can he detained for a period more than three months 
unless the Advisory Board duly constituted for the said purpose 
authorize for a loni:er detention on the basis of some sufficient 
cause. 
(ii) The authority making the order of detention must "as ;von as 
may be" Cl)tllnlunICalt' to the person detained the grounds of 
arrest. It is necessary that the grounds must he communicated in 
the language known to the detune. 
(iii) The dctune must be given "the earliest opportunity" of making a 
representation against the order of detention. The daunt is to he 
furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him to make a 
representation. 
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even an advocate with ten years standing was eligible to he 
appointed on the Board. The change was made to make Advisory 
Board independent of the executive. 
(c) Art. 22(7) (a), under which the government could prescribe the 
circumstances and class or classes of cases in which a person could 
be detained For 	period longer than three months without the 
approval of Advisory Board was deleted.[63] 
The Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 received the assent of 
the President on 30 April 1979. Most of the amending provisions of the 44th 
Amendment Act were brought into force from 20 June 1979 and the rest with 
effect from l August 1979 by issuing a notification. Ô41 l-owcvcr, section 3 of 
the Amendment Act, 1978, which amended .Art. 22(4) to (7) was not brought 
into force by" the said notification. It was to come into force as and when 
official notification is issued by the Government of India. [651 And the 
government did not issue notification bringing into force the said section 3 of 
the Amending Act. 1978. In 1980. the National Security Ordinance was 
promulgated by, the President in order "to provide for preventive detention in 
certain cases and matters connected therewith". Clause 9 of this Ordinance 
provided for the constitution of Advisory Board strictly in accordance with the 
provisions of section 3 of the 44'h  Amendment Act, 1978, in spite of the fact 
that the aforesaid section was not brought into force. The National Security 
Ordinance was replaced by the National Security Act. 1980 retrospectively. 
Section 9 of the National Security Act. 1980 made a significant departure from 
clause 9 of the Ordinance providing for the constitution of Advisory Boards in 
accordance with Art. 22(4) in its original form and not in accordance with the 
amendment made to that article by section 3 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth 
Amendment) Act. 1978. 
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This was challenged before the Supreme Court in AK Roy vs. Union 4lndia, 
[661 (popularly known as the National Security Case). One of the most 
important question raised before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court 
in A.K Roy case,  was whether a writ of mandamus should or should not be 
issued to the Central Government to bring section 3 of the Constitution (Forty-
fourth Amendment) Act. 1978 into force. It was argued that section 1(2) of the 
Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act. 1978 which conferred power on 
the Central Government to bring into force different provisions of the 
Amendment Act on different dates, is unreasonable, arbitrary and unguided 
power on the executive and it violated Arts. 14 and 21 which are integral parts 
of the basic structure of the Constitution. It was also argued that the failure of 
the Government to issue the notification was mala fide and the Government 
was obligated to bring the whole of the Amendment into force within a 
reasonable time, since the executive cannot veto or nullify or negate the 
constitutional amendment by not bringing it into force for an indefinite time. 
The majority judgment was delivered by Chandrachud, C.J., for himself, 
Bhagwati and Desai 11 and rejected the above arguments by holding that 
section 1(2) of the Amendment Act is constitutionally valid Gupta, J. gave a 
dissenting judgment and Tulzapurkar J.. agreed with him on this point. Thus, 
according to majority opinion mandamus couldn't be issued to the Central 
Government to bring into force section 3 of the Amending Act, 1978. 
Since the question involved in this case was of great importance and had direct 
bearing on the "personal liberty of the people, it is necessary to analyze the 
majority and minority opinions of the Court. [67] 
The first question which arises for our consideration is that why was power 
conferred on the Central Government to fix the same date or different dates for 
bringing the provisions of the Amending Act into force. The only probable 
answer to this is that since Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 
had brought some significant changes in whole of the Constitution. therefore, 
sometime might he needed to make suitable arrangements to implement its 
numerous provisions. For example, under section 3 of the Amending Act, New 
Advisory Boards were to be constituted and it required appointment of sitting 
as well as retired judges of the High Court. But it has to be remembered that 
power to bring into force the provisions of Amending Act was not conferred by 
Parliament but by a constituent body exercising a constituent power. (68 
Therefore, the next question which arises is that could the executive 
nullify the will of the constituent body by not bringing into force certain 
provision of the Amendment Act, 1978? And should not the mandamus be 
issued to the Central Government to bring into force the said provisions" 
Though the majority view refused to issue ma ndwuus to the Central 
Government to bring into force section 3 of the Amendment Act. 1978. the 
following observations of Chief Justice Chandrachud, who delivered the 
majority opinion are worth noting: 
"We have said at the very outset of' the discussion on this point that our 
decision on the question as to whether a inare1unius should he issued as prayed 
for by the petitioners, should not be construed as anti, approval on our part o/ 
the long and unexplained .juilare on the part of the Central Government to 
bring Section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act into force. We have no doubt that 
in leaving it to the judgment of the Central Government to decide as to when 
the various provisions of the 44 1`' Amendment should be brought into force, the 
Parliament could not have intended that the Central Government may exercise 
a kind of veto over its constitutional will by not even bringing the Amendment 
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or sonic of its provisions into force ... it is not open to the Central Govern rent 
to sit in judgment over the wisdom of' the halic'r of' that section". It is submitted 
that the above observations make it amply clear that Section 1(2) of the 
Amending Act imposed upon the Central Government "duty" and not 
"discretion", to bring into force the provisions of the Amendment Act, 1978. 
After not approving the "long and unexplained failure" on the part of Central 
Government in not bringing Section 3 of the Amendment Act into force one 
wonders as to why the majority felt helpless in issuing the writ of mcndkoHus to 
the Central Government to enforce a "duty". More so particularly because in 
the instant case the "duty" related to bringing into force a provision which was 
to assure the detainee that his case will be considered by an impartial tribunal 
fairly and objective. It is settled law that where an act is to be done or a duty is 
to be discharged and no time is specified for it, the law implies that the act 
must he done or the duty must be discharged with a reasonable time having 
regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The writ of mandamus is a 
writ of justice and it can be issued whenever justice is denied or delayed. It is 
used to compel the public body to do its public duty which it neglects or 
refuses to do.169] In the instant case the Central Government was charged with 
a public duty affecting a section of the people for whom the constituent body 
had further provided some safeguards before he could he preventively 
detained. In fact, Chandrachud, C.J. himself pointed out that "it is difficult to 
appreciate what practical difficulty can possibly prevent the Government from 
bringing into force the provisions of Section 3 after the passage of (more than a 
decade now)" and hoped that "Central Government will without further delay" 
bring Section 3 into force. Hence, delay in implementing the will of the 
Parliament may justifiably raise many an eyebrow, and there was sufficient 
material before the Court to sustain a finding of mule fide, not in the sense of 
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malice or dishonest' but in the sense of acting unreasonable and using the 
power the achieve the Object other than that for which the authority believed 
the power had been conferred, even if the intention may he to promote another 
public interest. Therefore, it is submitted that the majority opinion in not 
issuing the writ of mandamus is wrong and not well founded. Let us remember 
that if we have to have a "government of laws and not of men", the men who 
interpret and enforce the laws must possess social insight, practical sense and 
intellectual resourcefulness of measure up to the challenge of their office, and 
integrity and courage so necessary for the exercise of judicial power.(701 
However. it ray of hope emerged from the dissenting opinion of AC. Gupta, J., 
to which Tulzapurkar. J. agreed. Justice Gupta rightly explained that the non-
implementation of Section 3 of the Amendment Act. 1978 was not due to 
practical or administrative difficulty of the Government. Because Section 9 of 
the National Security Ordinance, which was promulgated in 1980, had 
provided that Advisory Board will be constituted in accordance with Art. 22 as 
amended by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. Had there 
been some practical or administrative difficulty in implementing Section 3 of 
the Amending Act 1978, the Ordinance of 1980 could not have provided for 
constitution of Board in accordance with amended Art. 22. 
Therefore, and rightly so, Gupta J. issued the writ of mandamus 
directing Central Government to issue notification under Section 1(2) of the 
Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. bringing into force the 
provisions of Section 3 of the Act within two months. [71 ] It is submitted that 
the minority opinion is in consonance with the .settled principles of 
constitutional jurisprudence. It is hoped that the majority view will he 
overruled by the Supreme Court so as to settle the controversy finally. 
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In ,M( ,rneN General For India vs..lmrut lu! Piaji►•urtdu.s. 1721 once again the 
yucstion was raised before the Supreme Court whether failure of the Central 
Government to specify the date for the enforcement of amended clauses (4) to 
(7) of article 22 amounted to abdication of or delegation of essential 
constituent power and therefore had. The Supreme Court did not consider 
necessary to decide this question in the context of that case and held that the 
applicability of A.K Kay case decision also need not be considered. It is 
submitted that the non-enforceability of the amended article 22 gave a blow to 
the personal liberty of the people of India. However, the judiciary has shown 
its concern in the individual cases and has reviewed various cases of preventive 
detention, whenever challenged before it. under its power of judicial 
reN icw.l731 
(c) Freedom against L•'.tp!auaziv? 
Article 23 of the Indian Constitution prohibits the traffic in human beings and 
beggar and other similar forms of forced labour. It provides: "Prohibition of 
tru%/lc in human beings and furcec/ laborer " 
(I) Traffic in human beings and hegc ar and other similar forms of forced 
labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an 
offence punishable in accordance ssith law. 
(_ 1 Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory 
.service for public purposes, and in imposing such service the State shall not 
make any discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste or class or 
any of them. 
This provision corresponds to article -1 of the Ltni ersal Declaration of Iluatan 
Rights. Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
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and also article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic. Social and 
Cultural Rights, contain the similar provision. 
"Traffic in human beings" means selling and buying of men and women and 
includes immoral traffic in women and children for immoral or other purposes. 
Though the word "slavery" is not found in article 23 of the Constitution yet the 
aspect of "traffic in human beings" is inter-twined with and common to the 
problems of forced labour. Slavery and servitude. Second part of article 23( 1) 
makes any contravention to this protection as an offence punishable in 
accordance with law. The Parliament in pursuance of article 35(ii) has enacted 
the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act. 1956. Now the 
title of this Act has been changed to "The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 
1956. There are many provisions in the Indian Penal Code which are addressed 
to the problems of crimes against women, including forcing minors to 
prostitution, and are attended with strict punishment. 
Beggar and "other similar forms of forced labour" are also prohibited under 
article 23 of the Constitution. Beggar means tabour or service extracted by 
government or person in power Without giving remuneration for it. In short, it 
means involuntary work without payment. It must he noted that article 23 of 
the Constitution not only prohibits beggar but also "other similar forms of 
forced labour". If a person provides labour or service to another for 
remuneration which is less than minimum wage, it would also amount to 
forced labour. The only exception is provided in clause (2) of article 23 of the 
Constitution which enables the State to impose "compulsory service for public 
purpose" without discrimination. 
As already noted, the practice of forced labour is condemned in almost every 
international instrument dealing with human rights. Article 23 of the Indian 
116 
Constitution provides right against exploitation and it is characterized as a 
charter of the down-trodden people of India. This article strikes at forced 
labour in whatever form it may manifest itself, because it is violative of human 
dignity and contrary to basic values of human rights. Article 23 of the 
Constitution protects the individual not only against that State but also against 
private citizens. The protection under this article is available to both citizens as 
well as non-citizens. But the painful gap between preachment and performance 
is best stated by Toistoy in the following words: "The abolition of slavery has 
gone on fora long time. Rome abolished Slavery. America abolished it and we 
did but only the words were abolished, not the things. 1741 
Many bonded or forced labours have been identified and liberated in India but 
the problem of eradication of debt bondage which constituted the most 
frequent kind of forced labour still exists in many parts of the country. Such 
kind of' forced labour can he solved by the government by generating rural 
employment and developing a specific programme in this regard. The 
Parliament has also enacted the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 
so as to tackle the problem of bonded labour in India. The effective 
implementation of this Act is the crying need of the hour if the human rights of 
the have-nots are to he protected. Article 24 of the Constitution prohibits the 
employment of children in factories. It provides: "No child below the age of 
fourteen years shall he employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in 
any other hazardous employment". 
The genesis of this article is that the human rights of children (boys as well as 
girls) have to he protected and because of their tender age they should not he 
exploited and employed in any factory or hazardous employment where there 
is a danger to their life. Thus, a special provision is found in the Constitution of 
India where the attention is drawn towards the protection of human rights of 
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children. Children are the assets of the nation and this provision is in the 
interest of public health and safety of life of children. 
(d) Right to Freedom of Religion 
India is a "secular" state. Articles 25 to 28 of the Indian Constitution 
specifically provide freedom of religion etc. The Indian Constitution 
guarantees to all persons the freedom of conscience and the right to profess 
practice and propagate any religion of their own choice. The freedom of 
religion as enshrined in the Constitution means freedom for all religions but it 
does not enable any religious group to work against the same rights of another 
religious group or persons. Article 25 of the Constitution provides: "Freedom 
of conscience and free profession, practice (utd pro/)agation of religion ". 
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of 
this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the 
right freely to profess. practice and propagate religion, 
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or 
prevent the State from making any la%v- 
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other 
secular activity which may be associated with religious practice: 
(h) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of 
Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and 
sections of Hindus. 
Explanation 1: The wearing and carrying of kirpuns shall he deemed to be 
included in the profession of the Sikh religion. 
Explanation II: In sub-clause (h) of clause (2), the reference to Ilindus shall be 
construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh. Jain or 
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Buddhist religion, and the reference to IIindu religious institutions shall he 
construed accordingly. 
The corresponding provision is article 18 of the Universal Ueclaration of 
Human Rights. Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights also provides freedom of religion. 
Article 25 of the Constitution ensures equality of all religions. Under this 
article a person is guaranteed two-fold freedom, i.e.. (i) freedom of conscience 
and (ii) freedom to profess. practice and propagate religion. 1751 
The "freedom of conscience" means absolute inner freedom of the citizens to 
have their own relation with Almighty. To "profess" means to openly declare 
one's faith or belief. To "practice" means to perform the religious duties, rites 
and rituals according to one's own religion. The word "propagation" means to 
spread or publicize 'religious views. 
However, these freedoms are not absolute. They are subject to the following 
restrictions. 
(i) Public Order 
(ii) Morality 
(iii) Health 
(iv) State law regulating or restricting any economic, financial or 
political or other secular activity which may be associated with 
religious practice. 
(v) State law providing for social welfare and social reform. 
These restrictions have been prescribed in article 25 itself which ensures the 
freedom of religion to persons. These restrictions are necessary to maintain the 
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secular character of the State and are in the interests of the general public. 
Every person is given the freedom to profess. propagate or practice any 
religion but in doing so he cannot interfere with the religion of another person. 
Nobody can compel any other person to convert to his religion. Also the 
Constitution empowers the State to make any law providing for social reform 
or social welfare. 
Under article 26 of the Constitution every religious denomination has been 
given the freedom to manage the religious affairs. It provides: 
Freedom to manage religious af%ctirs-Subject to public order. morality and 
health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right 
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable 
Purposes: 
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; 
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property: and 
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law. 
Article 27 further advances the secular character of the nation. It provides 
freedom as to payment of taxes for promotion of any particular religion. It 
says: Freedom as to pU171rcnt of taxes for promotion of any: particular 
religions-SC: person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of 
which are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion 
or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. 
Article 28 prohibits the imposition of religious belief's in any educational 
institutions on the persons attending any such educational institutions. It 
provides: Freedom as to attendance at religious instruction or religious 
►Worship in certain educational institutions: 
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	1 i 	No religious instruction shall be provided in any educational 
institution wholly maintained out of State funds. 
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to an educational institution 
which is administered by the State but has been established under 
any endowment or trust which requires that religious instruction 
shall be imparted in such institution. 
(3) No person attending any educational institution recognized by 
the State or receiving aid out of State funds shall be required to 
take part in any religious instruction that may be imparted in such 
institution or to attend any religious worship that may be 
conducted in such institution or in any premises attached thereto 
unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian has 
given his consent thereto. 
It is submitted that all these provisions are of great importance to India which 
comprises of people belonging to different religions, faith and beliefs. The 
secular and democratic nature of Indian society demands mutual tolerance of 
different religious beliefs and faiths with full freedom to practice the respective 
religious belief or faith of any community. 
(c) Cultural and Educational Rights 
Cultural and educational rights are indispensable for the dignity of a person 
and for the free development of his personality. Articles 29 and 30 of the 
Indian Constitution deal with cultural and educational rights. These articles 
provide: 
Protection o/ interests o/ Dziilor(tlPS; 
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(1) Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part 
thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have 
the right to conserve the same. 
(2) No citizen shall he denied admission in to any educational institution 
maintained by the State of receiving aid out of State funds on grounds 
only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. 
Right of miforities to establish (711(1 administer educational i?rstitutions: 
(I) 	All minorities whether based on religion or language. shall have the 
right to establish and. Administer educational institutions of their 
choice. 
(IA) In making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any 
property of an educational institution established and administered by a 
minority, referred to in clause (1). the State shall ensure that the amount 
fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such 
property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed 
under that clause. 
(2) 	The State shall not, in _ranting aid to educational institutions, 
discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is 
under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or 
language. 
The corresponding provisions are article 22 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
The protection under article 29 of the Constitution is available to only citizens 
whereas article 30 applies to both citizens and noncitizens. In article 29(1) the 
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protection is provided to any section of citizens to conserve their distinct 
language. script or culture. Article 29(2) prohibits the discrimination between 
citizens in state funded educational institutions on the grounds only of reliFgion, 
race, caste, language or any of them. 
On the other hand article 30 of the Constitution is confined to minorities. 
whether based on religion or language. At the same time, article 30 (1) is not 
confined to the conservation of' language. script or culture. It protects the 
minorities, whether based on religion or language, firstly by granting them the 
right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice and 
secondly by restraining the State from discriminating against any such 
institution. Thus, the Indian Constitution provides suitable protection to all the 
languages and the linguistic communities and guarantees equal treatment. 
(f) Right to Constitutional Remedies 
The talk of all human rights and declaring them as fundamental rights in the 
Constitution is meaningless unless they can be enforced by an effective 
machinery. If there is no effective remedy against the violation of human 
rights, there are no effective human rights in the real sense. In India, the courts 
are regarded as standing between the individual and the State, protecting the 
human rights of' the individual from any interference which is not justified by 
law. The Indian Parliament has the power to legislate on matters relating to 
human rights which are embodied in the Indian Constitution as fundamental 
rights, directive principles or other constitutional rights. The Indian legal 
system enables individuals to challenge legally the violation of their civil and 
political rights. The fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Indian 
Constitution vest the individual with legal capacity to challenge the measures 
adopted by the State which affect or threaten to affect his or her civil or 
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political right. For the enforcement of fundamental rights, the individual can 
approach the highest court of the land, i.e., the Supreme Court, even at the very 
first instance under article 32 of the Constitution which provides: 
Remedies fi►r enforcement o/ rights conferred hr this Part- 
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the 
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or 
writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, 
prohibition, quo u'arranto and certiorari, whichever may... .be 
appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this 
Part. 
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by 
clauses (1) and (2). Parliament may by law empower any other court to 
exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the 
powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2). 
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as 
otherwise provided for by this Constitution. 
The corresponding provision is article 8 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Similar provision has also been incorporated in article 2(3) (a) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Thus, the right to move to the highest court of the land, i.e.. the 
Supreme Court, has itself been raised to the status of fundamental right. Article 
226 of the Constitution confers powers on all the High Courts to issue the 
writs. orders or directions for the enforcement of fundamental rights. In 
addition, individuals can also seek administrative remedies. In certain 
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circumstances, particularly affecting life, resort could be made to the executive 
head of the Union or the State. f 76 
Clause (1) of article 32 guarantees the fundamental right to move the Supreme 
Court by "appropriate proceedings" for the enforcement of fundamental rights 
conferred by Part III of the Indian Constitution. The power of the Supreme 
Court under this clause is the widest. Article 32(1) talk of "appropriate 
proceedings" and this means that the requirement of the appropriateness of the 
proceeding must be judged in the light of the purpose for which the proceeding 
is taken. namely, the enforcement of fundamental rights. Therefore, the 
Supreme Court has held that even a member of the public can move the Court 
even by writing a letter. [771 This interpretation has led to the development of 
a new constitutional jurisprudence in the area of public interest litigation and 
human rights. It is not obligatory on the Court to follow adversary system'. 
Article 32(2) empowers the Supreme Court to issue directions, orders or writs, 
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition. 
certiorari and quo ►t'arranto, whichever may be appropriate, for the 
enforcement of' any of the fundamental rights. On the scope of article 32 
Bhagwati. J (as he then was), rightly said This provision conferring on the 
Supreme Court power to enforce the fundamental rights in the widest possible 
terms shows the anxiety of the Constitution makers not to allow any procedural 
technicalities to stand in the way of enforcement of fundamental rights. The 
Constitution makers clearly intended that the Supreme Court should have the 
amplest power the issue whatever direction. order or writ which may be 
appropriate in a given case for the enforcement of a fundamental right. 71 
Thus, the Indian Supreme Court is not hound to follow the procedural 
technicalities of the English law. Bhagwati. J.. further said that we could no 
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longer blindly follow the adversarial procedure and the Courts must "abandon 
the laiseaiz . faire approach in the judicial process", particularly in human rights 
jurisprudence in a country like ours where there is so much of poverty, 
ignorance; illiteracy, deprivation and exploitation. Any insistence on a rigid 
formula of proceeding for enforcement of fundamental rights would he self-
defeating. The true scope of article 32 has thus been summed as under: 
Article 32 does not only confer power on the Court to issue a direction, order 
or writ for the enforcement of the fundamental rights but it also lays a 
constitutional Obligation on this Court to protect the fundamental rights of the 
people and for that purpose this Court has all incidental and ancillary powers 
including to forge new remedies and fashion new strategies designed to 
enforce fundamental rights. It is in realization of this constitutional Obligation 
that this Court has innovated new methods and strategies. particularly for 
enforcing fundamental rights of the poor and disadvantaged who are denied 
their human rights and to whom freedom and liberty have no meaning. [79] 
Thus, whenever any person approaches the Supreme Court for the 
protection against violation of human rights, the Court is not helpless and the 
wide powers given to the Supreme Court by article 32, which itself is a 
fundamental right, imposes a constitutional Obligation on the Court to forge 
such new tools which may be necessary for doing complete justice and for 
enforcing the fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. The power 
available to the Supreme Court under article 142 of the Constitution is also an 
enabling provision in this behalf, any contrary view would not only merely 
render the Court powerless but also make the constitutional guarantee a 
mirage. 
126 
Under clause (3) of article 32 the Parliament is empowered to make a law and 
confer the powers of the Supreme Court on any other Court. But this power is 
without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (I) 
and (2) of Article 32. Under clause (4) it is provided that this article shall not" 
be suspended except as otherwise provided by the Constitution. It may also be 
mentioned here that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all 
the Courts within the territory of India. (80J 
In India the Supreme Court and the f ugh Courts have been vested with 
the power of judicial review which is vital and essential safeguard against the 
illegal exercise or abuse of power by the executive and administrative 
authorities. This is so because an independent judiciary is able to judge matter 
brought before it entirely free from political or other bias. Judicial review is 
thus the interposition of judicial restraint on the legislature as well as the 
executive organs of the government. 
3.4 Suspension of Fundamental Rights 
It has already been mentioned earlier that the fundamental rights cannot be 
enjoyed as absolute rights. Most of the fundamental rights also contain the 
grounds on the basis of which restrictions can be imposed in the exercise of 
those fundamental rights. In addition to this, the Indian Constitution also 
contains provision under article 352 for the imposition of emergency on the 
ground that the security of India or any part of its territory is threatened by war 
or external aggression or armed rebellion. In such a situation the security of the 
country becomes more important than the rights of the individuals. 
Corresponding provisions. i.e., article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights is relevant in this regard. Therefore, the Constitution 
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provides for the curtailment or suspension of the fundamental rights in the 
following circumstances, 
Art. 358 of the Constitution provides that when an emergency is declared on 
the ground that the security of the country or any part of its territory is 
threatened by "war" or "external aggression", the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed under article 19 of the Constitution are automatically suspended 
and would continue to be so far the period of emergency. The suspension of 
the freedoms guaranteed under article 19 thus removes the restrictions on the 
legislative and executive powers of the State imposed by the Constitution. Any 
law or executive order made by the State during this period cannot be 
challenged on the `round that it is inconsistent with the rights or freedoms 
guaranteed under article 19 of the Constitution. However, such laws or 
executive order cease to have effect as soon as the proclamation of emergency 
ceases and then article 19 is automatically revived. Article 358 also makes it 
clear that anything done or omitted to be done during the proclamation of 
emergency cannot be challenged even after the emergency is over. This is so 
because when the right itself* had been suspended, no remedy can he sought for 
the violation of that right after its revival. 
Article 359 of the Constitution further empowers the President that when a 
proclamation of emergency is in operation, he may by order declare that the 
right to move any Court for the enforcement of such of the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by Part Ill of the Constitution as may he mentioned in the order and 
all proceedings pending in any Court for the enforcement of the rights so 
mentioned, shall remain suspended during the period of proclamation of 
emergency or for any shorter period as may be provided in the order. However. 
Constitution (Forty-fourth) Amendment Act, 1978 has introduced a very 
important safeguard, i.e., right to move any court for the enforcement of 
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fundamental rights under articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended. This 
safeguard was introduced after the nation saw how the provision could be 
misused in the national emergency which was proclaimed in 1975. Thus, -the 
Constitution of India gives top priority to the right to life and personal liberty 
which is the basic human right of the people. Unlike article 358. any legislative 
or executive order in contravention with the fundamental rights whose 
enforcement is suspended under article 359, can be challenged after the order 
of the President under article 359 ceases to have effect. This is so because 
rights as such are not suspended under article 359. Only the "right to move any 
Court for their enforcement is suspended. Thus, under the Constitutional 
scheme an attempt has been made to harmonize the individual rights with 
national interest. 
3.5 Directive Principles of State Policy 
Directive Principles of State Policy are enshrined in Part IV of the Constitution 
(articles 36 to 51). The preamble, the fundamental rights and the directive 
principles all are part of the same constitutional scheme and aim at the 
establishment of a free and an egalitarian social order based on rule of law. The 
directive principles aim at the betterment of the individual as an integrated 
component of the society. The fundamental rights would be meaningless and 
remain only as paper tigers if the people who are to enjoy these rights are not 
free socially and economically. The makers of the Constitution were aware that 
in the context of socioeconomic conditions which existed at the time when the 
Constitution was framed, it was not enough to guarantee the people mere civil 
and political rights. Hence they incorporated certain socio-economic rights in 
Part IV of the Constitution. In the socialist countries like ours it has always 
been regarded that economic rights are as important as, if not more than, 
political rights. The Indian Constitution acts up to this synthesis and 
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philosophy and describes, in Parts 111 and IV, both classes of human rights as 
"fundamental. [81 ] 
At this place, it is also worth pointing out that article 13 makes all the laws 
inconsistent to Part III as void and prohibits the State from making any law in 
contravention with Part 111. On the other hand, a positive obligation is put on 
the "State" to apply the directive principles of Part IV in the making of laws". 
Article 36 of the Constitution provides that in Part III the expression "Stare" 
shall have the same meaning as under article 12 in Part 111. Article 37 deals 
with the application of the directive principles in Part IV. It provides: 
Provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but the 
principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of 
the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in 
making laws. 
Thus, at the first place, the directive principles in Part 1V have been 
made "unenforceable" by any court. In this regard they also differ from the 
fundamental rights of Part III which are enforceable in the court of law. But the 
non-enforceability does not decrease their importance in the constitutional 
scheme. Article 37 itself makes them "fundamental in the governance of the 
country". What is 'fundamental in the governance of the country', cannot be 
said to he of less fundamental importance than the individual fundamental 
rights. [82] further, last part of uncle 37 provides that "it shall be the duty of 
the State to apply these principles in making laws". Thus, all the three organs 
of the "State", i.e., legislature, executive and judiciary are duty bound to 
respect these directive principles and apply them in the making of laws. They 
serve as the guidelines for the future and they are equally 'fundamental" with 
fundamental rights. [83] 
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The reason for the division of directive principles and the fundamental rights 
into two Parts making one enforceable and other as ton-enforceable has been 
best explained by the Planning Commission in the following words; 
The non-enforceability clause only provides that the infant State shall not be 
immediately called upon to account for not fulfilling the new obligations laid 
down upon it. A State just awakened to freedom with its many pre-occupations 
might be crushed under the burden unless it was free to decide the order, the 
time, the place and the mode of fulfilling them. [84] In fact, both Parts III and 
IV are complementary and supplementary to each other and integral 
component of the same organic constitutional system. Fundamental rights can 
be made more meaningful by implementing the directive principles, for, the 
directive principles are intended to bring about socio-economic revolution and 
to create a new socio-economic order wherein there will be social and 
economic justice for all and everyone [85] If the State commits a breach of its 
duty by acting contrary to the directive principles, the courts can prevent it 
from doing so. 186] 
Article 38 provides: "Srate to secure a social order for the promotion of 
welfare of the people". 
(1) The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and 
protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, 
economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life. 
(2) The State shall, in particular, strive to minimize the inequalities in income 
and endeavor to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, 
not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in 
different areas or engaged in different vocations. 
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A positive obligation has been put on the State to promote the social 
welfare of the people by securing socio-economic justice to all. In a way article 
38 of the Constitution reflects the spirit of articles 28 and 29 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Article 38(2) of the Constitution is focused 
towards promoting equality not only amongst individuals but also amongst 
groups of people residing in different areas. In other words, the State is 
required not to discriminate the people. Clause (2) of article 38 was added in 
the Constitution by the Constitution (Forty-fourth) Amendment Act, 1978 and 
it is also in consonance with article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Iluman 
Rights and articles 2 and 3 of the International Covenant on Economic. Social 
and Cultural Rights. 
Article 39 can also be described as having the Object of securing a "welfare 
state". It provides: Certain principles 0{ policy to be/allowed by the State 
The State shall in particular direct its policy towards Securing 
(a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an 
adequate means of livelihood: 
(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the 
community are so distributed as best to sub serve the common 
good; 
(c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the 
concentration of wealth and means of production to the common 
detriment. 
(d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women; 
(e) that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the 
tender age of children are not abused and that citizens are not 
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forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to 
their age or strength; 
(f) 	that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a 
healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that 
childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and 
against moral and material abandonment. 
Thus, the State is required to direct policies towards securing. Objectives 
mentioned in article 39. Clause (a) puts obligation on the State to secure to the 
citizens an adequate means of livelihood. The Supreme Court has interpreted 
this clause as a part of article 21 of the Constitution, The State may not by 
affirmative action, be compellable to provide adequate means of livelihood. 
But any person. who is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to 
just, fair and reasonable procedure established by law, can challenge the 
deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by article 21 of the 
Constitution. [87] 
Clauses (b) and (c) of article 39 are pivotal not only in the context of article 39 
but in the context of whole of the Constitution. They can be described as "the 
charter of economic democracy" and 'the charter of the poor men". These two 
clauses promote the objective of establishing a social welfare State where there 
is no concentration of wealth in the hands of a few people. Clauses (h) and (c) 
of article 39 read with article 37 and 38 provide all the necessary tools for the 
attainment of equalitarian order and prevention of concentration wealth in a 
.few hands and provide social-economic justice to the people of India. The 
corresponding provision regarding "agrarian reforms and 'equitable 
distribution" is also found in article Llclaus.cs 2(a) and (b) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. 
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The doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" for both men and women enshrined 
in article 39(d) "is not a mere demagogic slogan. It is a constitutional goal 
capable of attainment through constitutional remedies, by the enforcement of 
constitutional rights. [881 The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as 
implicit in articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and thus made it enforceable 
in the court of law. The Parliament has also enacted the "Equal Remuneration 
Act, 1976" for achieve of the objectives of article 39(d) of the Constitution. 
The applicability of this Act does not depend upon the financial ability of the 
management to pay equal remuneration as provided by it. [89] 
The corresponding provision is article 23(2) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and article 7(a) (i) of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. Clause (e) of article 39 of the Constitution is 
aimed at protecting the health and strength of workers, men and women and 
tender age of children so that hey may not he compelled by economic 
necessity to enter avocations which are not suited to their age. Similarly clause 
(f) expects the State to direct its policies in such a manner so as to provide 
opportunities and facilities to children to develop in a healthy manner and in 
conditions of freedom and dignity, which are their basic human rights. 
Article 39-A, dealing with equal justice and free legal aid was added by the 
Constitution (Forty-second) Amendment Act, 1976. It provides: 
39A. Equal justice and free legal aid 	The State shall secure that the 
operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, 
and shall, in particular provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes 
or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not 
denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. The right to 
seek justice is one of the very important human rights and article 39-A enables 
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the people to seek justice. Under article 39-A the State is required to secure the 
operation of legal system which promotes justice on a basis of equal 
opportunity and to ensure that equal opportunity for securing justice are not 
denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. One may say 
that article 39-A. aims of achieving the Object of Magna Carta of 1 215 which 
provided: "To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay the right of 
justice ...... 1901 
Thus, article 39-A gives constitutional status of free legal aid to the poor 
and envisages the prospects of inequality in access to justice being abolished. 
[91] The Supreme Court has further elevated the right to free legal services as 
an essential ingredient of "reasonable, fair and just" procedure and implicit in 
article 21 of the Constitution as an enforceable right. 1921 The Parliament has 
also enacted "Legal Services Authorities Act, 1957" to achieve the objectives 
of article 39-A of the Constitution. 
Article 41 to 43 of the Constitution provide as under: 
Right to twork, to education and to Imblic assistance in certain cases_ The 
State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make 
effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public 
assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in 
other cases of undeserved want. 
Prot -ision fir just and humane couclition.' of it ork and maternity relief- The 
State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work 
and for maternity relief. 
Living n age, etc., firr t orkers- The State shall endeavor to secure, by suitable 
legislation or economic organization or in any other way, to all workers 
agricultural, industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work 
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ensuring a decent standard of life and Cull enjoyment of leisure and social and 
cultural opportunities and. in particular. the State shall endeavor to promote 
cottage industries on an individual or co-operative basis in rural areas. 
These articles correspond to articles 23 and 25 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and articles 6. 7 and 1012) of the International Covenant on 
Economic. Social and Cultural Rights. 
The basic aim of these provisions is not only that the State should secure. 
within its economic capacity, right to work, education, humane conditions of 
work and maternity leave. etc.. but also social security in cases of old age, 
sickness and disablement and ensuring decent standards of life, which is the 
basic human right of all. 
Article 43-A. dealing with participation of workers in management of 
industries, was added by the Constitution (Forty second) Amendment .Act, 
1976. This provision is also based on industrial democratic principle and is in 
consonance with a "conception of man and human rights." [93] It was expected 
that the State shall provide free and compulsory education to all the children 
below the age of fourteen years within the period of ten years after the 
commencement of the Constitution. Article 45 of the Constitution provides: 
Proi'ision fir free and c •nfu/sol_u education far children- The State shall 
endeavor to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of 
this Constitution. for free and compulsory education f'or all children until they 
complete the age of fourteen years. 
This provision corresponds to article 26 of the Universal IDeclaration of Human 
Rights and Articles 13 and 14 of the International Covenant on Economic. 
Social and Cultural Rights. Education is enlightenment. It is the one that lends 
dignity to a man. Education seeks to build up the personality of the pupil by 
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assisting his physical, intellectual, moral and emotional development. [941 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of State and local 
government. In the present days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably 
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of education. [95] 
It is noteworthy that among the several articles in Part [V, only article 
45 speaks of a time-limit; no other article does. But even after 45 years of the 
commencement of the Constitution the underlined objective of article 45 
remains a distant dream. The Constitution contemplated a crash programme 
being undertaken by the State to achieve the goal set out in article 45. It is 
relevant to note that article 45 does not speak of the "limits of its economic 
capacity and development" as does article 41. inter alia, speaks of right to 
education. Even article 46 of the Constitution also says that the State shall 
promote the educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes and other 
weaker sections of the people. But so far only 14 States and 4 Union 
Territories have enacted legislations to make education compulsory hut socio-
economic compulsions that keep the children away from schools have 
restrained them from prescribing the rules and regulations whereby those 
provisions can be endorsed. However, the judicial activists has made it a 
fundamental right implicit in article 21 of the Constitution. 
Raising the level of nutrition and standard of living and the improvement of 
public health is considered as prirnar7 duty of the State in article 47 of the 
Constitution which provides: 
"Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and 
to improve public health-The State shall regard the raising of the level of 
nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public 
health as among its primary duties and, in particular. the State shall endeavor 
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to bring about prohibition of the consumption, except for medicinal purposes. 
of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health". 
This provision correspond to article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of 
I luman Rights and articles 11(1) & (2) and 12(1) of the International Covenant 
on Economic. Social and Cultural rights. 
In 1976, a new article 48-A was added by the Constitution (Forty-second) 
Amendment Act which says: The State shall endeavor to protect and improve 
the environment and to safeguard the forest and wild life of the country'. 
In this regard article I2(2) (h) of the International Covenant on Economic. 
Social and Cultural Rights is relevant. 
Improvement of public health will include the improvement of environment 
without which public health cannot he assured. 
The State cannot treat these obligations as mere pious wishes or pious 
obligations. They are "fundamental in the governance of the country" and they 
being the part of the supreme law of the land, have to he implemented. The 
Courts in India have further interpreted that the right to live in healthy 
environment is a part of right to life under article 21 of' the Constitution 
because right to life means, a life of dignity, to be lived in a proper 
environment, free from the danger of disease or infection. 
Finally article 51 provides as under: 
Pro,notion of international peace and security 
The State shall endeavor to 
(a) promote international peace and security; 
(b) maintain just and honorable relations between nations; 
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(c) 	foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the 
dealings of organii.ed people with one another, and 
(d) 	encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration. 
Thus. the State is. inter alia, under an Obligation to maintain just and 
honorable relations with other nations and foster respect for international law 
and treaty obligations in dealing with the people. 
Thus, the Indian Constitution covers the question of propaganda for war by 
enabling the State to impose restrictions on the expression and opinions of its 
citizens in such a way that do not violate friendly relations with foreign States. 
Further the Indian Penal Code treats the acts aimed against foreign states as 
crimes with suitable punishment. 
India has been against any advocacy of racial or religious hatred, and has 
consistently followed the policy of non-violence. Accordingly. India has 
become party to the International Covenant on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crimes of Apartheid. The Indian Parliament has already 
passed legislation on this matter, namely, the Anti-Apartheid (United Nations 
Convention) Act, 1981. We have seen in that most of the directive principles 
correspond to venous provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and other International Covenants on Human Rights. It is the duty of the State 
that it must respect the international instruments on human rights and achieve 
their underlined objectives by implementing the various constitutional 
provisions which are part of the Supreme Law of the land. 
3.6 Fundamental Duties 
Rights and duties are co-relative. Part III of' the Constitution confers certain 
human rights on its people. In Part IV certain "obligations" have been placed 
on the State which it must endeavor for achieving the ends given in Part III of 
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the Constitution. At the gone time it is necessary that the citizens also have 
certain duties for achieving the ends or goals of Part III of the Constitution. 
Article 51-A in Part IV-A was added by the Constitution (Forty-second) 
Amendment Act, 1976 specifying ten duties for its citizens which are as under: 
51 A. Fundamental duties 	It shall he the duty of every citizen of India 
la) 	to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions. 
the National Hag and the National Anthem; 
(b) to cherish and follow the noble ideals which inspired our national 
struggle for freedom; 
(c) to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity any integrity of 
India; 
(d) to defend the country and render national service when called 
upon to do so: 
(e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood 
amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic 
and regional or sectional diversities; to renounce practices 
derogatory to the dignity of women: 
(f) to value and preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture: 
(CO 	to protect and improve the natural environment including t'orests, 
lakes. rivers, wild life and to have compassion for living 
creatures; 
(h) to develop the scientific temper. humanism and the spirit of 
inquiry and reform: 
(i) to safeguard public property and to abjure violence; 
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(j) 	to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and 
collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher 
levels of endeavor and achievement. 
We find that it is the duty of every citizen of India, inter alia, to promote 
harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst people; to renounce 
practices derogatory to the dignity of women; to protect and improve natural 
environment; to safeguard public property and to adjure violence and to strive 
towards excellence in all spheres of' individual and collective activity which is 
possible if we protect and promote the human rights of all the people. 
Thus, we find that the preamble. fundamental rights, directive principles 
of state policy and the fundamental duties provided in the Indian Constitution 
aim at protecting and promoting the human rights. 
References 
[ 1 ] 	Goodyear India v. State of I laryana, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 781 at 791. 
121 	V.R. Krishna Iyer. Human Rights And The Law. 5 (1986 Reprint). 
[ 31 	Granville Austin, the Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of A Nation. 52- 
53(1976 Reprint). 
[4] Shariful Hasan. Supreme Court: Fundamental Rights and Directive 
Principles. 23 (1981). 
[5] AIR 1983 S.C. 239. 
[6] Excel Wear v. Union of India. AIR. 1979 S.0 25.para 24, Atam Prakash 
v. State of I Iaryana. AIR 1986 S.C. 859 para 5; Randhir Singh v. Union 
141 
of India. A.I.R. 19922 S.C. 979 para 8 and D.S. Nakara v. Union of India. 
A.I.R 1983 S.C. 130 para 33.34. 
[ 71 	Lingappa v. State of Maharashtra. A.1.R. 1985 S.C. 389 para 14, 16,18 
and 20; Sadhuram v. Polin. A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1471 para 29, 70 and 73. 
[8] 	Ismail Farooquiv Union of India. 1 1994) 6 SCC 360 at 418 and 436. 
[91 	S.R Bommai vs. Union of India. (1994) 3 see I at 236. 
1 101 RC. Poudyal vs. Union of India. 1994 Supp. (1) sec 324 at 362.364. 
[ 1 l I 	Article 17 of the Constitution of India. 
[ 121 K.C. Markandan, The Preamble: Key to the Minds of the Makers of the 
Indian Constitution. 135 (1984). 
[ 131 	KC Savananda Bharti vs. State of Kerala. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461. 
1 141 Magna Carta of 12 I5 is one of the four great Charters of liberty from 
which the liberties of the British citizens derive their protection. In 1689 
the Bill of Rights was written consolidating all important rights and 
liberties of the English people. 
[i5] Manea Gandhi vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597 at 620. 
[ 16] RD. Shetty v. The International Airport Authority. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 
1629: Sum Parkash vs. Union of India. AI.R. 1981 S.C. 212: Ajay Hasia 
v. Khalid Mujib, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 481 and Star Enterprises v. CTDC of 
Maharashtra, (1990) 3 SCC 280. 
[ 17] Article 13(4) provides:"Nothing is this article shall apply to any 
amendment of this Constitution made under article 368." 
142 
[ 181 Kcsavananda Bharti vs. State of Kerala. AI.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 and 
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. (AI.R. 1980 S.C. 1789 
[ 19) Second paragraph of the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations 
and paragraph 3 of article I. 
[20] Rubinder Singh vs. Union of India. AI.R. 1983 S.C. 65. 
[211 Freedom of the Individual under Law. United Nations. 132 (1990) 
122 	Indra Sawhncy vs. ("nion of India. 1992 Supp (3) see 211. 212 and 213. 
[ 23 ] Jai Singh v. Union of India, AAR 1993 Raj 177 at 181-182. 
[24) Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India. AI.R. 1982 
S.C. 1473. 
1251 Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Manuhhai D.Shah (1992) 3 see 
637. 41. Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v, Union of India, AI.R. 
1982 S.C. 1473. 
126 	Bishamer vs. State UP., AI.R, 1982 S.C. 333 at 35. 
[27[ Pathumma vs. State of Kerala. AIR. 1978 S.C. 771. See also 
Chintamani Rao vs. Sate of M.P., A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 118. 
[25) Narendra Kumar vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1960S.C. 430; State of 
Madras vs. V.G. Row. A.I.R. 1952 S.0 196 and Kerala S.M.T Fed. V. 
Kerala TBO. Assn. (1994) 5 see 28. 
[29] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, article 29(2). See also 
B.G. Ramcharan (Ed.. I Ium an Rights-Thirty Years after the Universal 
Declaration. 27-28 (1979). 
[301 AK Gopalan vs. State of Madras. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27. 
1311 	Kharok Singh vs. State of UP.. A.I.R. 196: S.C. 1295. 
143 
1321 	A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597. 
133 ] Pathumma vs. State of Kerala, (1978). 
[34] A.I.R. 1981 S.0 746. 
[35] Satwant Singh vs. D. Ramarathnan A.P.O., New Delhi, AI.R. 1967 S.0 
1836. 
[36] Gobind vs. State of M.P., (1975) 2 sec 148, R. Rajagopal v. State of 
T.N.. (1994) 
[37] Sunil Batra vs. Delhi Administration, (1978). 
138] 	Charles Sobraj vs. Supdt. Central Jail, (1978). 
[39] 	MI!. Iloskot vs. State of Maharashtra, (1978). 
[401 Hussain Ara Khatoon vs. Home Secretary Bihar, (1980). 
[411 Prem Shankar Shukla vs. Delhi Administration. (1980). 
[421 T.V. Vathecswaran vs. State of T.N., (1983) 2 SCC 68. See also Trivcni 
Ben v. State of Gujarat. AIR. 1989 S.0 1355. 
1431 Sheela Barse vs. State of Maharashtra, (1983). 
[44] A.G. of India v. Lachma Devi. AI.R. 1986 S.C.467. 
[45] Pararnanand Katra vs. Union of India, (1989). 
[46] Shantistar Builders vs. N.K Totame, (1990). 
[47] Kishore Singh v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1981. 
[481 	A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180 
[49] Delhi Development Horticulture Employee's Union vs. Delhi 
Administration. Delhi. (1992) 4 SCC 99 at 110. 
144 
[50] Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar. A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 420. 
[51 1 Vincent v. Union of India, (1987) 2 SCC 165. 
[521 (1992)3SCC666. 
[53 ] Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 at 680-68 1 where the 
Supreme Court has limited the right to education up to the age of 
14years as implicit in article 21 of the Constitution. 
154) Rex'. Halliday, (1917) AC 260 at 269. 
(551 Ayya vs State of UP., (1989) 1 SCC 374 at 380-8!. 
1561 	A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27. 
1571 13.P. Srivastava. "Right Against Arbitrary Arrest and Detention under 
Art. 9 of the Covenant as recognized and protected under the Indian 
Law," 1! .I.I.L.I., 29 (1969). 
1581 	List 1 to III and different entries there under are enumerated in the 
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. 
[591 	Article. 246 of the Constitution of India. 
(601 	1.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law. 606 (1987). 
1611 B. Shiva Rat) (ed.) the T ramin of India's Constitution-s-A Study. 243 
(1968). 
(621 A.D.M. Jabalpurv. Shiv Kant Shukla, AI.R. 1976 S.C. 1207. See also, 
II.M. Seervai. The Emergency, Future Safeguards and the habeas 
Corpus Case: A Criticism. (1978): Mohammad Ghouse. "Constitutional 
Law-I, A.S.I.I.. 240 at 270-71 (1976): Upcndra Raxi, The Indian 
Supreme Court and Politics, 87-88 (1980). 
[63) Section 3 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1979. 
145 
[64] Notification No. GSR 383(E), dated 19 June 1979 and Notification No. 
GSR 529(E) dated 5 September 1979. 
1651 S.I. (2) of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 which 
authorized the Central Government to appoint different dates for 
bringing into force different provisions of the Act. 
[ 661 	A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710. 
[67] For critical analysis of the judgment see vs. Deshpande, "Protection" in 
M. Hidayatullah (ed). Constitutional Law of India. Vol. 1, 487 at 5I7-18 
(1984). 
[681 H.M. Scervai. Constitutional Law of India, 829-32 (1983). 94. Supra 
note 9l at 733. 
1691 A.T. Markose. Judicial Control of Administrative Action in India. 364-
68 (1965). See also H.M. Seervai, supra note 93 at 834. Rohtas 
Industries Ltd. v. S.P. Aggarwal, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 7()7. 
[701 V.R. Krishna Iver. Law and The people-s-A Collection of Essays, 142 
(1972). 
[71 ] A.K Roy v. Union of India supra notes 91 at 754. Tulzapurkar, J. agreed 
with Gupta J.. on this point ibid at 756. 
[721 (1994) 5 see 54 at 98. 
1731 Paramjit S. Jaswal, "India: Judical Review" in Andrew Harding and 
John Hatchard (eal.), Preventive Detention and Security Law: 
AComparative Sur \ cy . 7 I -103 (1993). 
[741 	V.R. Krishna Iyer. Indian Social Justice in Crisis, 21 ( 1983). 
146 
[751 Bijoc Emmanualv. State of Kerala. (1986) 3 see 615 and Ramesh vs. 
Union of India, (1988) 1 see 668. 
[76] Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India. 
[77] S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India. A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149. 
[78] Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs. Union of India. A.1.R. 1984 S.C. 802. 
[79] M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India. AIR. 1987 S.C.1086 at 1091 and 
Nilabati Behera vs. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746 at 763-64. 
[80] Art. 141 of the Constitution of India. 
[81 ] V.R. Krishna Iyer. 1 tuman Rights And the Law, 1 1 (1986). 
[82] I ara►njit S. Jaswal, Directive Principles Jurisprudence and Socio-
Economic Justice in India, (1995). See also H.M. Seervai, 
Constitutional Law of India. Vol. 2 at 1980 (1984). 
1831 S. Sundara Rama Reddy. "IFundarnentalness of Fundamental Rights and 
Directive Principles in the Indian Constitution", 22 J. J.L.I., 399 at 403 
(1980). 
(841 	K.S. Itegde, [)irectivc Principles of State Policy in the Constitution of 
India. 52 (1972). 
[85] Minerva Mills Ltd. vs. 'Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789 at 1852 
(per Bhagwati.J.). 
[86] Central Inland Water Tpt. Corpn. v. Brojo Nath. A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 
1571at 1587. 
[87] Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation. (1985) 3 SCC 545 at 
573. 
[88] Randhir Singh v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 879. 
147 
[89] Fcdcration of A.I.C. & C.E. Stenographers v. Union of India. A.I.R 
1988 S.C.1281 at 1289. 
[90] Clause 40 of Magna Carta of 1215. 
[91] V.R. Krishna Iyer, Law vs. Justice. 66 (1980). 
[92[ Hussain Ara Khatoon vs. State of Bihar. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1369 at 1374. 
[93[ The Economic Times, dated 25 October 1976 at 1. 
1941 University of Delhi vs. Ram Nath, (1964) 2 SCR 703 at 710. 
[951 Brown v. Board of Education, 98 L. ed. 873: 347 US 483 (1954). 
148 
Chapter - IV 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN 
INDIA AND JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM 
4.1 Introduction 
Modern nation-state functions throu(uh a set of institutions. Parliament, the 
judiciary, executive apparatus such as bureaucracy and the police, and the 
formal structures of union —state relations as well as the electoral system are 
the set of institutions constituted by the idea of constitutionalism. Their 
arrangements. dependencies and inter-dependencies are directly shaped by the 
meta-politico-legal document- i.e., Constitution. The legal system derives its 
authority from the Constitution and is deeply embedded in the political system, 
the presence of judiciary substantiates the theory of separation of power 
wherein the other two organs, viz, legislature and executive stand relatively 
apart from it. Parliamentary democracy works on the principle of `fusion of 
power.' and in the making of law, there is direct participation of the legislature 
and the executive, it is the judiciary that remains independent and strong 
safeguarding the interests of the citizens by not allowing the other organs to go 
beyond the Constitution. 11I It acts, therefore, as a check on the arbitrariness 
and unconstitutionality of the legislature and the executive. Judiciary is the 
final arbiter in interpreting constitutional arrangements. It is in fact the 
guardian and conscience keeper of the normative values that are 
'authoritatively allocated by the state.' The nature of the democracy and 
development depends much on how the legal system conducts itself to sustain 
the overall socio-economic and political environment. The Indian Judicial 
System is one of the oldest legal systems in the world today. It is part of the 
inheritance India received from the British after more than 200 years of their 
Colonial rule, and the same is obvious from the many similarities the Indian 
legal system shares with the English Legal System. The frame work of the 
current legal system has been laid down by the Indian Constitution and the 
judicial system derives its powers from it. The Constitution of India is the 
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supreme law of the country, the fountain source of law in India. It came into 
effect on 26 January 1950 and is the world's longest written constitution. It not 
only laid the framework of Indian judicial system, but has also laid out the 
powers, duties, procedures and structure of the various branches of the 
Government at the Union and State levels. Moreover, it also has defined the 
fundamental rights & duties of the people and the directive principles which 
are the duties of the State. In spite of India adopting the features of a federal 
system of government, the Constitution has provided for the setting up of a 
single integrated system of courts to administer both Union and State laws. The 
Supreme Court is the apex court of India. followed by the various High Courts 
at the state level which cater to one or more number of states. Below the High 	- 
Courts, there are the subordinate courts comprising of the District Courts at the 
district level and other lower courts. An important feature of the Indian Judicial 
System is that it's a 'common law system'. In a common law system, law is 
developed by the judges through their decisions, orders, or judgments. These 
are also referred to as precedents. Unlike the British legal system which is 
entirely based on the common law system. where it had originated from. the 
Indian system incorporates the common law system along with the statutory 
law and the regulatory law_ 
Another important feature of the Indian Judicial system is that our system has 
been designed on the pattern of the adversarial system. [21 This is to be 
expected since courts based on the common law system tend to follow the 
adversarial system of conducting proceedings instead of the inquisitorial 
system. In an adversarial system, there are two sides in every case and each 
side presents its arguments to a neutral judge who would then give an order or 
a judgment based upon the merits of the case. Indian judicial system has 
adopted features of other legal systems in such a way that they do not conflict 
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with each other while henefitting the nation and the people. For example, the 
Supreme Court and the High Courts have the power of judicial review. This is 
a concept prevalent in the American legal system. According to the concept of 
judicial review, the legislative and executive actions are subject to the scrutiny 
of the judiciary and the judiciary can invalidate such actions if they are ultra 
vires of the Constitutional provisions. In other words, the laws made by the 
legislative and the rules made by the executive need to be in conformity with 
the Constitution of India. 
4.2 Judiciary- A Conceptual Overview 
The judiciary is the branch of government that deals with interpretation of a 
nation's laws, resolution of legal conflicts, and judgments for violations of the 
law. The judiciary, also known as the judicial system, is composed of judges 
and courts. The judicial system is deliberately kept separate from the nation's 
legislative body, such as a parliament or congress, which creates or abolishes 
the nation's laws as part of the political process. Attorneys are specialists who 
study the law in order to help cticuts navigate the judicial system. Legal 
systems of various kinds have existed since the dawn of civilization. 
Precedents of the modern judicial system include ancient Greek and Roman 
law and the law speakers of medieval Scandinavia. English common law 
established by the Magna Carta is the most direct ancestor of many current 
legal systems. France's Napoleonic Code was also influential in replacing local 
customs with a set system of laws and courts. Ry the 18th century, many 
countries around the world had developed some form of a judiciary. In naany 
nations, the law is established by a constitution or similar document created 
when the nation was founded. The legislative body then creates further laws 
that are intended to carry the spirit of the constitution into specific situations. It 
is the responsibility of the judiciary to determine if these new laws are, in fact, 
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true to the intent of the constitution. For this reason, judges must be extremely 
well versed in the laws of the nation. Most begin their careers as attorneys 
before moving on to the judicial bench. The judiciary is best known for its 
administration of criminal court cases, Anyone caught violating a law must 
eventually face a judge, who will determine whether the violation occurred, the 
severity of the offense, and the penalty. Judges are aided in this process by 
their understanding of the law, their own interpretation of its meaning, and in 
some cases by a jury or a panel of fellow judges. The majority of court cases, 
however, involve civil law, such as trademark or copyright violations, 
bankruptcy, or individual lawsuits. In the United States, 80 percent of court 
cases involve civil law, while only 20 percent are criminal cases. 
In the U.S. and many other nations, the judiciary contains a hierarchy, with 
judges in higher courts possessing the authority to change or void prior 
decisions made by judges from lower courts. This establishes a system of 
appeals. The loser of a case in a lower court may appeal to a higher court for a 
reversal of the verdict. As long as they can afford the legal expenses, parties 
can continue to appeal until they reach the highest court, known as the 
Supreme Court in the U.S. and the High Court in Australia and other English-
speaking nations. The judgments of this highest court can determine not only 
the final outcome of the case, but in some cases can alter the interpretation of 
the law itself. 
In common law jurisdictions, courts interpret law, including constitutions, 
statutes, and regulations. They also make law (but in a limited sense, limited to 
the facts of particular cases) hascd upon prior case law in areas where the 
legislature has not made law. For instance, the tort of negligence is not derived 
from statute law in most common law jurisdictions. The term common law 
refers to this kind of law. In civil law jurisdictions, courts interpret the law, but 
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are prohibited from creating law, and thus do not issue rulings more general 
than the actual case to be judged. Jurisprudence plays a similar role to case 
law. 
In the United States court system, the Supreme Court is the final 
authority on the interpretation of the federal Constitution and all statutes and 
regulations created pursuant to it. as well as the constitutionality of the various 
state laws; in the US federal court system, federal cases are tried in trial courts, 
known as the US district courts, followed by appellate courts and then the 
Supreme Court. State courts, which try 98% of litigation. [3] may have 
different names and organization; trial courts may be called "courts of common 
plea', appellate courts "superior courts" or "commonwealth courts". [41 The 
judicial system, whether state or federal, begins with a court of first instance, is 
appealed to an appellate court, and then ends ar the court of last resort. [5] 
In France, the final authority on the interpretation of the law is the Council of 
State for administrative cases, and the Court of Cassation for civil and criminal 
cases. 
In the People's Republic of China, the final authority on the interpretation of 
the law is the National People's Congress. 
Other countries such as Argentina have mixed systems that include lower 
courts, appeals courts, a cassation court (for criminal law) and a Supreme 
Court. In this system the Supreme Court is always the final authority. but 
criminal cases have four stages, one more than civil law does. On the court sits 
a total of nine justices. This number has been changed several times.[6] 
4.3 Formation and Structure of Judiciary 
Under our Constitution there is a single integrated system of courts for the 
Union as well as the States, which administer both union and state laws, and at 
us 
the head of the system stands the Supreme Court of India. Below the Supreme 
Court are the high Courts of different states and under each high court there 
are 'subordinate courts', i.e., courts subordinate to and under the control of the 
High Courts. 
Formation of Judiciary 
After the French Revolution, lawmakers stopped interpretation of law by 
judges, and the legislature was the only body permitted to interpret the law; 
this prohibition was later overturned by the Code Napoleon. 171 
In civil law jurisdictions at present, judges interpret the law to about the same 
extent as in common law jurisdictions however it is different than the common 
law tradition which directly recognises the limited power to make law. For 
instance, in France, the jurisprudence constante of the Court of Cassation or the 
Council of State is equivalent in practice with case law. However, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court notes the principal difference between the two legal 
doctrines: a single court decision can provide sufficient foundation for the 
common law doctrine of stare decisis, however, "a series of adjudicated cases, 
all in accord, form the basis for jurisprudence constants" [8] Moreover, the 
Louisiana Court of Appeals has explicitly noted that jurisprudence constants is 
merely a secondary source of law, which cannot be authoritative and does not 
rise to the level of stare decisis. [91 
Indian judiciary is a single integrated system of courts for the union as 
well as the states, which administers both the union and state laws, and at the 
head of the entire system stands the Supreme Court of India. The development 
of the judicial system can be traced to the growth of modern-nation states and 
constitutionalism. During ancient times, the concept of justice was inextricably 
linked with religion and was embedded in the ascriptive nomvs of socially stratified 
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caste groups. Caste panchayats performed the role of judiciary at the local level, 
which was tied up with the religious laws made by the monarchs. Most of the Kings' 
courts dispensed justice according to 'dlmnna', a set of eternal laws rested upon the 
individual duty to be performed in four stages of life (ashra na) and status of the 
individual according to his status (varna). The King's power to make laws 
depended on the religious texts and the King had virtually no power to legislate 'on 
his own initiative and pleasure'. Ancient state laws were largely customary laws and 
any deviation from it or contradiction from dhartna was rejected by the 
community. In medieval times, the dictum 'King can do no wrong  was applied 
and the King arrogated to himself an important role in administering justice. 
He became the apostle of justice and so the highest judge in the kingdom. 
Perhaps, the theory of institutionalism guided justice, manifesting gross 
arbitrariness and authoritarianism. (10] 
Modern Judiciary in India 
With the advent of the British colonial administration. India witnessed a 
judicial system introduced on the basis of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. The 
Royal Charter of Charles If of the year 1661 gave the Governor and Council 
the power to adjudicate both civil and criminal cases according to the laws of 
England. However, the Regulating Act of 1773 established for the first time the 
Supreme Court of India in Calcutta, consisting of the Chief Justice and three 
judges (later reduced to two) appointed by the Crown acting as King's court 
and not East India Company's court. Later, Supreme Courts were established in 
Madras and Bombay. The Court held jurisdiction over "His Majesty's 
subjects". In this period the judicial system had two distinct systems of courts, 
the English system of Royal Courts, which followed the English law and 
procedure in the presidencies and the Indian system of AdalatiSadr courts, 
which followed the Regulation laws and Personal laws in the provinces. Under 
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the High Court Act of 1861. these two systems were merged. replacing the 
Supreme Courts and the native court. (Sadr Dewani Adalat and Sadr Nizamat 
Adalat) in the presidency towns of Calcutta. Bombay and Madras with High 
Courts. However, the highest court of appeal was the judicial committee of the 
Privy Council. British efforts were made to develop the Indian legal system as 
a unified court system. Indians had neither laws nor courts of their own, and 
both the courts and laws had been designed to meet the needs of the colonial 
power. 
The Government of India Act of 1935 (section 200) set up the Federal 
Court of India to act as an intermediate appellant between High courts and the 
Privy Council in regard to matters involving the interpretation of the Indian 
Constitution. It was not to 'pronounce any judgment other than a declaratory 
judgment' which meant that it could declare what the law was but did not have 
authority to exact compliance with its decisions. The Federal Court's power of 
'judicial review' was largely a paper work and therefore a body with very 
limited power. Despite the restrictions placed on it, the Federal Court 
continued to function till 26th January 1950. when independent India's 
Constitution came into force. In the meantime, the Constituent Assembly 
became busy drafting the basic framework of the legal system and judiciary. 
Structure of Judiciary 
The members of the Constituent Assembly envisaged the judiciary as 
the bastion of rights and justice. They wanted to insulate the courts from 
attempted coercion from forces within and outside the government. Sapru 
Committee Report on judiciary and the Constituent Assembly's ad hoc 
committee on the Supreme Court report formed the bulk of the guidelines for 
judiciary. A.K.Ayyar. K.Santhanam. M.A.Ayyangar, Tej Bahadur Sapru, 
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B.N.Rau. K.M. Munshi. Saadulla and B.R.Arnbedkar played important roles in 
Shaping the judicial system of India. The unitary judicial system seems to have 
been accepted with the least questioning. The Supreme Court was to have a 
special, countrywide responsibility for the protection of individual rights. 
Ambedkar was perhaps the greatest apostle in the Assembly of what he 
described as 'one single integrated judiciary having jurisdiction and providing 
remedies in all cases arising under the Constitutional law, the Civil, or the 
criminal law, essential to maintain the unity of the country'. 
Under Our Constitution there is a single integrated system of courts for 
the Union as well as the States, which administer both union and state laws, 
and at the head of the system stands the Supreme Court of' India. Below the 
Supreme Court are the High Courts of different states and under each high 
court there are 'subordinate courts', i.e., courts subordinate to and under the 
control of the Iligh Courts. 
Judiciary Stricture in India 
• Supreme Court of India 
• High Court (in each of the states) 
• District & Session Judges' Court (In Districts) 
• Subordinate Judges Court (Civil) 
• Munsiff5' Courts 
• Nyaya Panchayats 
• Provincial small cause court 
• Court of Session (Criminal) 
• Subordinate Magistrates' Courts 
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• Judicial Magistrates 
• Executive Magistrates 
• Panchayat Adalts 
• 'Metropolitan Magistrate's Court (In Metropolitan areas) 
• City Civil and Session Courts Presidency small cause court 
India has a quasi-federal structure with 29 States further sub-divided into about 
601 administrative Districts. The Judicial system however has a unified 
structure. The Supreme Court, the High Courts and the lower Courts constitute 
a single Judiciary. Broadly there is a three - tier division. 
Each District has a District Court and each State a High Court. The Supreme 
Court of India is the Apex Court. Each State has its own laws constituting 
Courts subordinate to the District Courts. Besides, a number of judicial 
Tribunals have been set up in specialized areas. The significant Tribunals are: 
Company Law Board; Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade Practices 
Commission: Securities Appellate Tribunal. Consumer Protection Forum: 
Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction; Customs and Excise 
Control Tribunal; Tax Tribunal; etc. These Tribunals function under the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court where they may he situated. 
The Indian judiciary has a reputation of being independent and non-partisan. 
Judges are not appointed on political considerations. They enjoy a high 
standing in society. India has a unified all India Bar and an advocate enrolled 
with any State Bar Council can practice and appear in any court of the land 
including the Supreme Court of India. I lowever for doing any acting work in 
the Supreme Court a qualifying examination (called an 'Advocate on Record' 
1S8 
exam) needs to be cleared. Foreign lawyers are not permitted to appear in 
Courts (unless qualified). though they can appear in arbitrations. 
Practice and Procedure: 
The influence of' the British Judicial System continues in significant aspects. 
The official language for Court proceedings in the High Court & the Supreme 
Court is English. Lawyers don a Town and a band as part of their uniform and 
Judges are addressed as "My Lord". The procedural law of the land as well as 
most commercial and corporate laws is modeled on English laws. English case 
law is often referred to and relied upon both by lawyers and judges. As in 
England, a certain class of litigation lawyers is designated as "Senior 
Advocates" (equivalent to QCs). They do not deal with clients directly and 
take instructions only through solicitors. Certain lawyers however, follow a 
mixed practice i.e.. both plead and act in relation to court matters. There is a 
great tradition and emphasis on oral arguments. Counsel,, are seldom restrained 
in oral arguments and complex hearings may well take days of arguments to 
conclude. Specialization is relatively a new phenomenon. Most lawyers have a 
wide-ranging practice. 
, r•bitratuiu: 
In 1996, arbitration got an impetus with the enactment of the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act. This is based on the UNCITRAL Model Rules. The earlier 
enactment of 1940 was widely considered ineffective. With the enactment of 
the new law, arbitration has gained in popularity and is fast becoming the 
preferred route for settlement of commercial disputes. India does not have a 
separate Arbitration Lawyers Bar. Generally. court lawyers are engaged for 
arbitrations that are conducted over the weekends or after court hours. Often 
retired I igh Court or Supreme Court Judges are appointed as arbitrators. The 
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Indian Council of Arbitration, promoted by the Ministry of Commerce is a 
leading Institute for administration of arbitrations. However, due to its low 
payment scales for arbitrators, it is not suitable for large international 
arbitrations. 
4.4 The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court is the highest court of law in India. It has appellate jurisdiction 
over the high court's and is the highest tribunal of the land. The law declared by 
the Supreme Court is binding on all small courts within the territory of India. It has 
the final authority to interpret the Constitution. Thus, independence and integrity. 
the powers and functions and judicial review are the issues of utmost importance 
concerned with the Supreme Court. 
Composition and Appointments 
The Supreme Court consists of the Chief Justice of India and not more than twenty-
five other judges. There can be ad hoc judges for a temporary period due to lack 
of quorum of the permanent judges. however. Parliament has the power to make 
laws regulating the constitution. organisation. jurisdiction and powers of the 
Supreme Court. The Constitution makes it clear that the President shall appoint the 
Chief Justice of India after consultation with such Judges of the Supreme Court and 
of High Courts as he may deem necessar.  . And in the case of the appointment of 
other judges of the Supreme Court. consultation with the Chief Justice, in 
addition to judges is obligatory. 
A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court 
unless he is: 
a) a citizen of India. and h) either 
i) a distinguished jurist: or ii) has been a I ugh Court judge for at 
I6() 
'e 
least 5 vicars, or iii) has been an Advocate of a Iligh Court for at 
least 10 years. 
Once appointed, a judge holds office until he attains 65 years of age. He may resign 
his office by writing addressed to the President or he may be removed by the 
President upon an address to that effect being passed by a special majority of 
each I louse of the Parliament on grounds of 'proved misbehaviour and 'incapacity'. 
The salaries and allowances of the judges are fixed high in order to secure their 
independence, efficiency and impartiality. The Constitution also provides that the 
salaries of the judges cannot he changed to their disadvantage, except in times of a 
financial emergency. The administrative expenses of the Supreme Court, the 
salaries, allowances. etc. of the judges are charged on the Consolidated Fund of 
India. In order to shield the judges from political controversies, the Constitution 
empowers the court to initiate contempt proceedings against those who impute 
motives to the judge in the discharge of their official duties. Even the Parliament 
cannot discuss the conduct of a judge except when a resolution for his removal is 
before it. 
PuR er Of the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has vast jurisdiction and its position is strengthened by the fact 
that it acts as a court of appeal, as a guardian of the Constitution and as a reviewer of 
its own judgments. Article 141 declares that the law laid down by the Supreme 
Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. Its jurisdiction is 
divided into four categories: 
u) Original Ju/ITSdiC'tiOlt and Writ furiSdwGtlCBi 
Article 131 gives the Supreme Court exclusive and original jurisdiction in a dispute 
between the Union and a State, or between one State and another, or between 
group of states and others. It acts, therefore, as a Federal Court, i.e., the parties 
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to the dispute should be units of a federation. No other court in India has the 
power to entertain such disputes. 
Supreme Court is the guardian of Fundamental Rights and thus has non-exclusive 
original jurisdiction as the protector of Fundamental Rights. It has the power to 
issue writs, such as Habeas Corpus, Quo t arrw o, Prohibition. Certiorari and 
Mandamus. In addition to issuing these writs, the Supreme Court is empowered 
to issue appropriate directions and orders to the executive. Article 32 of the 
Constitution gives citizens the right to [nOVC to the Supreme Court directly fur the 
enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights enumerated in part III of the 
Constitution. 
b) : l ch'isory Jurisdiction 
Article 143 of the Constitution vests the President the power to seek advice 
regarding any question of law or fact of public importance. or cases belonging to 
the disputes arising out of pre-constitution treaties and agreements which are 
excluded from its original jurisdiction. This jurisdiction does not involve a lis, the 
advisory opinion is not binding on the government, it is not executable as a 
judgment of the court and the court may reserve its opinion in controversial 
political cases as in the I3abri Masjid case. 
c) Appellate Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court is the highest court of appeal from all courts. Its appellate 
jurisdiction may be divided into 
i) cases involving interpretation of the Constitution - civil, criminal or otherwise ii) 
civil cases, irrespective of any Constitutional question, and iii) Criminal cases, 
irrespective of any Constitutional question. 
Article 132 provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court by the High Court 
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certification, the Supreme Court may grant special leave to the appeal. Article 133 
provides for an appeal in civil cases. and article 134 provides the Supreme Court 
with appellate jurisdiction in criminal mattes_ However, the Supreme Court has 
the special appellate jurisdiction to grant, in its discretion, special leave appeal 
from any judgment, decree sentence or order in any case or matter passed or made 
by any court or tribunal. 
d) Review Jwisdiction 
The Supreme Court has the power to review any judgment pronounced or order 
made by it. Article 137 provides for review of judgment or orders by the 
Supreme Court wherein, subject to the provisions of any law made by the 
Parliament or any rules made under Article 145, the Supreme Court shall have the 
power to review any judgment pronounced or made by it. However, the Supreme 
Court jurisdiction may be enlarged with respect to any of the matters in the Union 
List as Parliament may by law confer. Parliament may, by law, also enlarge or can 
impose limitations on the powers and functions exercised by the Supreme Court. 
Since Parliament and the Judiciary are created by the Constitution, such aforesaid 
acts must lead to harmonious relationship between the two, and must not lead to 
altering the basic structure of the Constitution. Moreover, all these powers can also 
be suspended or superseded whenever there is a declaration of emergency in the 
country. 
4.5 High Courts 
There shall be High Court for each state (Atticle 214), and every High Court shall 
be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the 
power to punish for contempt of itself (Article 215). However, Parliament may, by 
law, establish a common High Court for two or more states and a Union 
Territory (Article 231). Every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and 
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such other judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to 
appoint. Provisions for additional judges and acting judges being appointed by the 
President are also given in the Constitution. The President, while appointing the 
judges shall consult the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and also 
the Chief Justice of that High Court in the matter of appointment of a judge other 
than the Chief Justice. Ajudge of a High Court shall hold office until the age of 62 
years. A judge can vacate the seat by resigning, by being appointed a judge of the 
Supreme Court or by being transferred to any other High Court by the President. 
A judge can be removed by the President on grounds of misbehaviour or 
incapacity in the same manner in which a judge of the Supreme Court is 
n:moved. 
Power'oJHigh Courts 
The jurisdiction of the High Court of a state is co-terminus with the territorial 
limits of that state. The original jurisdiction of High court includes the 
enforcement of the Fundamental Rights, settlement of disputes relating to the 
election to the Union and State legislatures and jurisdiction over revenue matters. 
Its appellate jurisdiction extends to both civil and criminal matters. On the civil 
side, an appeal to the High Court is either a first appeal or second appeal. 
The criminal appellate jurisdiction consists of appeals from the 
decisions of 
a) a session judge, or an additional session judge where the sentence is 
of imprisonment exceeding 7 yeah 
b) an assistant session judge, meuopolitan Magistrate of other judicial 
Magistrate in certain certified cases other than 'petty' cases. 
The writ jurisdiction of High Court means issuance of writs/orders for the 
enforcement of Fundamental Rights and also in cases of ordinary legal rights. High 
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Court also has the power to superintend all other courts and tribunals, except those 
dealing with armed forces. It can also franc rules and issue instructions for 
guidance from time to time with directions for speedier and effective judicial 
remedy. High Court also has the power to transfer cases to itself from subordinate 
courts concerning the interpretation of the Constitution However, the 
Parliament, by law, may extend the jurisdiction of a High Court to, or exclude the 
jurisdiction of a High Court from, any Union Territory. High Courts power of 
original and appellate jurisdiction is also circumscribed by the creation of Central 
Administrative Tribunals. with respect to services under the Union and it has no 
power to invalidate a Central Act, rule, notification or order made by any 
administrative authority of the Union. 
Subordinate Courts 
The hierarchies of courts that lie subordinate to High Courts are referred to as 
subordinate courts. It is for the state governments to enact for the creation of 
subordinate courts. The nomenclature of these subordinate courts differs from 
state to state but broadly there is unifonnity in ternls of the organisational 
structure. 
Below the High Courts, there are District Courts for each district, and has appellate 
jurisdiction in the district. Under the district courts, there are the lower courts 
such as the Additional District Court, Sub Court, Munsiff Magistrate Court, Court 
of Special Judicial Magistrate of II class, Court of Special Judicial Magistrate of I 
class, Court of Special Munsiff Magistrate for Factories Act and labour laws, etc. 
Below the subordinate courts, at the grass root levels are the Panchayat Courts 
(Nyaya Panchayat. Gram Panchayat. Panchayat Adalat, etc.). These are, 
however, not considered as courts under the purview of the criminal courts 
jurisdiction. 
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District Courts can take cognizance of original matters under special status. The 
Governor, in consultation with the High Court, makes appointments pertaining 
to the district courts, Appointment of persons other than the District Judges to the 
judicial service of a state is made by the Governor in accordance with the rules 
made by him in that behalf after consultation with the High Court and the State 
Public Service Commission. The llieh Court exercises administrative control 
over the district courts and the courts subordinate to them, in matters as posting, 
promotions and granting of leave to all persons belonging to the state judicial 
service. 
4.6 Judicial Review and Public Interest Litigation (PIL) 
Judicial Review means the power of the judiciary to pronounce upon the 
Constitutional validity of the acts of public authorities, both executive and 
legislature. In any democratic society, judicial review is the soul of the system 
because without it democracy and the rule of law cannot be maintained. Judicial 
review in India is an integral part of the Constitution and constitutes the 'basic 
structure of the Constimnon. The whole law of judicial review has been developed by 
judges on 4  case to case basis. Consequently. the right of seeking judicial 
review depends on the facts of each individual case; however, there cannot be a 
review of an abstract proposition of law. 
Though 'judicial review  does not find mention in our Constitution, this power has 
been derived by the judiciary from various provisions, Firstly, judiciary power 
to interpret the constitution and especially the limits on Fundamental Rights vis-a-vis 
Article 13(2) that suggests that any law contravening the Fundamental Rights would 
be declared void. It is the duty of the Supreme Court to safeguard and protect the 
Fundamental Rights of people and thus it is invested with the power of judicial 
review under Article 32 and to interpret the Constitution. 
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The Supreme Courts power of judicial review extends to Constitutional Amendments. 
however, Constitutional Amendment review by judiciary in relation to Fundamental 
Rights and its legal validity has been a contentious political issue. Parliament can 
amend the Constitution under Article 368 but such amendments should not take 
away or violate Fundamental Rights and any law made in contravention with this 
rule shall be void. (Article 13) 
Before Golakhnath case (1967) the courts held that a Constitutional Amendment 
is not law within the meaning of Article 13 and hence, would not he held void if it 
violated any fundamental right. In Golakhnath case it was settled that 
ij all amendments be law [13 (3)] 
u) Fundamental Rights are transcendental and immutable, so cannot be amended, 
nonetheless to amend Fundamental Rights a new Constituent Assembly needs 
to be convened, and iii) Constitutional Amendment is an ordinary legislative 
power. 
In 1971, Parliament, by the 24th Constitutional Amendment, reversed the Golakhnath 
judgments by declaring Constitutional Amendments made under Article 368, not to 
be as 'law' within the mcanine of Article 13 and the validity of' the Constitutional 
Amendment Act shall trot be open to question on the ground that it takes away or 
affects Fundamental Rights [Art.36S (3)1. In 1972, the Parliament passed the 25th 
Constitutional Amendment Act allowing the legislature to encroach on Fundamental 
Rights if it was said to he done pursuant to giving effect to the Directive Principles 
of State Policy. The 28th Amendment Act ended the recognition granted to former 
rulers of Indian states and their privy purses were abolished. In the famous 
Keshavnanda Bharati case, 1973, the court held that the Parliament could 
amend even the Fundamental Rights, but it and not competent to alter the 'basic 
structure' was or 'framework' of the Constitution_ The 42 Amendment Act (1976) 
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declared that Article 368 was riot subject to judicial review by inserting clause (4)  
and (5) in Article 368. However, in 1980 in Minerva Mills case, court struck down 
clause (4) and (5) from Article 368 and maintained that' judicial review is are basic 
feature of the Indian Constitutional system which cannot be taken away even by 
amending the constitution. The Supreme Court, since then, has been defining the 
basic stmcture' case by case. 
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is a socio-economic movement generated by the 
judiciary to reach justice especially m the weaker sections of the society. The 
idea came from 'ratio pupularis' of the Roman jwisprudence, which allowed court 
access to every citizen in matters of public wrongs. The purpose of PIL is not the 
enforcement of the right of one person against the other but to reach justice to the 
deprived sections of the society. The court is not exercising any extra constitutional 
jurisdiction and is now firmly rooted in Article 14, i.e., protection against all 
arbitrariness and lawlessness in administrative actions, and Article 21 that provides 
for protection of life embodying everything that goes for a dignified living, 
including rightful concern for others and Directive Principles applying to weaker 
sections. 
The granting of the right to PIT, has led to plethora of litigations in the courts, 
indicative of the development of democratic tights by the judiciary. S.P.Sathe has 
suggested that the Supreme 
Court has been working under these 
patterns: 
i) Interpretational thrusts with a view to extending judicial control over other 
organs of the state to ensure liberty, dignity, equality and justice to the 
individual and greater accountability of die governing institutions. 
ii) Interpretational strategies with a view to facilitate social change, which 
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would promote greater protection of the minorities, weaker sections 
of the society and political and religious dissenters. 
iii) Innovating new methods for increasing access tojustice (like PIL and 
Lok Adalats) 
The judiciary must find ways and means to clear burgeoning pending cases. In this 
judiciary, as an organisation, needs specialisation and differentiation in order to 
solve the cases. Lok Adalats and tribunals must be made more effective. Judiciary 
must appoint judges on merit basis and all adhocism must go. As the Tenth Law 
Conmussion has suggested, Constitutional Courts and the zonal courts of appeals 
may be constituted. A working democracy requires an independent judiciary well 
co-ordinated by an effective executive and a responsible legislature. 
4.7 Judiciary and Role of Judiciary 
The judiciary (also known as the judicial system) is the system of courts that 
interprets and applies the law in the name of the state. The judiciary also 
provides a mechanism for the resolution of disputes. Under the doctrine of the 
separation of powers, the judiciary generally does not make law (that is, in a 
plenary fashion, which is the responsibility of the legislature) or enforce law 
(which is the responsibility of the executive), but rather interprets law and 
applies it to the facts of each case. This branch of the state is often tasked with 
ensuring equal justice under law, It usually consists of a court of final appeal 
(called the "Supreme court" or "Cortstitutional court"), together with lower 
courts. In many jurisdictions the judicial branch has the power to change laws 
through the process of, judicial review. Courts with judicial review power may 
annul the laws and rules of the state when it finds them incompatible with a 
higher norm, such as primary legislation, the provisions of the constitution 
orinternational law. Judges constitute a critical force for interpretation and 
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implementation of a constitution, thus de facto in common law countries 
creating the body of constitutional law. In the US during recent decades the 
judiciary became active in economic issues related with economic rights 
established by constitution because 'economics may provide insight into 
questions that bear on the proper legal interpretation'. [Ill Since many 
countries with transitional political and economic systems continue treating 
their constitutions as abstract legal documents disengaged from the economic 
policy of the state, practice of judicial review of economic acts of executive. 
and legislative branches have begun to grow. 
In the 1980s. the Supreme Court of India for almost a decade had been 
encouraging public interest litigation on behalf of the poor and oppressed by 
using a very broad interpretation of several articles of the Indian Constitution. 
f12l 
Budget of the judiciary in many transitional and developing countries is almost 
completely controlled by the executive. The latter undermines the separation of 
powers, as it creates a critical financial dependence of the judiciary. The proper 
national wealth distribution including the government spending on the 
judiciary is subject of the constitutional economics. It is important to 
distinguish between the two methods of corruption of the judiciary: the state 
(through budget planning and various privileges), and the private. [ 131 
The term "judiciary" is also used to refer collectively to the personnel, such as 
judges, magistrates and other adjudicators, who form the core of a judiciary 
(sometimes referred to as a "bench"), as well as the staffs who keeps the 
system running smoothly. [ 14] 
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The Role of Judiciary in India 
In a democracy, the role of judiciary is crucial. Judiciary is a faithful keeper of 
the constitutional assurances. An independent and impartial judiciary can make 
the legal system vibrant. Our Indian judiciary can be regarded as a creative 
judiciary. Credibility of judicial process ultimately depends on the manner of 
doing administration of justice. Justice K. Subba Rao explains the function of 
the judiciary as thus 
• It is a balancing wheel of the federation; 
• It keeps equilibrium between fundamental rights and social justice; 
• It forms all forms of authorities within the bounds; 
• It Controls the Admi nl strati ve Tribunal s. 
Justice — Social, economic and political is clearly laid down in the preamble as 
the guiding principle of the constitution. Social justice is the main concept on 
which our constitution is built. Part III and IV of Indian constitution are 
significant in the direction of Social Justice and economic development of the 
citizens. Judiciary can promote social justice through its judgments. In other 
sense, they are under an obligation to do so. While applying judicial discretion 
in adjudication, judiciary should be so cautious. And prime importance should 
be to promote social justice. Supreme Court had itself suggested in one of the, 
early and landmark case (Bandhu Mukti Morcha v Union of India 1984) 1 SCC 
161, 234) that is a great merit in the court proceedings to decide an issue on the 
basis of strict legal principle and avoiding carefully the influence of purely 
emotional appeal. For that alone gives the decision of the court a direction 
which is certain and unfaltering, and that especial permanence in legal 
jurisprudence which makes it a base for the next step forward in the further 
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progress of the law. Indeed both certainty of substance and certainty of 
direction are indispensable requirement in the development of the law and 
invest it with credibility which commands public confidence in its legitimacy. 
The Court must Lake care to see that it does not overstep the limits of its 
judicial function and trespass into areas which are reserved to the executive 
and the legislature by the constitution. Clear violation of constitutional or 
statutory provision must be interfered by the apex judiciary. If a considered 
policy decision has been taken which is not in conflict with any law or is not 
malafide, it will not be in Public Interest to require the court to go into and 
investigate those areas which are the function of the executive. When two or 
more options or views are possible and after considering them the government 
takes a policy decision it is then not the function of the court to go into the 
matter a fresh and in a way, sit in appeal over such a policy decision (Baleo V. 
Union of India (2002) 2 SCC 311) whatever method adopted by judiciary in 
adjudication, it must be the procedure known to the judicial tenets. It is proper 
to conclude with the note adopted by Justice Ranganatha Misra in the case of 
Dr. P. Nalla Tharnpy Thera v. Union of India as follows 
"We think it proper to conclude our decision by remembering the famous 
saying of Herry Peter Broughan with certain adaptations. "It was the boast of 
Augustus that he found Rome of bricks and left it of Marble". But how noble 
will be the boast of the citizens of free India of today when they shall have it to 
say that they found law dear and left it cheaper; found it scaled book and left it 
a living letter; found it the patrimony of the rich and left if the inheritance of 
the poor; found it the two edged sword of craft and oppression and left it the 
staff of honesty and the shield of innocence. It is only in a country of that 
order that the common man will have his voice heard. 
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4.8 Changing Role of the Indian Judiciary 
A strong ambivalence clouds the public image of the Indian judiciary. On a 
superficial level, it reflects the shaky state of India's democracy. Both are 
basically in place, but both are also seriously troubled. Galanter (1984: 500) 
summarizes the public's perception as follows: "Courts in India are viewed 
with a curious ambivalence; they are simultaneously fountains of justice and 
cesspools of manipulation. Litigation is widely regarded as infested with 
dishonesty and corruption. But courts, especially High Courts are among the 
most respected and trusted institutions.[ 151 
To judge by recent literature, this ambivalence has increased. On the 
one hand, judicial activism is seen as a sign of hope to set shortcomings right. 
Social awareness, insistence on human rights and the attempt to check 
governmental lawlessness are said to have 'transformed the Supreme Court of 
India into a Supreme Court for Indians' (Baxi 1994a: 143, his emphasis). In the 
words of a former Supreme Court Justice, the judiciary has ensured that 
howsoever high you may otherwise be, the law is above you' (Khanna. 
1999:25),I 16] 1171 
On the other hand, symptoms of inefficiency haunt the courts as they do other 
state institutions. The courts are not free of corruption. The legal process is 
even said to have become more and more intractable, dilatory, whimsical and 
protective of the criminal and law breaker having influence or financial clout' 
(Anand, 1996: 16). [18] 
There are serious complaints of widely reported allegations of judicial 
misconduct and a disconcerting compromise of integrity and impartiality' 
(Jethmalani, 1999: 22). (191 
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This mixed picture is reinforced by a recent assessment of a high ranking 
expert group including, a former chief justice of the Indian Supreme Court, 
A.M. Ahmadi (Chodosh et al., 1997:5)'. [201 
Widespread and profound backlog and delay currently undermine the 
fundamental priorities of a law-based society. Backlog and delay in the 
resolution of civil disputes in India erode public trust and confidence in legal 
institutions, and act as significant barriers to India's chosen path to social 
justice and economic development_ The inability to enter final legal decisions 
within a reasonable time renders state action functionally immune, turns 
obligations to perform contractual duties into effective rights to breach with 
impunity. and devalues remedies eventually provided. In sum, the inability to 
resolve disputes in a timely manner eviscerates public and private rights and 
obligations. While it is acknowledged that trials are delayed throughout the 
world, the authors go on to state that 'nowhere, however, does backlog and 
delay appear to be more accentuated than in modern-day India'. 
The same essay, however, mentions signs of hope. Most important, it suggests 
that court administrations and case management be reformed. Such reforms 
should dramatically enhance the efficiency of the judiciary. They include 
computerization, systematic classification of cases, comprehensive tracking of 
ongoing proceedings, and similar measures, The essay stresses the remarkable 
success of reforms along these lines that were initiated by A.M. Ahmadi in the 
Supreme Court: These initiatives dramatically reduced the Supreme Court 
caseload from approximately 120.000 cases in October 1994 to 28,000 cases in 
September 1996. The essay also places hope on alternative dispute settlement 
through, for instance, lok adnlats, or people's courts. Chodosh ct al. stress the 
relevance of a trustworthy and efficient judiciary for a 'diverse and exploding 
population, the largest democracy and the seventh largest national market in 
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the world'. They mention the recent drive toward greater accountability in 
public administration' and the relevance of judicial reliability in view of 'post-
1991 market reforms'. In a nutshell, their analysis once again reflects the 
exigencies of functional differentiation and modernization. 
4.9 Judicial Activism: An Overview 
To begin, let us ask: What is judicial activism? How does it work in a modem 
society? In a modern democratic state; among the three instrumentalities 
constituting the state and executing its functions: the executive, the legislature 
and the judiciary; the last holds neither the power of the purse nor the sword, 
yet its the only one that can seek to prevent the excesses of the executive and 
the legislature and act for protection and enforcement of their rights and as a 
keeper of their liberties. 
Simply put, judicial activism depicts the pro-active role played by the judiciary 
in ensuring that rights and liberties of citizens are protected. Through judicial 
activism, the court moves beyond its normal role of a mere adjudicator of 
disputes and becomes a player in the system of the country, laying down 
principles and guidelines that the executive must carry out. It must be 
remembered though that performing this role requires the court to display fine 
balancing skills. While protecting the fundamental human rights of the people, 
the judiciary must constantly guard itself against the dangers of judicial 
populism. 
Justice V.R. Krishna lycr once remarked: THE LAW, substantive and 
procedural, never stands still even as life, societal life, ever is in locomotion.' 
But the vitality of law as a living organism largely depends on the judge's 
ability to pour life into the law when the occasion demands by making new 
inroads in law. Common law could not have grown if judges had hesitated to 
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enter the arena of judicial activism. Would judicial review of statute law have 
been possible if Chief Justice Marshall had in Malbury v. Madison confined 
judiciary's role to faithfully interpreting the cold print of legislative enactment? 
Would the reach of Articles 14 and 21 of our constitution have been what it is 
today if judges had not treated them expansively? No one can deny, with the 
changing social environment, the interpretation of constitutional and legislative 
provisions must also change. Holmes says in 'The Path of the Law' (1897), 5 
'we do not realize how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a 
slight change in the habit of the public mind. 
The Indian Supreme Court is widely known for its thrust towards judicial 
activism. Despite the popular impression that judicial activity began less than 
two decades ago; the roots can be traced way back to 1893 when Justice 
Mehmood of Allahabad High Court delivered a dissenting judgment, sowing 
the seed of activism in India. It was a case of an under trial who could not 
afford to engage a lawyer. So the question was whether the court could decide 
his case by merely looking at his papers. Remarkably, the taw was treated as a 
`living' organism for the protection of the rights of the disadvantaged. 
However, at the same time, the judiciary should always be conscious about the 
range of its powers and should generally be seen to exercise them with restraint 
within the constitutional parameters without unduly treading onto the path of 
the executive and the legislature. Though, in recent times, there have been 
complaints that the judiciary in general and the Supreme Court in particular has 
taken over the administration of the country by entering into the domain of the 
executive, one can safely say that except in a few stray cases, the court has 
only intervened when it has found executive action wanting. Before getting 
into the thrust of the discussion on the role of judicial activism played by the 
Indian Supreme Court in the context of the protection and prescrvativn of 
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human rights, let us briefly dwell on the experiences of the judiciary in the 
United States and in Britain, both having played a major role in the 
development of the judicial process the world over. 
Judicial activism can be described when the judiciary steps in to the shoes of 
the executive or the legislature and embarks on the works and privileges of the 
other two organs rather than interpretation of law. This topic has assumed 
immense significance because today everything from river pollution to the 
selection of the cricket team and even the disposal of waste has become the 
purview of Judicial Activism. The Supreme Court of India in a recent 
judgment on May 5, 2010 in Sclvi vs. Karnataka considered the 
constitutionality of the investigative Narco analysis technique holding it 
permissible only when the subject consents to its use. The decision taken by 
the Supreme Court or India about the 9h Schedule of the constitution deserves 
great attention. It was an example of excessive judicial Activism. In this case, 
one of the most controversial judgments of the Supreme Court was that the 
ninth schedule of the Constitution was open to judicial Review. The common 
citizens have discovered great relief in Judicial Activism because. of the 
inefficient administration and nonperforming of the other organs of 
Government and the wide spread corruption and criminality in the political 
sphere. In many cases the courts acted in the right direction but in certain 
instances it made upset the constitutional system of separation of 
powers. Today judicial activism has touched almost each and every aspect of 
life ranges from human rights issues to maintenance of public roads! 
4.10 Judicial Activism: Conceptual Framework 
Judicial activism has always been a source of heated dehate, especially in the 
light of recent developments in this regard. Over the last few years with 
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various controversial decisions, judges of the Supreme Court as well as various 
High Courts have once again triggered off the debate that has always generated 
a lot of heat. But still, what the term "judicial activism" actually connotes is 
still a mystery. From the inception of legal history till date, various critics have 
given various definitions of judicial activism, which are not only different but 
also contradictory. This is an attempt to bring out the exact connotation of 
"judicial activism" and to find out its effects on today's changing society. 
Although the idea of judicial activism has been around for quite some time, the 
term judicial activism was first introduced to the public by Arthur Schlesinger 
Jr. in his article which appeared in fortune Magazine in January 1947. He 
referred to the judges of the U.S. Supreme Court and explained different views 
held by them. Justice Black. Justice Douglas, Justice Murphy and Justice 
Rutlege were described as judicial activists who believed that the Supreme 
Court can play an affirmative role in promoting social welfare. Justice 
Frankfurter. Justice Jackson and Justice Burton appeared as champions of self 
restraint who argued that the judiciary should not go beyond its established but 
limited role and respect the principle of separation of powers as embodied in 
the U.S. Constitution, The critics held the view that judicial activism paves 
way for an unwanted intrusion by the courts into the realm which is reserved 
for political branches of government. 
The term judicial activism has been defined differently by legal scholars_ In 
order to reach a considered conclusion it would be pertinent to refer different 
legal sources. In the Harper Collins Dictionary of American Government and 
Politics, the term judicial activism has been defined as the making of new 
public policies through the decision of judges. Black's Law Dictionary defines 
it as a philosophy of judicial decision making whereby the judges allow their 
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personal views about public policy, among other factors, to guide their 
decisions...." 
While in the US, both the views are provalent, in the developing world, the 
view commonly held is that the courts should function as an instrument to 
achieve desired social results. It is widely believed that the judges should not 
hesitate to go beyond their traditional role as interpreters of the Constitution 
and laws in order to assume a role as independent trustees on behalf of society. 
The reason for widespread acceptance of this view is that in these countries the 
executive and legislature have failed to ensure good governance and provide a 
fair deal to their citizens. It shows how judiciary has been able to keep up the 
standards of good governance in the face of corruption, failed political process, 
incompetent elite and lack of respect for human rights. 
4.11 Nature and Scope of Judicial Activism 
It must from the outset be made clear that the concept of judicial activism does 
not lend itself to an exact definition. [21] It has variously been defined as, a 
philosophy advocating that judges stwutd interpret the Constitution to reflect 
contemporary conditions and values; f22] when courts do riot confine 
themselves to reasonable interpretations of law, but instead create law or when 
courts do not limit their ruling to the dispute before them, but instead establish 
a new rule to apply broadly to issues not presented in the specific action.[23] 
At the core of the concept is the notion that in deciding a case judges 
(particutarly those of the appellate courr) may. or some advocate must, reform 
the law if the existing rules or principles appear defective. On such a view, 
judges should not hesitate Logo beyond their traditional role as interpreters of 
the constitution and laws given to them by others in order to assume a role as 
independent policy makers or independent "trustees" on behalf of society. The 
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array of existing disparate, even contradictory, ways of defining the concept 
has made its meaning increasingly unclear. [241 This concept is traditionally 
the opposite of the concept of judicial restraint, whereby the courts interpret 
the Constitution and any law to avoid second guessing the policy decisions 
made by other governmental institutions such as Parliament. and the President 
within their constitutional spheres of authority. On such a view, judges have no 
popular mandate to act as policy makers and should defer to the decisions of 
the elected "political" branches of the government in matters of policy making 
so long as these policymakers stay within the limits of their powers as defined 
by the Constitution. We are not going to indulge in the on-going debate on the 
pros and cons of these two concepts [251 but will start from the premise that 
judicial activism is a reality and dual with it accordingly. 
4.12 Judicial Activism Theories 
As far as the origin and evolution of judicial activism go, there are two theories 
behind the whole concept. They are_ (i) Theory of Vacuum Filling and (ii) 
Theory of Social Want. 
Theory of Vacuum Filling 
The Theory of Vacuum Filling states that a power vacuum is created in the 
governance system due to the inaction and laziness of any one organ. When 
such a vacuum is formed, it is against the good being of the nation and may 
cause disaster to the democratic set up of the country. Hence, nature does not 
permit this vacuum to continue and other organs of governance expand their 
horizons and lake up this vacuum. In this case, the vacuum ik created by the 
inactivity, incompetence, disregard of law, negligence. corruption. utter 
indiscipline and lack of character among the two organs of governance viz, the 
legislature and the executive (Subliash C. Kashyap, 1997). 126] Hence the 
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remaining organ of the governance system i.e. the judiciary is left with no 
other alternative but to expand its horizons and fill up the vacuums created by 
the executive and the legislature. Thus according to this theory, the so-called 
hyper-activism of the judiciary is a result of filling up of the vacuum or the 
void created by the non-activism of the legislature and the executive. 
Theory of Social Want 
The Theory of Social Want slates that judicial activism omerged due to the 
failure of the existing legislations to cope up with the existing situations and 
problems in the country. When the existing legislations failed to provide any 
pathway, it became incumbent upon the judiciary to take on itself the problems 
of the oppressed and to find a way to solve them. The only way left to them 
within the framework of governance to achieve this end was to provide non-
conventional interpretations to the existing legislations, so as to apply them for 
greater good. Hence judicial activism emerged. The supporters of this theory 
opine that "judicial activism plays a vital role in bringing in the societal 
transformation. It is the judicial wing of the state that injects life into taw and 
supplies the missing links in the legislation... Having been armed with the 
power of review, the judiciary corns to acquire the status of a catalyst on 
change." (Shailja Chander, 1998) 1271 
4.13 Judicial Activism in India 
The term" judicial activism" was coined for the first time by Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr. in his article The Supreme Court: 1947," published in Fortune 
magazine in 1947.Though the history of judicial activism dates back to 1803 
when concept of Judicial review was evolved by chief justice Marshall in 
celebrated case of Mar bury v/s Madison. The emergence of judicial review 
gave birth to a new movement which is known as judicial activism. Black Law 
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Dictionary defines judicial activism as a." philosophy of judicial decision 
making whereby judges allows their personal views about public policy among 
other factors to guide their decision". 
Exercise of unconventional jurisprudence or creative approach of judiciary can 
he called as judicial activism for it instance in India the Supreme Court has 
treated even a letter as a writ petition and has passed appropriate orders. This 
concept has turned into it important means to enhance the applicability of a 
particular legislation for social betterment and also to bring improvement in the 
concerned state machinery. Judicial activism has turned a judge into a social 
activist, environmental activist, political activist etc. Basic purpose is, to bring 
the justice to the poor people at their doorstep. 
Position in India 
Unlike American eoiltit{tutifgl. Indian constitution itsctt pw" idc'. scope <or 
can say that makes space for emergence of judicial activism by virtue 
of Article~ 13. 32, 226.141. 142. but this term \4 as explained and recognized 
hti the Supreme Court in Golaknath's case ss here iii the court laid down the 
judicial principle of Prospective Overruling by ;giving wider beneficial 
interpretation of Article I3ot' the cuntititutiun. In real sense the history of 
judicial actinism in India began in late seventies v hen the strict rule of locus 
standi was ;given it final rest in S.P Gupta '5. Union of' India 1281, popula rly 
known as Judges transfer case. In this case Justice l3hagwati better known as 
champion of PEE. inter alia ohser\cd "where it legal wrong or legal injury is 
caused or threatened to it person or determinate class of persons and as such 
person or determinate class of person is by reason of poverty- .helplessness or 
disability of socially or economically disadvantaged position ,unahle to 
approach the court of relief :an\ mensher of public can maintain an application 
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for an appropriate direction. orrlcr kfr v ru in the High Court under Art 226 and 
in Supreme Court under Art 32.seeking judicial redress Cur the legal wrong or 
itijur\ Lau.C(l to such person... 
PIL and Judicial activism►r 
Public interest litigation means "litigation in the interest of public" entered 
judicial process in 1970.This type of litigation was innovated by judges to 
provide "equal access" to the unprivileged section of the society. The idea of 
PIL came from actin popularis of the Roman jurisprudence which allowed 
court access to every citizen in matters of public wrong. Development of Pit. 
has provided significant assistance in making the judicial activism meaningful. 
On account of this type of litigation the court has found opportunity to give 
directions in public interest and enforce the public duties. [291 
Judicial activism and the Constitution 
Articles 13, 32,226,141,142 are of considerable importance in judicial 
activism. Article 32 makes the Supreme Court as the protector and guarantor of 
the fundamental rights. Article I3 conferred wide power of judicial review to 
the Apex court. In the exercise of the judicial review it can examine the 
constitutionality of executive or legislative act the high courts have also the 
same power in this regard. 
Art 141 indicates that the power of the Supreme Court is to declare the law and 
not enact it, but in the course of its function to interpret the law, it alters the 
law. Art 142 enables the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to pass 
such order or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any 
cause or matter pending before it. Through these Articles the supreme court as 
well as high courts have played a significant role in rcdressal of' several social 
issues, environmental issues etc. 
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4.14 Legitimacy 
The Supreme Court of India has become the most powerful apex court in the 
world. Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States. the [louse of Lords in 
England, or the highest court,, in Canada or Australia. the Supreme Court of 
India may review a constitutional amendment and strike it down if it 
undermines the basic structure of' the Constitution. The realist school of 
jurisprudence uncovered the myth that judges merely declare or interpret pre-
existing law. The realist school of jurisprudence stated that judges make law 
and the law is what the courts say it is. This "legal skepticism" was a reaction 
to Austin's definition of law as a command of the political sovereign. 
According to analytical jurisprudence, a court merely applies or interprets 
existing. law. The American realist school of jurisprudence asserted that the 
judges made law, though interstitially. Jerome Frank, Justice Ilolmes, Justice 
Carduro. and Justice Karl Lewellyn were the chief exponents of , this school. 
The Indian Supreme Court nut only makes law, as understood in the sense of 
realist jurisprudence, but actually legislates. Judicial law making in the realist 
sense is what the Court does when it expands the meanings of the words 
"personal liberty," "due process of law." or "freedom n of speech and 
expression."I 301 
The doctrine of separation of po%%ers envisages that the legislature should 
make law, the executive should execute it, and the judiciary should settle 
disputes in accordance with the pre-existing law. In reality, this distinction is 
impractical and does not exist. Construed broadly it merely means that one 
body of the state should not perform it function that essentially belongs to 
another body. While lawmaking through interpretation and expansion of the 
meaning of open textured expressions like "due process of law," "equal 
protection of law s'' or "freedom of speech and expression" is it legitimate 
judicial function, the Supreme Court's creation of entirely new laws through 
directions, as in the above mentioned cases, is not a legitimate judicial 
function. 
After surveying Indian Supreme Court case la'N, we arrive at the conclusion 
that the Court has clearly transcended the limits of the judicial function and has 
undertaken functions which really belong to either the legislature or the 
executive. Its decisions clearly violate the limits imposed by the doctrine of 
separation of powers. A court is not equipped with the skills and the 
competence to discharge functions that essentially belong to other coordinate 
bodies of government. Its institutional equipment is inadequate for undertaking 
legislative or administrative functions. It cannot create positive rights such as 
the right to work, the right to education, or the right to shelter. It does not have 
the equipment for monitoring the various steps that are required for the 
abolition of child labor. It cannot stop entirely the degradation of the 
environment or government lawlessness. Its actions in these areas are bound to 
be symbolic. Admitting all these aspects, therefore. judicial activism is 
welcomed not only by individuals and social activists, but also by the 
government and other political players, like the politic all parties and civil 
servants. None cat the political players have protested against judicial intrusion 
into matters that essentially belonged to the executive. Some feeble whispers 
are heard, but they are from those whose vested interests are adversely 
affected. On the other hand, the political establishment is showing unusual 
deference to the decisions of the Court. Whether it is the limitation by the basic 
structure doctrine on Parliament's constituent power under Article 368 of the 
Constitution, or the limitations upon the President's power under Article 356. 
the political establishment has considered itself bound to function within the 
limits drawn by the Supreme Court. Generally, the people believe that the 
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government and other authorities must abide by the decisions of the Court. The 
general population and political players believe that in matters involving 
conflict between various competing interests, the courts are better arbiters than 
politicians. And by political players, I mean not only the central and the state 
governments and political parties, but also various constitutional authorities 
such as the President, the Election Commission, the National Human Rights 
Commission, and the statutory authorities including the tribunals, commissions 
and regulatory agencies. 
Legitimacy: Conceptualization 
John Austin defined law as a command of the sovereign enforced through 
sanction. According to Austin, it is coercive power that distinguishes law from 
fashions, habits. or even customs. Austin did not make any distinction between 
good law and bad law. To him, even a bad law was law if it fulfilled the three 
characteristics of law: 
(1) it was a command; (2) it was issued by the sovereign authority; and (3) it 
was backed by a sanction. H.L.A. Hart, a critic of analytical jurisprudence. 
asks whether an order from a gunman demanding a hank teller to hand over his 
cash was law. The order of the gunman was also backed by a sanction, i.e., the 
fear of death. Was the gunman a sovereign? Austin defines sovereign as a 
person or authority that is subordinate to none and is. 	by all. At the 
particular point of time when the gunman orders the bank teller to hand over 
the cash, he is obeyed by everyone who is under his threat and he is not 
required to obey anyone. The difference between the gunman and a political 
sovereign is that the gunman is not considered to be a lawful authority and his 
command is obeyed out of fear of death alone. According to Hart, the bank 
teller obeyed the gunman because, he was "obliged" to do so. He did not have 
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an obligation to obey. What is the difference between "being obliged to obey" 
and "having an obligation to obey?" The batik teller is obliged to obey but does 
not have an obligation to obey. Hart further says: "It is. however, equally 
certain that we should misdescribe the situation if we said 'on these facts' that 
(the bank teller] had an obligation' or a 'duty' to hand over the money. So 
from the start it is clear that we need something else for an understanding of 
the idea of obligation. There is a difference, yet to be explained, between the 
assertion that someone was obliged to do something and the assertion that he 
had an obligation to do it." 
A sovereign is considered to be a legitimate authority. A legitimate authority is 
one who is obeyed not only because one "is obliged to do so" but also because 
one feels that he is "under an obligation to do so" Professor hart was a 
linguistic philosopher and by drawing a distinction between "being obliged to 
act" and "having an obligation to act," he points out the difference between 
compliance with an order because of fear and compliance with an order 
because such an order is considered to be binding. A gunman is obeyed only 
because there is fear of death. A sovereign may also be obeyed because there is 
fear of punishment, but that punishment is considered to be prescribed by a 
legitimate authority. It is the "obligation to act" that arises from the legitimacy 
of an order. A sovereign that is appointed or elected by law is considered 
legitimate. Legal validity is a prerequisite to legitimacy. When we say that a 
law is valid, we mean that it is made by an authority competent to make it and 
that it is made in accordance with the procedure prescribed therefore. the 
difference between power and authority is similarly significant. The gunman 
has power, but no authority. The sovereign is supposed to have power and 
authority. Sometimes the sovereign lacks power, but possesses authority. For 
example, under the Constitution, the President of India has to act on the aid and 
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advice of the Council of Ministers. The President has power to return the 
advice once but if the cabinet persists in giving that advice, he must accept it 
and act in accordance with it. Thus, the president may not have the power but 
he has the authority. The ultimate order must be in the name of the President; 
otherwise, it is not legitimate. 
According to Max Weber. the most common form of legitimacy is the belief 
in legality, i.e., the acquiescence in enactments which ate formally correct and 
which have been made in the accustomed manner". 1311 While validity is 
essentially a Legal concept, legitimacy is a sociological concept. Validity is 
determined in terms of legality and it is also a prerequisite of legitimacy. 
However, a law maybe valid and yet lack legitimacy. For example, when 
Gandhi refused to obey a law he considered unjust, he delegitimized the 
colonial law and sought to legitimize conscientious objection to an unjust law. 
Although the law was valid because it had been enacted by a competent 
authority, it was divested of its legitimacy in the eyes of a large number of 
Indians because of its unjust character. When Tilak was sentenced to six years 
of imprisonment For the offense of sedition, he stated that although he was 
guilty in a civil court, he was innocent in a higher court, a divine court. Unlike 
Gandhi, Tilak did not plead guilty to the charge of sedition but asserted that 
what he wrote or said did not amount to sedition. Gandhi's approach was basec 
on morality (natural law) whereas Tilak appealed to the concept of the rule of 
law-the basis of English law. [321 Both, however, protested against the positivk 
law which they saw as unjust. 
The justness of the law was determined by applying moral parameters 
In legal theory, the concept of natural law has always acted as a moral scale to 
the evaluation of a positive law. Where a positive law manifestly runs counte 
to natural law, it loses its legitimacy. When Gcrman generals pleaded that the, 
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participated in the extermination of the Jews under orders of superiors given 
under valid German laws, the Nuremburg tribunal, set up by the Allies to try 
war criminals after the end of the Second World War, rejected that plea on the 
ground that their crimes against humanity could not be justified under any law. 
The tribunal therefore held that even a valid law could not give authority for 
such heinous crimes. The decision of the Nurcmhurg tribunal, though 
erroneous from the standpoint of legal positivism, was right according to a 
widely shared consensus which emerged after the War. That consensus lens 
legitimacy to the decision of the Nuremburg tribunal. 
In India. although the declaration of emergency in 1975 and the subsequent 
curbs on liberty imposed through various orders of the President were legally 
valid, they obviously lacked legitimacy in the eyes of those who felt they were 
excessive. This was evidenced from the fact that even Mrs. Gandhi herself was 
not sure of the legitimacy of the emergency regime and therefore wanted to 
secure legitimacy for her rule through the elections that she announced in 
1977. Legitimacy therefore means: (I) legal validity; (2) a widely shared 
feeling among the people that they have a duty to obey the law; and (3) actual 
obedience of the law by a large number of people. [331 
Gandhi's passive resistance was based on challenging the latter two 
requiretnents_ It was aimed at delegitimization of colonial law, which was 
unjust and unfair. At the same time, Gandhi avoided the growth of anarchy by 
volunteering to suffer punishment for his disobedience of the law. Submission 
to the punishment prescribed by the law tended to legitimate the rule of law, 
but also tended to de-legitimate the colonial law. It also legitimated the right to 
peaceful protest against a taw that was considered io be a had law. 
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4.15 Recent examples of Judicial Activism 
2G Spectrum and commonwealth scam cases are glaring examples to show that 
how PIL can be used to check the menace of corruption in Indian 
Administration. In both these cases matter was initiated at the instance of 
public spirited person by way of PIL On 2"d february2012 the SC court has 
taken an unprecedented step and cancelled 122 2G licenses distributed by 
government in 2008 to different telecom companies. [34] 
Often criticised for alleged judicial overreach, the Supreme Court justified its 
order cancelling 122 licenses for 2G-spectrum, saying it was duty-bound to 
strike down policies that violate constitutional principles or were contrary to 
public interest. An apex court bench said this was needed to "ensure that the 
institutional integrity is not compromised by those in whom the people have 
reposed trust and who have taken oath to discharge duties in accordance with 
the Constitution and the law without fear or favour, affection or ill will and 
who, as any other citizen, enjoy fundamental rights but is bound to perform 
duties" It said, "There cannot he any quarrel with the proposition that the court 
cannot substitute its opinion for the one formed by the experts in the particular 
field and due respect should be given to the wisdom of those who are entrusted 
with the task of framing the policies. 
"However, when it is clearly demonstrated before the court that the policy 
framed by the State or its agency/instrumentality and/or its implementation is 
contrary to public interest or is violative of the constitutional principles, it is 
the duty of the court to exercise its jurisdiction in larger public interest and 
reject the stock plea of the State that the scope ofjudicial review should not be 
exceeded heyond the recognised parameters." the bench added. 
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Referring to the PILs filed by the Centre for Public Interest Litigation and 
Janata Party chief Subranranian Swanty, it said: "When matters like these are 
brought before the judicial eonstitucnt of the State by public spirited citizens, it 
becomes the duty of the Court to exercise its power in larger public interest..." 
While admitting that TRAI was an expert body assigned with important 
functions under the 1997 TRAI Act, the bench said, the TRAI in making 
recommendations cannot overlook the basic constitutional principles and 
recommend which should deny majority of people from participating in the 
distribution of state property_ 135] 
Holding that spectrum was a natural resources, the court said natural resources 
"are vested with the govenmrcnt as 4 matter of trust in the name of the people 
of India and it is the solemn duty of the state to protect the national interest, 
and natural resources must always be used in interest of the country and not 
private interest." In Noida land acquisition case the Supreme Court cancelled 
the acquisition of land by U.P government as it was acquired for industrial 
purpose but it was given to builders for making apartments. The court ordered 
that land should be revert back to farmers from whom land was acquired_ Often 
Supreme Court and different high courts pass order for CBI investigation in 
several cases. Under the law these power lies with the governments. This is 
again an example of judicial activism. The Supreme Court has also played a 
significant role in case relating 2002 Gujarat riot. 
4.16 Judicial Activism in Other Countries 
Judicial activism in the form of public interest litigation has proved to be an 
effective means for the protection of civil rights in India. It provides justice to 
the most deprived sections of the society and the executive is forced to show 
responsibility towards the rights of the citizens. Despite a Constitutional Form 
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of government which stands for rule of law and protects the rights of citizens 
the Indian democracy has not been able to remove the exploitation and 
discrimination against the poor Although there have been several legislative 
efforts but due to their poor implementation they couldn't produce the desired 
results. The government has not been able to ensure the economic and social 
well-being of its citizens. The poorer economic conditions have led to 
economic exploitation of poorest elements of Indian society. The people are 
forced to work at low wages, employ their children to supplement their income 
and engage in bonded labour. Millions are denied subsistence wages despite 
the minimum wage act on (he Statute. Children still work, in carpet weaving or 
glass factories and serve as domestic help despite laws against child labour. 
Hundreds of thousands including children suffer in bondage despite the 
Bonded Labour (Abolition) Act 1976. 
According to Human Rights Watch the Indian political system has supported a 
rule of law but remained indifferent towards law enforcement. Indian law- 
enforcement agencies are quite notorious for their brutality and corruption. 
They are often involved in criminal activities such as killing of suspects and 
torture of prisoners. These terrible conditions forced the judiciary to come to 
the rescue of the affected people by developing a novel system which is known 
as public interest litigation. Two judges, Justice Bhagwati and Justice Krishna 
Iyer played an important role in the development of PIL. Keeping in view the 
indifference and apathy of the administration towards the condition of the 
people and the fact that the judicial procedure was too tedious to he of any help 
in getting judicial relief they declared that anyone whose fundamental rights 
have been violated can directly bring the issue before the court by writing a 
letter. 
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Highlighting the role of }udiciary, Justice Bhagwati observed as under, the 
judiciary has to play a vital and important role not only in preventing and 
remeding abuse and misuse of power but also in eliminating exploitation and 
injustice, for this purpose it is necessary to make procedural innovation in 
order to meet the challenges posed by this new role of an active and committed 
judiciary. Under this philosophy, judiciary looks an active role in addressing 
the human rights issues. In a number of noteworthy cases, the courts set 
precedents which heralded new role of judiciary in social policy-an area that 
was earlier considered to be the sole domain of executive and the Legislature In 
Hussainara Khatoon case, the court provided relief to prisoners and asserted 
that speedy trial is a fundamental right of every citizen, In Anil Yadav vs. State 
of Bihar and Khatri vs. State of Bihar the court took stringent action against the 
police brutality and provided quick relief. Similarly PIL has been used to 
provide relief to bonded labourers. With the initiative of various civil society 
organizations courts have been able to identify and rehabilitate hundreds of 
bonded people. A similar stance has been taken by the judiciary on issues such 
as low wages, environmental protection, violation of people's rights and 
corruption. Through PIL, the judiciary has been able to hold the political elite 
accountable, In this regard, the most noteworthy was JMM bribery case in 
which former Indian PM Narisma Rao was prosecuted. 
Mexico and Argentina have undergone a similar experience, in these countries; 
it is mainly the problem of 'democratic deficit' which has given rise to judicial 
activism. There is a widespread perception and belief that the government, 
though democratically elected is too far removed from the public sentiment. 
Most of the public policies are not arrived at through a broad discussion and 
consensus among all the stakeholders. This is the result of a detached 
technocratic assessment which reflects the preferences of powerful elites. Due 
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to lack of participation opportunitie.`, the courts provide the only forum where 
the policy decisions can be contested, on the issues of Constitutionality or 
public interest litigation. 
Apart from Mexico and Argentina, the entire Latin America has witnessed a 
radical change which the judiciary has brought about by way of strengthening 
the region's democratic political system and the situation relating to rule of law 
in a case study it was aptly stated as under: 
"The judicial activism may also reflect issues of 
regime. or at least governmental legitimacy. where the 
political class is seen as being too mired in 
unacceptable levels of corruption and graft. A 
dramatic example of' this is the operation of Mano 
Pulitti (Clean Hands) in Italy, leading to a spectacular 
redefinition of Italian political landscapes as the 
justice system stepped in to sort out the mess of 
corruption within the political class, In Latin America, 
the whole question of corruption and Impunity in 
public office represents a major obstacle for 
democratic consolidation". 
Catalina Smulovitz in Discovery of law made a similar observation: 
"In the face of democratic deficit of representative 
government the law and invocation of the law through 
judicial institutions can become an instrument of civil 
society empowerment. Courts act as an equalizing 
institution through which social grievances can be 
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addressed which otherwise do not have access to 
political channels of representation". 
Another noteworthy example which needs consideration is that of Israeli 
judiciary. The absence of a written Constitution has not deterred Israeli 
Judiciary from developing a system of judicial review over administrative 
actions. Since the creation of the State, the courts, led by the Supreme Court. 
developed a wide array of principles and doctrines in order to review the 
actions of' the bureaucracy, military and other administrative institutions. 
Before 1980s Supreme Court avoided, getting embroiled in political 
controversies. However, the 1980's saw a major shift in almost all aspects of 
judicial review. There was a dramatic change in principles concerning access 
to courts and the rule of law. In its landmark decision in: 
Ressler vs. Minister of Defense, Justice Aharon Barak said. any human action 
is susceptible to determination by a legal norm and there is no action regarding 
which there is no legal norm determining it. There is no legal vacuum, in 
which actions are taken without the law having anything to say about them. 
The law encompasses any action_,. the fact that an issue is strictly political does 
not change the fact that such an issue is also a legal issue. 
4.17 Limits of Judicial Activism 
Today, everything from river pollution to the selection of the cricket team has 
become the purview of judicial activism. Is it time to put the genie back in the 
bottle and confine the courts public interest jurisdiction to its original purpose 
of ensuring justice to the poor and exploited? 
All judges have subjective opinions. Their views have a hearing on judgments 
delivered. So, regardless of the appearance of neutrality, the values and beliefs 
of the judiciary play a major role in the life of the nation. In that sense, the 
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judiciary actively pushes things in a certain direction. For example, 
immediately after Independence the courts' approach was one of protection of 
the rights of property. and this led to the striking down of land reform 
legislations. 
There has always been a tussle between Parliament and the judiciary, leading 
to various constitutional amendments that, in turn, have been challenged in the 
courts. However, the genesis of 'judicial activism' lies in the evolution of 
public interest litigation. Under the Indian Constitution, the Supreme Court and 
high courts can be approached in case of a violation of' fundamental rights. 
I lowever, it was the person whose rights had been directly affected who could 
petition the court. This rule, prohibiting the filing of cases on behalf of other 
individuals, was followed for almost three decades. 
In 1979, a small news item in the Indian Express, describing the plight of 
undertrial prisoners who had been languishing for periods longer than the 
maximum punishment prescribed, led an advocate to file a petition in the 
Supreme Court. The court entertained this petition on behalf of the prisoners, 
and various directions to provide relief were given in the Bihar under trials 
case. 
Thereafter, the court entertained a number of' representative petitions in the 
areas of custodial death, prisoners' rights, and abolition of bonded labour, 
condition of mental homes. workers' rights, occupational health and related 
issues. The rationale was that fundamental rights remained on paper for a large 
number of marginalized sections of society that were not in any position to 
come to court. Therefore, public-spirited persons could file petitions on behalf 
of these poor and exploited classes of' people. Even letters describing the plight 
of the dispossessed were entertained, and relief given. 
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Public Interest Litigations (PILs) evolved as an innovative departure from ti 
rules, in tune with the socio-economic condition of our society. Even in d 
field of environmental jurisprudence, in cases like the Srirarn olcutn gas tel 
incident in 1985, in Delhi, the court evolved principles of corporate liabili 
and awarded compensation to the injured workers and people living around ti 
factory. Those were the heydays of judicial activism, with socially-oriented 
judges like Krishna Iyer, P N Bhagwati and Chinnappa Reddy. 
Gradually, however, the court began enter taining public interest petitions that 
were not solely on behalf of the exploited sections. Some of the petitions dealt 
with social ills like corruption and the criminalisation of politics. Others were 
about the protection of ancient monuments like the Taj Mahal, the tombs of 
Zauq and Ghalib. River pollution, destruction of forests, waste management 
and environmental conservation began to constitute another huge chunk of 
PILs. 
People turned to the judiciary as a panacea for all ills, and the courts seem to 
have accepted their own omnipotence. Cases like the hawala. Bofors and 
fodder scam are all household names today. And yet, corruption is prevalent in 
the courts themselves, and the apex court has not been able to cleanse its own 
backyard while attempting to root out corruption from the entire country. 
Today. PIL is an ever-expanding universe. Any and everything, from the 
selection of the cricket team to the construction of a flyover, falls within its 
domain. Simultaneously, a large number of funded and non-funded CSOs, in 
the shape of committees, centres and human rights networks with the primary 
objective of filing PILs, have mushroomed and are part of the litigating 
constellation. 
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From the PIL's humble beginnings as champion of the poor and exploited, 
public interest litigation is moving in it diametrically opposite direction. There 
was a time when the courts would provide relief from the harsh, arbitrary 
actions of the executive, reflected in, say. the grant of a stay on the demolition 
of slums on grounds of lack of it rehabilitation plan or hardship of the 
monsoons, or school examinations. Today, slum demolitions are being directed 
on orders from the courts. In fact, the tables have turned. Today, it's the 
executive and legislature that are trying to put it relief and rehabilitation 
scheme in place before such demolitions. The courts, on the other hand, are 
declaring that demolitions should be carried out immediately, rendering scores 
of people homeless. 
A similar trend is reflected in a are number of PIL areas. Thus, in the 
decision to shift heavy industries out of Delhi, the court heard public interest 
litigant M C Mehta. the owners of the industries, and the government, but 
denied the opportunity to be heard to the \4orkers whose right to life and 
livelihood was going to be affected by the decision. 
Protection of the environment is an area in PIL where the people versus 
environment paradigm have been constructed. But in cases such as the ongoing 
Godavarman case, the judiciary issued directions to evict tribals and other 
villagers from sanctuaries, national parks and tiger reserves. The right to life 
and livelihood of thousands of people residing in these areas does not find 
much place in the developing environmental jurisprudence. 
The declining authority of the legislature and executive has led to ever-
increasing activism by the judiciary in these areas. The role of the judiciary 
was understood to be interpreting the laws made by the legislature. However. 
the Supreme Court evolved the doctrine that in areas where no law had been 
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made by the legislature. the judiciary could create a law to address the 
problems and issues raised in petitions. For instance, in the absence of 
levislation. the court laid down 22uidelines and mechanisms with respect to 
sexual harassment in the workplace, in the famous Vishakha judgment. In the 
sphere of environmental jurisprudence, the Supreme Court created the five-
member Central Empowered Committee (CEC) which functions like a judicial 
body and gives recommendations. Generally. appointment to statutory bodies 
created under legislation is a prerogative of the executive. Ilowever, on the 
recent issue of appointments to the Forest Advisory Committee, the judges 
reacted with indignation to the environment ministry's rejection of the names 
suggested by the CEC and endorsed by the court. The Supreme Court has been, 
and remains, a political institution. The role it plays varies with the nature of 
the polity, the strength and stability of the Centre, and the prevalent mood in 
the country. Today, in an era of coalition politics, a Weak and wilting Centre, 
and the eroded credibility of the legislature and executive, the judiciary has 
taken centrestage. But is it time to put the genie back in the bottle and confine 
the courts' public interest jurisdiction to its original purpose of being 
permissible solely on behalf of the poor and exploited.,  
4.18 Criticism of ,Judicial Activism 
The concept of judicial activism has been put under scanner by the critic since 
its inception. It has been criticized on several counts. One such criticism is that 
the PIL strategy is a status quoits approach of the court to avoid any change in 
the system and so it is a painkilling strategy which does not treat the disease. It 
is argued that the problems of the poor .disadvantaged and the deprived cannot 
be solved by any trickle down method, therefore whatever the court is doing in 
PIL is merely symbolic, simply to earn a legitimacy for itself which it has lost 
over the years.. 
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The critics have further argued that because of judicial activism, separation of 
power has been under stake. the judiciary is interfering in the field of 
executive and several times it has become difficult for executive to deal with 
new kind of problem with new strategy as it is anticipated that judiciary will 
struck down this type of strategy' 
It is further argued that by extending its jurisdiction through PIL the court is 
trying to bite more than what it can chew. Lawyers have started complaining 
that much of the court's time is being consumed by PIL and hence for the court 
a postcard are more important than a fifty-page affidavit. It is further argued 
that at a time when the figures of pending cases before the courts are 
astronomical, this new area of litigation would spell a total collapse of the 
judicial system in India as it would open floodgates of litigation. However, the 
history of PIL in India does not support this apprehension. Contrary to the 
popular belief fresh PIL filing has registered a decline in the subsequent years. 
According to one opinion, the misuse of PII, has reached ridiculous limits and 
petitions are being filed all over the country before the writ courts for matters 
like student and teacher strike, shortage of buses, lack of cleanliness in 
hospitals, irregularities in stock exchange, painting of road signs, Dengue 
fever, examinations and admissions in universities and college etc. one can go 
on but the list will not he exhaustive. Classical case came up when PH, petition 
was tiled in Delhi High Court to seek direction to the United Front 
Government at the centre (1997) to form a eoahtion cabinet with the congress. 
A petition (1999) was filad for invalidating no-confidence vote against the 
Vajpayee Government. 1361 
Power and publicity apart, many judges have to entertain PIL because of the 
liberalization of the rule of locus stanch and the concept of social justice for the 
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poor. oppressed and exploited sections of the society. Thus indiscriminate use 
of this strategy is bringing it into disrepute because it has become the privilege 
of the privileged to have access to the court. In fact, majority of the petitions 
either should not have been filed or should not have been entertained. PIE. must 
be confined to cases where justice is to he reached to that section of the society 
which cannot come to the court due to socio-economic handicap or where a 
matter of grave public concern is involved. 1371 
Conclusion Remarks 
Even If all these criticism is valid no one would suggest abolishing this 
strategy which the courts have innovated to reach justice to the deprived 
section of the society. Anything contrary would be like suggesting the abolition 
of' marriage in order to solve the problem of divorce. This socio-economic 
movement generated by court has at least kept alive the hope of the people for 
justice and thus has weaned people away from self —help or seeking redress 
through a private system of' justice At is necessary for sustaining the 
democratic system and the establishment of a rule of law in society. Therefore, 
one has to he both adventurous and cautious in this respect and the judiciary 
has to keep on learning mostly by experience. Indian courts are a cornerstone 
of our democracy. distinctive for the transparency. predictability and 
accountability of their process. In a democratic country like India. the role of 
judiciary is significant. Judiciary administers justice according to law. It is 
required to promote justice in adjudicatory process. Credibility of judicial 
process ultimately depends on the manner of doing administration of justice. 
Judiciary can promote social justice through its judgments. Otherwise common 
man will suffer a lot. In a democracy, the legal system and the judiciary' are 
important constituents within the larger political milieu. The modern judiciary in 
India derives its sources from the Constitution. and acts as a check on the arbitrary 
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decisions of the legislature and the executive. The Constituent Assembly foresaw 
the significance of Judiciary as a guardian of rights and justice. While the 
Supreme Court is the highest court of law in India, whose decisions arc equally 
binding on all, the High Courts and the Subordinate Courts ensure justice at the 
state and district levels respectivel'.. The provision for judicial review and public 
interest litigation ensure that the rule of law is maintained, thereby providing for a 
dignified living and rightful concern for all. The critics of judicial activism 
huuld remember the fact that in India until the Public Interest Litigation was 
developed by the Supreme Court. justice was only a remote and even 
theoretical proposition for the nm of illiterate, underprivileged and exploited 
persons in the country. At a time of crucial, social and economic 
transformation, the judicial process has a part to play as a midwife of change. 
The issue of Public Interest Litigation touches a matter of the highest 
importance literally affecting the quality of life of millions of Indians. Besides 
this, it will also spread wide the canvas of judicial popular support and moral 
authority especially at a time when other institutions of governance are facing a 
legitimate crisis. 
The need for judicial activism 'as also stressed in the task of balancing 
interest of ethnic groups as both the executive and the legislature would 
invariably reflect the aspirations of the majority community. Judicial inaction 
in such circumstances could aggravate perceptions of injustice and eventually 
lead to violence. It was perhaps as much recognition of these dangers as it was 
a response to considerations of social justice that witnessed the growth of 
Public Interest Litigation in India. It is true that the independence of the 
judiciary is the first concern of the constitution but how far a judge can go is 
not without limits. Court is called upon to dispense justice according to the 
constitution and the law of the land ."Therefore. in activity it must not forget the 
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limits of' its power that call for self-restraint and in periods of restraint it must 
not be unmindful of' its constitutional duty and obligation. Fact remains that the 
judiciary in India has performed well, lapses notwithstanding. There is a lack 
of understanding and scholarship in India on the concept and application of 
judicial activism and the Judge cannot act arbitrarily rather they should act 
judicially. When the judges approach the law going beyond the two persons or 
two parties of the case or suit effectively, then it is called 'Judicial Activism'. 
Judicial Activism can be the best tool for the protection of human rights but the 
State is the main culprit for the violation of human rights. Existing poor 
mechanism of' the protection 01 human Rights in India and breaking down of' 
the 'Rule of'aw' are great problems for a sound judicial activism. 
Disappearance, cross-fire are regularly being traditionalised and girls are being 
victimized in the safe custody which are the gross violation of human rights. 
Sometimes someone is detained unlawfully and at last the court says that you 
are free now which cannot be a good practice of judicial activists. however. 
Judges es are in better place to he an activist of human rights. Thus, the unit 
broadly analyses the structure, process, behavior and interaction of the judiciary 
within a broad framework to achieve the goals of development and democracy 
and also discuss about the theoretical framework of Judicial Activism. Next 
chapter deals with the evaluating Judicial Activism and Protection of' human 
rights. 
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Chapter - V 
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
AND PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
5.1 Introduction 
The responsibilities that a court carries in it country with a written constitution 
are very difficult-much more-difficult than the responsibilities of a court 
without a written constitution. Because here, they do riot just interpret the laws 
but also the provisions of the constitution, and, are thus entrusted with giving 
meaning to the cold letter of the constitution. The courts thus act as the 
supreme interpreter, protector and guardian of the supremacy of the 
constitution by keeping all authorities — legislative, executive, administrative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial — within legal bounds. The judiciary has the 
responsibility to scrutinize all governmental actions and it goes without saying 
that in a constitution having provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights of the 
people. the judiciary has the power as well as the obligation to protect the 
people's rights from any undue and unjustified encroachment. Judiciary is the 
custodian of the Constitution. An independent judicial system is perhaps better 
than any other institution to maintain the perfect equilibrium between the 
liberty of the individual and the power of the State. In a democratic socialist 
republic like ours, everyone is under a duty to act in co-operation and co-
ordination with everyone else. If, while dealing, with cases, the judiciary finds 
that a law requires a change, or a particular legislation is essential for fulfilling 
the Objective of the Constitution, or that it would serve better the rule of law if 
the executive adopts a particular line of action, there can be no Objection; 
instead it becomes the duty of the Court to point out the lacuna in the law or in 
its execution and implementation.[ I 1 Tn fact, courts can issue directions to the 
executive and the legislature to perform their obligatory duties. Lord Denning 
has rightly observed! "I think the Judges alone can deal with the instant case, to 
remedy the wrong in the case which is before. them. If you wait for the 
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legislation you may wait for years and years and that can't affect the instant 
case. 
The independence of judiciary is the "live wire" of our judicial system. 
The judiciary under our constitutional scheme has been performing positive 
and creative function in securing and promoting human rights to the people. 
The Apex Court in India in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree 
or make order as is necessary for doing "complete justice" in any cause or 
matter pending before it. 121 The Supreme Court under article 32 of the 
Constitution has the power to issue any orders, directions or writs, whichever 
may he appropriate, for the enforcement of fundamental rights enshrined in the 
Constitution. Similarly the High Courts have the power under article 226 of the 
Constitution to issue any order, directions or wants, whichever may be 
appropriate, for the enforcement of fundamental rights or for any other 
purpose. In this regard the power of the I ligh Courts is wider than the Supreme 
Court. The judiciary in India has exercised this power in the most creative 
manner. It has devised new strategies. forged new tools and broadly interpreted 
the letter of law to ensure the protection of human rights to the people. 
Method of Liralcccttion: Judicial AActi►•isnr anc! Protection o/ Ilwuan Rights 
In this study, evaluating and managing all of the information gathered from the 
secondary Sources. Furthermore, it gives a lot of useful information by 
evaluating the cases under the different categories and the researcher try to 
confine study into limited categories like given below: 
A. Procedure Established by Law: A New Approach 
B. Fair Proccolure and Public Interest Litigation 
C. I luman Dignity and Protection against Exploitation 
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(a) Bonded Labour 
(b) Protection of Children from Exploitation 
D. Right to Live in Healthy Environment 
5.2 Procedure Established by Law: A New Approach 
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution provides: 
"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to 
procedure established by law'. []]. Thus, it is clear that a person can be 
deprived of his right to life and liberty only according to 'procedure 
established by law From the very commencement of the Constitution, the 
significance of the words. 'procedure established by law" has been a subject 
matter of judicial consideration. The judicial consideration started in 1950 
itself in the case of K Gopalan vs. State of Madras. [ 4] In this case, the 
supreme Court was divided while interpreting the expression procedure 
established by law". The majority view held that "procedure established by 
]aw" meant the procedure enacted by the Parliament and State Legislature. The 
minority wanted to apply "due process clause" of the U.S. Constitution. It was 
argued by the petitioner that under the Constitution of the United States of 
America, the corresponding provision was found in the 5`" and 14'" 
Amendments, where the provision, interalia, was that no person shall be 
deprived of his life or liberty or properly except by due process of law. It was 
contended that the Indian Constitution gave the same protection to every 
person in India except that in the United States "due process of law" had been 
construed by its Supreme Court to cover both substantive and procedural Law, 
while in India only the protection of procedural law was guaranteed and that 
the word "due" made no difference to the interpretation of the words in article 
21. The word "established" has a wider meaning than the word "prescribed". 
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The word "law" did not mean "enacted law" because that would be no 
legislative protection at all. If that definition was accepted. any Act passed by 
the Parliament or the State Legislature which was otherwise within its 
legislative power, could destroy or abridge this right. On the basis of the same 
reason, it was further argued that if that was the intention, there was no 
necessity to put this as a fundamental right in Part ill at all. Regarding the 
meaning of the word "law. it was argued that it meant jus, that is, law in the 
abstract sense of the principles of natural justice and not !ex, that is, "enacted 
law Chief Justice Kania gave four points which distinguished the American 
Constitution from article 21. f=irstly, in the American Constitution, the word 
"liberty" was used, simplic iter, while in India it was restricted to "personal 
liberty'. Secondly, in the American Constitution, the same protection was 
given to property. while in India; the fundamental right in respect of property 
was contained in article 31. Thirdly. the word "due" was omitted altogether and 
the expression "due process of law" was not used deliberately under the Indian 
Constitution. Lastly, the word "established" was used and was limited to 
"procedure" in article 21. 
Rejecting the contention for the petitioner. Chief Justice Kania held that the 
word "law" must mean enacted law". The word "established" according to 
Oxford Dictionary means to fix, settle, institute or obtain by enactment or 
agreement. According to him, the word "established" itself suggested an 
agency which fixed the limits. The dictionary would show that this agency 
could be either the legislature or an agreement between the parties. lie felt that. 
therefore, there was no justification to give the meaning of jus to "law" in 
article 21. The expression "procedure established by law" seemed to be 
borrowed from article 31 of the Japanese Constitution. But in order to 
determine the meaning of "law" in the phrase "procedure established by law", 
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other articles of that Constitution which expressly preserve other personal 
liberties in different clauses had to be read together. These articles of the 
Japanese Constitution had not been incorporated in the Constitution of India in 
the same language. It was not shown that ' law" means ]us in the Japanese 
Constitution. The word 'due" in the "due process of law" in the American 
Constitution was interpreted to mean "just" by the Supreme Court in America. 
The deliberate omission of the word "due" form article 21 lent strength to the 
contention that the justiciable aspect of law, that is, to consider whether it was 
reasonable or not by the court did not form part of the Indian Constitution. 
The other judges constituting the majority opinion also expressed the 
same view. Justice Das cited the meaning of the word "establish" given in the 
Oxford English Dictionary and Annandale's edition of the New Gresham 
Dictionary. According to this New Gresham Dictionary, the word "establish" 
meant amongst other things, to find permanently; to institute: to enact or 
decree; to ordain; to ratify; to make firm. He observed that in that sense the 
word "established" would mean "enacted" and "established by law would, 
therefore, mean 'enacted by law" and it that meaning was accepted, "law" 
mustmean "State-made law" and not the principles of natural justice. He 
discarded the fear that it would give supremacy to the legislatures in the 
following words: This absolute supremacy of the legislative authority has, 
however, been cut down by Article 21 which delimits the ambit and scope of 
the substantive right to life and personal liberty by reference to a procedure and 
by Article 22 which prescribes the minimum procedure which must be 
followed". 
He also rejected the introduction of American doctrine of 'due process' in 
article 21 because he felt that the word "due' did not find place in article 21 so 
as to qualify the procedure. The contrary view was expressed by Justice 
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Mahajan and Fazal Ali. Justice Mahajan stated that article 21 laid down 
substantive law as giving protection to life and liberty in as much as it said that 
these could not be deprived except according to "procedure established by 
law". It meant that before a person could be deprived of his right to life and 
liberty, there should exist, as a condition precedent, some suhstantive law 
conferring authority for doing so and the law should further provide for a mode 
of procedure for such deprivation. He felt that article 21 gave complete 
immunity against the exercise of despotic power by the executive. The article 
gave immunity also against invalid laws which contravened the Constitution. It 
also guaranteed that there should be some form of proceeding before a person 
could be condemned in respect of his life and liberty. Ile remarkably stated that 
the article negative the idea of fantastic arhirrary and oppressive forms of 
proceeding. Fazal Ali, J., viewed that "law" in article 21 mean[ "valid law" and 
with reference to procedure for the deprivation of personal liberty it concluded 
four elements or qualifications as explained by Wills. (51 These elements were: 
(1) Notice 
(2) Opportunity to be heard 
(3) Impartial tribunal 
(4) Orderly course of procedure 
Justice Fazal Ali observed that these qualifications were independent of any 
claim of the judiciary through the "due process clause" and could be part of the 
phrase 'procedure established by law". Such elements could be found in the 
normal interpretations of the "law of the land" in English. Halsbury had 
observed: 
It seems to me that there should be added to this list the following rights which 
appear to have become well-established the right of the subject to have any 
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case affecting him tried in accordance with the principles of natural justice, 
particularly the principles that a man may not be a judge in his own cause, and 
that no party ought to be condemned unheard, or to have a decision given 
against him unless he has been given reasonable opportunity of putting forward 
his case. [6] 
The Gopalan's interpretation of the expression "procedure established by law" 
was also followed in the cases of Collector of Malabar vs. E. Ebrahirn Hajeet 
[71 and Rain Chancier Prasad v. Stale of Bihar. [8] In these cases also the 
Supreme Court held that "procedure established by law" meant procedure 
enacted by law made by the State, that is, the Parliament or the State 
Legislatures. The Court did not favour the interpretation of the word "law" in 
the abstract sense embodying the principles of natural justice. However, 
Lakhanpat vs. Union of India, [9] shows a change in the judicial approach, No 
doubt the detente was not given any right to represent at the time of review of 
his case, but the Court held that the detente must be given such an opportunity 
on the ground of principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court took more 
than 25 years to free itself from the shackles of Gopolan case. This feat was 
achieved in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of tonic ruse, which did it through Bank 
Nationalization case. [10] In Bank Nationalizations case the court held that 
fundamental rights conferred by Part I11 were not distinct and mutually 
exclusive rights. The Court reversed the view of Gopalan that article 22 of the 
constitution was a complete code and that articles 19, 21 and 22 had different 
dimensions. This led justice Bhagwati (as he then was) to say in Maneka 
Gandhi case that article 21 could not be divorced from article 19, or, for that 
matter article Id, which takes care of arbitrariness the purpose of natural 
justice also being to take care of arbitrariness; and so natural justice is read in 
article 21. Justice Bhagwati observed: 
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The attempt of the Court should be to expand the reach and ambit of the 
fundamental rights rather than attenuate their meaning and content by a process 
of judicial construction. 
Justice Bhagwati sought help front article 14 in making the procedure under 
article 21 as fair, just and reasonable. In E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu 
case, the Court had held: 
Quality is antithetic to arbitrariness, in fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn 
enemies: one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other, to the 
whim and caprice of an absolute monarchy. Where an act is arbitrary, it is 
implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and 
constitutional law and is therefore, violative of Article 14. 
Following Royappa case, Justice Bhagwali held: The principle of 
reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically is an essential element 
of equality or non-arbitrariness, pervades Article 14 like a brooding 
omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the 
test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be 
"right and just and fair" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive: otherwise, it 
would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be 
satisfied. 
Thus, Justice Bhagwati read articles 14 and 19 in article 21 in order to 
make the "procedure" under "procedure established bylaw" as "fair, just and 
reasonable". 
Among the concurring opinions in this case, Justice Chandrachud (as he then 
was) also held that mere prescription of some kind of procedure could not ever 
meet the mandate of articic21. The procedure prescribed by law must be fair, 
just and roasonablc, riot fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary. But he cautioned that 
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"due process" should not be read into article 21. Ile pointed out: The content 
which has been meaningfully and imaginatively poured into "due process of 
law may, in my view, constitute an important point of distinction between the 
American Constitution and ours which Studiously avoided the use of that 
expression.... Our Constitution too strides in its majesty but. may it he 
remembered without the due process clause... 
Justice Chandrachud did not allow the entrance of American due process 
clause because one right leading to another and that another to still other would 
produce "grotesque result. 
In fact, the fear was that once "procedural clue process was allowed to 
become a part of Article 21. it would be difficult to stop "substantive due 
process". Chief Justice Be-, who joined the majority opinion stated: 
The field of "due process" for cases of preventive detention is fully covered by 
article 22, but other parts of that field, not covered by Article 22, are 
"unoccupied" by its specific provisions. I have no doubt that, in what may he 
called "unoccupied" portions of the vast sphere of personal liberty, the 
substantive as well as procedural lmi%s /rust .corns/V the requirements of both 
Article. 14 uncl 19 e] he Consti/idiuii. 
Thus, "substantive" as well as "procedural due process" was introduced 
in article 21 of the Constitution. Justice Krishna Iyer. who agreed with the 
majority but delivered a separate opinion also observed: 'Procedure established 
by law', with its legal potentiality, will reduce life and liberty to a precarious 
playing if we do not ex-necessitate import into those weighty words an 
adjectival rule of law, civilized in its soul, fair in its heart and fixing those 
imperatives of procedural protection absent which the proccssual tail will wag 
the substantive head ....Processual justice is writ patently on Art. 21. It is too 
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grave to be circurnvented by a black letter ritual processed through the 
legislature. 1111 
Thus, according to Justice Krishna Iyer also, procedure must he "fair, 
just and reasonable". But he added to the opinion of Justice Bhagwati by taking 
"law' also reasonable. He interpreted the expression "procedure established by 
law" in such a manner as to reach the conclusion that "law" and "procedure" 
must be "fair', just and reasonable'. 
He explained: What is fundamental is life and liberty. What is procedural is the 
manner of its exercise. This quality of fairness in the process is emphasized by 
the strong word 'established' which means settled firmly not wantonly or 
whimsically. If it is rooted in the legal consciousness of the community it 
becomes 'established" procedure. And law' leaves little doubt that it is 
normally regarded as just since law is the means and justice is the end. 
Once the principles of natural justice have been read into article 21 of the 
Constitution there is nothing to prevent the Court from construing "law" as 
reasonable law. It will be very strange indeed, if article 21 leaves the 
legislature free to dispense with "fair play in action" while authorizing the 
violation of basic human right to life and personal liberty. 
In MA.Hoskot vs. Stare of Mahara.shrra. 1121 Justice Krishna Iyer quoted 
Justice Bhagwati's and his own opinion in Marteka case and held: "Procedure 
established by law" are words of deep meaning for all lovers of liberty and 
judicial sentinels. Amplified, activist fashion, "procedure" mean 'fair and 
reasonable procedure" which comports with civilized norms like natural justice 
rooted firm in neither community consciousness-not primitive processual 
barbarity nor legislated normative mockery. 
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After Maneku case, ariide 21 has become counterpart of "procedural due 
process". Just as in United States "due process" clause is used to maintain 
prison discipline, similarly in India, procedural faimess under article 21 
encouraged the Summit Court to bring prison reforms. 
In Sunil Patra (F) v. Delhi Administration [13] Justice Krishna Iyer observed: 
True, our Constitution has no "duc process" clause or the VIII Amendment, but 
in this branch of law, after Cooper__and Moneka Gandhi case ... the 
consequence is the same. For what is punitively outrageous, scandalizing 
unusual or cruel and rchabititively counter-productive, is unarguabty 
unreasonable and arbitrary and is shot down by Arts. 14 and 19 and if inflicted-
with procedural unfairness, falls foul of Article 21. 
In Jolly Varghese vs. Bank of Cochin, [14) Justice Krishna Iyer delivering the 
judgment, observed: The high value of human dignity and the worth of the 
hunttn person enshrined in Aut.21, read with Arts. l4 and 19, Obligates the 
state not to incarcerate except under law which is fair, just and reasonable in its 
proccssual essence. While saving the prisoners from prison torture. Justice 
Krishna Iyer again applied the concept of fair procedure in Sunil Batra (11) v. 
Delhi Administration' [15] and held: It is imperative, as implicit in Art. 21, 
that life or liberty shall not be kept in suspended animation or congealed into 
animal existence without the freshening flow of fair procedure. 
This trend of the Supreme Court was evident in the subsequent cases as 
well. When the Summit Court was passing through the continuous process of 
maneuvering "due process under article 21. AK Roy case 116] proved to he a 
deadly stroke. In this case it was contended that the National Security Act, 
1980 must bestruck down on the ground that it interfered with the Liberties of 
the people. Chief Justice Chandrachud, while delivering the majority judgment 
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rejected the contention and held that the court could not invalidate on the 
specious ground that it was calculated to interfere with the liberties of the 
people. 
It is submitted that the Chief Justice's refusal to examine the justness of the law 
under article 21 was born out of a narrow construction of that article which 
may not be consistent with the decisional law that had grown in the recent past. 
[ 17] It is-really shocking that Justice Bhagwati was party to this decision, who 
himself had become the creator of "due process" under article 21 in Maneka 
case. It is even more surprising that while delivering the minority opinion in 
Radian Singh case (which was delivered after this judgment) he gave the 
example of law of preventive detention to prove the existence of "due process" 
and in this case, he joined hands with Chief Justice Chandrachud to state that 
the power to judge the justness of preventive detention was not possessed by 
the court. A year later. Ranjan Dwivedi 1181 joined the row of cases which 
recognized the entry of due process. In this case, the Supreme Court did not 
hesitate to admit that it was difficult to hold in view of Maneka and E.P. 
Royappa cases etc. that the substance of the American doctrine of 'due 
process" had not still been infused into the conservative text of article 21. [I 
In Olga Tellis vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation [20] Chief Justice 
Chandrachud, while delivering the judgment, following the row of cases 
beginning with Maneka case, held that the procedure prescribed by law for the 
deprivation of the right conferred by article 21 must be fair, just and 
reasonable. It was pointed out: 
The procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his right to life. 
must conform to the norms of justice and fair play. Procedure which is unjust 
or unfair in the circumstances of a case, attracts the vice of unreasonableness, 
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thereby i'iticttinf,   the .lull• It'hirh prescribes that procedure and co►tsegttenth•, 
the action taken carder it ....The substance of the law cannot be divorced from 
the procedure which it prescribes for, how reasonable the law is, depends upon 
how fair is the procedure prescribed by it. [21 [ 
Chief Justice Chandrachud also observed that if a law was found to .direct the 
doing of an act which was forbidden by the Constitution or if for the 
performance of an act, it compelled the adoption of the procedure which was 
impermissible under the Constitution, it was liable to be struck down. 
It is submitted that when the Summit Court is ready to strike down the "law" 
which prescribes unreasonable "procedure" that does not mean that only 
"procedure" should be reasonable but that the "law" prescribing that procedure 
must also be reasonable. The court may not want to allow substantive due 
process directly along With procedural fairness but indirectly and impliedly it 
has expressed so. 
In Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab[??[ the Supreme Court has once again 
reiterated that the 'procedure' contemplated by article 21 is that the procedure 
must be "right, just and fair" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. In order 
that the procedure is "right, just and fair", it should conform to the principles of 
natural justice, that is, "fair play in action". 
Thus, the Summit Court by adopting a new approach to the expression 
"procedure established by law" has marked a watershed in the history of 
development of human rights in our country and this affords protection not 
only against executive action but also against legislation and any law which 
deprives the person of his human rights would be invalid unless it prescribed a 
procedure for such deprivation which is "reasonable", fair and just". 
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5.3 Fair Procedure and Public Interest Litigation 
One of the most important task before the State is to protect and promote the 
human rights of the people But the question is that if the State misperforms or 
does not perform this important task, how to make it accountable for its actions 
or inactions and how to enable the "poor and oppressed" class of people to 
enjoy their basic human rights. Perhaps. "public interest litigation" is a partial 
answer to this. With the active assistance of the social activists and public 
interest litigators, the judiciary in India is promising innovative remedial 
attention for vindication of the governmental commitment to the welfare and 
relief of the oppressed and in protecting and promoting human rights of the 
people. 
The concept and procedure of public interest litigation in India have 
been fashioned by the Supreme Court of India. They are still in the process of 
Ibrmulation and concretization. 1231 
Public Interest Ligation is concerned not with rights of one individual but the 
interest of a class or group of persons who are either the victi ins of exploitation 
or oppression or are denied their constitutional or legal rights and who are not 
in a position to approach the courts for redressal of their grievances. It seeks to 
help the victims of governmental lawlessness or repression. 1241 
In India, justice was only a remote and even, theoretical proposition for 
the mass of illiterate, underprivileged and exploited persons in the country till 
the concept of public interest litigation was accepted as a part of our 
constitutional jurisprudence. They were unaware of the law or even of their 
legal rights, unacquainted with the necessities of procedure involved, and too 
impoverished to engage lawyers, file papers and bear heavy expenditure on 
dilatory litigation. Thus, the vested interests that exploited them were 
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emboldened to continue with their cruel and even illegal practices with cynical 
contempt for the law. This vast underprivileged section of the society found 
they utterly helpless. Nor could anyone else take up their case for lack of locus 
staradi or any direct interest in the matter. Thus, the activist judges expressed 
the opinion that the present legal and judicial system was a "colonial legacy" 
unsuited to our condition. They expanded the concept of locus stundi from 
"traditional individualsim" to "community orientation of public interest 
litigation" and thus relaxed the formalities of procedure. 
The liberalization of the ode of locus stand was necessitated only because of 
the new constitutionalism blazed in Maneka Gandhi case and refined and 
extended in post—Maneka cases. Ln d4aneka case the court expanded the scope 
of right to "life" and "personal [iberty" by considering 'procedure" under 
"procedure established by law" as "fair, just and reasonable". The concept of 
fair procedure led to Apex Court to leave the adversary procedure and adopt 
the new innovation of public interest litigation to give relief to prisoners, 
undertrial workers, honded labourers, women, children and many others. The 
Summit Court also used this tool for the protection of environment which is an 
essential element needed to live a healthy life. [25] 
In Pa/lam Municiplil , case, 1261 Justice Krishna lycr observed: It is 
procedural rules...."which infuse life into substantive rights which activate 
them to make them effective" ....The truth is that a few profound issues of 
processual jurisprudence of great strategic significance to our legal system face 
us and we must zero-in on them as they involve problems of access to justice 
for the people beyond the blinkered rules of "standing" of British Indian 
vintage. 
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In Fertilizer Cotporation Kanegar Uninn, Sindri vs. Union of India. [271 
Justice Krishna Iyer emphasized the importance of public interest litigation: 
Law...is a social auditor and this audit function can be put into action only 
when someone with real public interest ignites the jurisdiction .... In a society 
where freedoms suffer from atrophy and activism is essential for participative 
public justice, some risks have to be taken and more opportunities opened for 
the public-minded citizen to rely on the legal process and not be repelled, from 
it by narrow pendency now surrounding locus .standi. 	- 
Justice Bhagwati, who was party to Krishna Iyers opinion in Fertilizer 
Corporation, gave a comprehensive exposition to his concept of public interest 
Litigation in S.F. Gupta vs. Union of" htdin [281 According to him, the 
traditional rule, that judicial redress was available only to an aggrieved party, 
was "a rule of ancient vintage". Formulating the concept of public interest 
litigation, he observed; Where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a 
person or to a determinate class of persons by reason of violation of any 
constitutional or legal right or any burden is imposed in contravention of any 
constitutional or legal provision or without authority of law or any such legal 
wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or 
determinate class of persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability 
or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the 
Court for relief, any member of the public can maintain an application for an 
appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court under Art. 226 and in 
case of breach of any fundamental right of such persons, in this Court under 
Art. 32 seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to such 
person or determinate class of persons.  
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He further observed: It must not be forgotten that procedure is but a hand 
maiden of justice and the cause of justice can never be thwarted by any 
procedural technicalities. The Court would therefore unhesitatingly and 
without the slightest qualms of conscience cast aside the technical rules of 
procedure in the exercise of its dispensing power and treat the letter of the 
public minded individual as a writ petition and act upon it. Today, a fast 
revolution is taking place in the judicial process; the theatre of the law is fast 
changing and the problems of the poor are coming to the forefront. The Court 
has to innovate new methods and devise new strategies for the purpose of 
providing access to justice to large masses of people who are denied their 
basic human rights and to wham j'reedom and liberty have no meaning. 
It is an essential element of the rule of law that every organ of the state must 
act within the limits of its power and carry out the duty imposed upon it by the 
Constitution or the law. If breach of duty is caused by the state and injury is 
caused not to any specific or determinate class or group of persons but to the 
general public and if no one can maintain an action for redress of such public 
wrong or public injury, it would be disastrous for the rule of law because it 
would be open to the state or public authority to act with impunity beyond the 
scope of its power. Where the observance of the law is left to the sweet will of 
the authority bound by it without any redress, if the law is contravened, the 
courts cannot countenance such a situation. Therefore, the court relaxed the 
strict rule of standing which insisted that only a person who had suffered a 
specific injury could maintain an action for judicial redress and adopted a 
broad rule which gave standing to any member of the public who was not a 
mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper but who had sufficient interest in 
the proceeding. The Apex Court broadened this rule because: It is only the 
availability of judicial remedy for enforcement which invests law with meaning 
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and purpose or else the law would remain merely a paper parchment. It is only 
by liberalizing the rule of locus slandi that it is possible to police the corridors 
of power and prevent violations of law. 
It is submitted that Mateka's case creation of "fair. just and reasonable" 
procedure protected the life and liberty of exploited through the expansion of 
the rule of locus standi by permitting the public-minded persons to seek the 
judicial redress for those whose life and liberty is at stake but they cannot 
protect it due to poverty or any other incapacity_ The post-Maneka case 
judicial activism impressed upon the Summit Court to liberate itself from 
clutches of the traditional technicalities of procedure which is to be followed 
for access to justice, Mateka case made the procedure "fair, just and 
reasonable" in order to give protection from the executive action which is 
unfair and unreasonable. 
In People's Union for Democratic Rights V_ Union of India [29) Justice 
Bhagwati (as he then was) further elaborated the principle of public interest 
litigation. 
Justice Bhagwati explained the scope and importance of public interest 
litigation in the legal aid movement, which is part of "fair, just and reasonable" 
procedure under article 21. He pointed out Public interest litigation which is a 
strategic arm of the Legal aid movement and which is intended to bring justice 
within the reach of the poor masses, who constitute the low visibility area of 
humanity, is a totally different kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional 
litigation which is essentially of an adversary character,.. but it is intended to 
promote and vindicate public interest which demands that violafions of 
constitutional or legal rights of a large number of people who are poor. 
ignorant or in a socially or economically disadvantaged position should not go 
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unnoticed and undcrdresscd. That would be destructive of the rule of law 
which forms one of the essential elements of public interest in any democratic 
[brm of government. 
Justice Bhagwati (as he then was) again elaborated the importance of public 
interest litigation in J?andhua Mukri Morcha vs. Union of India (30] Public 
interest litigation is not in the nature of adversary litigation but it is a challenge 
and an opportunity to the government and its officers to mnke basic human 
rights meaning/ul to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the cornmunily. 
The Constitution makers have also deliberately and advisedly not used any 
words restricting the power of the court to adopt any procedure which it 
considers appropriate in the circumstances of a case for the enforcement of a 
fundamental right. 
If in the process of new judicial activism to control unfair procedure, any 
aspersion is cast on the executive that should not be taken in a wrong spirit. 
The Apex Court also admitted: When the Court entertains public interest 
litigation, it does not do so in a caviling spirit or in a confrontational mood or 
with a view to tilting at executive authority or seeking to usurp it, but its 
attempt is only to ensure observance of social and economic rescue 
programmes, legislative as well as executive, framed for the benefit of the 
have-nots and the handicapped and to protect them against violation of their 
basic human rights, which is also the cwuonaimacd obligation of the executive. 
The Court is thus merely assisting in the realization of the constitutional 
objectives. 
The highest judiciary allowed the public spirited persons to come forward and 
become God fathers for the protection of human rights of the poor and 
ignorant. Due to the efforts of such public-spirited persons, Hussain Ara ease 
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[31] cried for the release of undectriats and echo was heard in Khatri case [321 
and Kadra Pehadiya case 1331,  tree legal aid was made part of "fair, just and 
reasonable" procedure to protect the fundamental rights of the poor. 
Sunii Batra case [34] and Sheela flat-se rase [35] brought the inhuman and 
degrading condition of prisons and prisoners before the human rights conscious 
court. Y.N. Thwnpy Theta vs. Unron of Tndia [36] made the court to endorse 
Francis Coratie Mallin case 1371 and observed that "the right to life has 
recently been held by this Court to connote not merely animal existence but to 
have a much wider meaning to include the finer graces of human civilization." 
Bandhua Mukti Morehai case made right to live with human dignity a 
fundamental right under article 21. Neeraja Chaudhary case [38] released and 
directed for the rehabilitation of bounded labourers. Olga Tellis case [39] 
recognizing right to livelihood as a part of right to life. 
In Rakesh Chandra vs. State of Bihar,[401 the Supreme Court in a public 
interest litigation, after not being satisfied with scheme furnished to it for 
improving conditions of mental hospitals, decided to monitor its management 
and a Committee was set up for this purpose. 
In Kishen vs. State of Orissa (41] the Supreme Court treated the letter of the 
petitioner as public interest litigation wherein it was alleged that there were 
starvation deaths of the inhabitants in the districts of Koraput and Kalahandi 
of State of Orissa due to utter negligence and callousness of the administration 
and government of Orissa. The Supreme Court pointed out that it is the duty of 
the government to prevent such deaths and directions were issued to 
reconstitute the Natural Calamities Committee to keep a watch on the measures 
taken and which may be taken in future to prevent deaths due to hunger, 
poverty and starvation. 
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In A.S. Miaal vs. State of U.P.[421 where irreversible damage was caused to 
the eyes of the patients in eye camps, a public interest litigation was filed by 
the petitioner espousing the cause of unfortunate victims. The Court directed 
the State government to pay Rs. 12,5001- to each ol- the victims and Rs. 50001- 
as costs to the petitioner for espousing the cause oh victims and prosecuting it 
with deligence. 
In Parinanand Katara vs. Union of India, [43[ the Supreme Court laid 
emphasis on professional ethics of medical profession in a public interest 
litigation. The Court held that when an injured citizen is brought for medical 
treatment, he should instantaneously be given medical aid to preserve life and 
thereafter procedural criminal taw should be allowed to operate in order to 
avoid negligent deaths. 
It is feared that the executive may find little comfort with the court's new role 
in settling matters of administration over which it has little expertise or no 
claim. The court is already looked upon as a hostile branch of the government 
by the executive and public interest litigation contains all potentials for a 
possible confrontation between the court and the executive. 
It is also feared that the concept of public interest litigation will encourage 
vexatious litigants to file a large number of cases and as a result, the judicial 
process will be abused causing further delay in the administration of justice 
and opening a floodgate of t itigation. 
Justice Krishna Iyer rejecting this fear in Bcr Council of Maharashtra vs. M. V 
Dahhalker,[441 observed: The possible apprehension that widening legal 
standing with a public connotation may unloose a flood of litigation which may 
overwhelm the judges is misplaced because public resort to court to suppress 
public mischief is a tribute to the justice system". The Australian Law Reform 
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Commission also opposed this argument: The idle and whimsical plaintiff, a 
dilettante who litigates for a lark, is a spectra which haunts the legal literature, 
not the court. Justice Krishna tyer also pointed out in Fertilizer Corporation 
Kamgar Union vs. Union of India [45]. We cannot he scared by the fear that all 
and sundry will be litigation happy and waste their time and money and the 
time of the Court through false and frivolous cases. 
In People's Union for Democratic Rights case,[461 Justice Bhagwati (as he 
then was) pointed out that there was misconception in the mind of some 
lawyers, journalists and men in public life that public interest was unnecessary 
cluttering up the files of the court and adding to the already staggering arrears 
of cases pending in the court for years. Those who were decrying public 
interest litigation did not realize that it is only the moneyed who have so far 
had the golden key to lock the doors of justice and then for the first time the 
portals of the court were being thrown open to the poor and the downtrodden, 
the ignorant and the illiterate and that their cases were coming before the 
courts through public interest litigation. 
The Judiciary has been very cautious in entertaining the public interest 
litigations. From case to case it has evolved various principles. Frivolous or 
vexatious writ petition in the name of public interest litigation, filed mats fide 
and arising out of enmity between the parties cannot be allowed. The Court has 
to protect the society from so called protectors. 
Mere obsession based on religious belief or personal philosophy cannot he 
treated as legal disability entitling third party as 'next friend' to file public 
interest litigation_ 
Public Interest Litigation espousing cause of an individual permissible only if 
it falls within the purview of policy decision of general application. It cannot 
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be used to remove distress of any particular individual or satisfy that individual 
whims, however pious that may he. Converting individual dispute into public 
interest litigation should be discouraged. 
In Janata Dal r's, 11 S. Cho►r ,clhrv, 1471 the Supreme Court has beautifully 
summarized the scope and object of public interest litigation, the horizon of 
which is widely extended and which at present constitute a new chapter in 
justice delivery system acquiring it significant degree of importance in the 
modern legal jurisprudence practiced by Courts in many parts of the world, 
based on the principle-"Liberty and Justice for all". 
Thus, the concept of public interest litigation which has been and is 
being fostered by judicial activism has become an increasingly important one 
setting up valuable and respectable records, especially in the arena of human 
rights and legal treatment for the unrepresented and under-represented. 
5.4 Human Dignity and Protection against F xploitation 
Human rights are part and parcel of human dignity which is adequately secured 
by various provisions of the Constitution of India. The importance of' the 
concept of human dignity is well exemplified by its inclusion in the national 
and inter-national basic legal texts. The preamble to the Constitution of India 
assures among other things "dignity of the individual'. Personal liberty and 
human dignity is most cherished values of our Constitution. These are the 
necessary epitomes which help in the development of an individual's 
personality and in the realization of human rights. Right to life under article 21 
of the Constitution means right to live with human dignity and free from all 
kinds of exploitation. In addition to this, article 23 specifically prohibits traffic 
in human beings and beggar and other similar forms of forced labour. 
Employment of children in hazardous employment is prohibited by article 24 
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of the Constitution. The State is expected to direct its policy towards securing 
that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of 
children are not abused and that the citizens are not forced by economic 
necessity to enter evocation unsuited to their age or strength. Children are 
required to be given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner 
and in conditions of freedom and dignity. The childhood and youth are 
required to be protected against exploitation and against moral and material 
abandonment. But in spite of the clear mandates of the Constitution, there has 
been exploitation of the people in various parts of the country and they have 
been living the life which is below human dignity. However, the judiciary has 
shown its deep concern for such people. Through judicial activism it has given 
new content and meaning to the letter of law. 
(a) Bonded Labour 
Bonded labour - or debt bondage - is probably the least known form of slavery 
today, and yet it is the most widely used method of enslaving people. A person 
becomes a bonded labourer when their labour is demanded as a means of 
repayment for a loan. The person is then tricked or trapped into working for 
very little or no pay. 
Bonded labour is prohibited in India by law vide Articles 21 and 23 of the 
Constitution. A specific law to prohibit the practice was legislated only in 1976 
known as the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act. With the 
commencement of the Act the following consequences followed: bonded 
labourers stand freed and discharged from any obligation to tender to bonded 
labour. Alt customs, traditions, contracts, agreements or instruments by virtue 
of which a person or any member of Family dependent on such person is 
required to render bonded labour shall be void. Every obligation of bonded 
labourer to repay any bonded debt shall be deemed to have been extinguished. 
2311 
No suit or any other proceeding shall lie in any Civil Court or any other 
authority for recovery of any bonded debt. (44 I 
The President promulgated Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Ordinance, 
1975 on 24 October. 1975. This Ordinance was replaced by the Parliament by 
the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act. 1976. 
This Act was enacted with the object of giving effect to article 23 of the 
Constitution and to strike against the system of bonded labour which had been 
a shameful scar on the Indian social scene even after independence. Though 
technically bonded labourers were freed in 1975 yet the system of bonded 
labour or t'orced labour exists in different parts of country even after thirty 
eight years have passed when legislature attempted to abolish it. Peter Davies. 
Director of the Anti-Slavery Society. at a meeting of the working group on 
slavery, a subsidiary body of U.N. Commission can Ilulnan Rights, Geneva, 
criticized the Indian Government's performance in tackling the problem, saving 
that the action taken by it was "at best deficient" and "at worst non-existent". 
He also implied that political will to deal with the problem in a time bound 
manner was lacking in India. 149] There are many reasons which are 
responsible for the failure of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976. 
Some of the reasons are as under: 
First, there has not been proper identification of the bonded labourers. The 
process of identification and release of the bonded labourers is a process of 
discovery and transformation of non-being into human beings. It has usually 
been found that the administration instead of identifying the bonded labourers, 
denies the existence of bonded labourers. 1501 
Secondly. most cif' the workers are totally ignorant or unaware of their right and 
entitlements. Third/v. sometimes vested interests obstruct the proper 
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implementation of the beneficial provisions of laws. Fourthly, the inadequate 
punishment to those who violate the labour laws, makes it  impossible to 
ensure the observance of beneficial provisions for the have-nets. In that case 
the welfare provisions remain only as paper tigers without any teeth or claws. 
Lastly, rehabilitation of the liberated bonded labourers is yet another factor 
which is required to be looked into in its proper perspective. Psychological 
rehabilitation must go side by side with the physical and economic 
rehabilitation. 
During the recent years. the judiciary, particularly the Apex Court, has played 
an important role in making right to live with human dignity a reality for 
millions of Indians and has protected them from exploitation. The Supreme 
Court has not only given the widest possible meaning to the fundamental rights 
enshrined in articles 21 and 23 but also took into consideration the various 
factors which were responsible for the failure of various other social welfare 
laws. 
The true scope and ambit of the expressions "beggar" and 'other .sinrilar farms 
of furred lahour" have been most eloquently explained by the Supreme Court 
in a monumental case of People's Union fbr Democratic Rights vs. Union of 
India. [511 In this case, the writ petition was filed by way of public interest 
litigation concerning the working conditions of workmen employed in the 
construction work of the various projects connected with the Asian games. In 
the petition, it was pointed out that the workers did not get the minimum wages 
as prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The violation of various 
other laws, such as Employment of Children Act, 1938; Contract Labour 
(Regulation and Abolition) Act. 1970, the [nter-State Migrant Workmen 
(Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Services) Act, 1979 and Equal 
Remuneration Act, 1976 etc., was also alleged. (52] 
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Defending the public interest litigation, Bhagwali. J., pointed out that public 
interest litigation is intended to bring justice within the reach of the poor 
masses, who constitute the low visibility area of humanity and is totally 
different from the ordinary traditional Litigation which is essentially an 
adversary in character. The rule of law, which is a part of "just, fair and 
reasonable procedure" under article 21 of the Constitution, does not mean that 
the protection of the law must be available only to a fortunate few or that the 
law should be allowed to be prostituted by the vested interests for protecting 
and upholding the status quo under the guise of enforcement of their civil and 
political rights. It was further pointed out that so far the courts have been used 
only for the purpose of vindicating the rights of wealthy and affluent. his only 
the moneyed who have so far had the golden key to unlock the doors of justice. 
But, now for the first time the portals of the Court are being thrown open to the 
poor and the down-trodden, the ignorant and the illiterate. Dwelling on the 
scope of article 23 of the Constitution, Bhagwati, J. speaking for the court 
observed: 
(Article 23) is clearly designed to protect the individual not only against the 
State but also against other private citizens. 
Article 23 is not limited in its application ....The sweep of Article 23 is wide 
and unlimited and it strikes at "traffic in human beings and beggar and other 
similar forms of Ibrced labour" wherever they are found. 
It was pointed out that the word beggar used in article 23 is not a word of 
common use in English language. It is a word of Indian origin which like many 
other words had found its way in the English vocabulary. Ii is very difficult to 
formulate a precise definition of the word "beggar," hut there can be no doubt 
that it is a form of forced labour under which a person is compelled to work 
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without reccivin(`I any remuneration for it. It is thus clearly a form of forced 
labour. Now it is not only beggar- which is prohibited under article 23 but also 
all other similar farms of forced labour', whenever they are found. The 
learned judge observed: 
This article (article 23) strikes at forced labour in whatever form it may 
manifest itself, because it is ►riulatire of human clignm altc/ is c•nntrcu-v to basic 
human values. Explaining the meaning of "other similar forms of forced 
labour", the Court observed: 
We do not think it would he right to place on the language of Art. 23 an 
interpretation which would emasculate its beneficial provisions and defeat the 
very purpose of enacting them. We are clear of the view that Article 23 is 
intended to abolish every form of forced labour. The words "other similar 
forms of forced labour" are used in Art. 23 not with a view to imparting the 
particular characteristic of 'beggar' that labour or service should he exacted 
without payment of any remuneration but with a view to bringing within the 
scope and ambit of that Article all other forms of forced labour and since 
'beggar' is one form of forced labour, the Constitution makers used the words 
other similar forms of forced labour. 
Another important question which arose before the court for consideration was 
whether there was any breach of' article 23 when a person provides labour or 
service to the state or to any other person and is paid less than the minimum 
wave for it. Lamenting on this question. Bhagwati, J., (as he then was) 
observed: 
That where a person provides labour or services to another for remuneration 
which is less than the minimum wage, the labour or service provided by him 
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clearly falls within the scope and ambit of the words "forced labour under 
article 23. 
What is prohibited under article 23 is 'forced labour', that is labour or service 
which a person is forced to provide and 'force' which would make such labour 
or service 'forced labour' may arise in several ways. It may be physical force 
which may compel a person to provide labour or service to another or it may 
he force exerted through legal provisions such as a provision for imprisonment 
orfine in case the employee fails to provide labour or service or it may even be 
compulsion arising from hunger and poverty, want and destitution. Thus, the 
term 'force' was explained by the Court in the following words: 
The word force  ntust, therefore, be construed to include not Only physical or 
legal force but also Force arising from compulsion of economic circumstances 
which leaves no choice of alternatives to a person in want and compels him to 
provide labour or service even though the remuneration received for it is less 
than the minimum wages. 
From the above observations, it is clear that the Supreme Court has given the 
widest possible interpretation to the various phrases used in article 23 of the 
Constitution. This interpretation of the Supreme Court, it is submitted, would 
make right to live with human dignity, a living reality for millions of workers 
who ate doing forced labour for one reason or the other. 
In Sarvjiz Roy vs. State of Rajasthan. [53) the Supreme Court relied on the 
Asiad Workers case and held that the payment of wages less than minimum 
wage amounts to 'forced labour' and hence 'violates article 23 of the 
Constitution. The Court pointed out that no work of utility and value can be 
allowed to be constructed on the blood and sweat of persons who are reduced 
to state of helplessness on account of drought and scarcity conditions. The 
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State could not under the guise of' helping persons extract work of utility and 
value without paying them the minimum wage. 
In Labourers Working on Sri/al lHvcly-o-Project vs. State a! J&K, 	the 
Supreme Court treated a letter addressed by Peoples Union for Democratic 
Rights and based on a news/report_ as writ petition. In the letter it was alleged 
that the labourers coming from the different parts of the country to the site of 
Salal Hydro-project in the State of J&K were being exploited and they were 
being denied the right to live with human dignity. The Supreme Court directed 
the observance of' the various labour laws and also pointed out that the 
minimum wages must be paid to the workmen directly without any deduction 
save and except those authorized by the statute. 
Bant1hua Mukti Murcia vs. Union of Julia, 1551 is yet another landmark 
judgment of the Supreme Court where the bonded labourers have been 
protected from exploitation. In this case the petitioner was an organization 
dedicated to the cause of release of bonded labourers in the country. Justice 
Bhagwati, while describing the true condition of' bonded labourers remarked 
that they are non-beings. exiles of civilisation. living a fife worst than that of 
animals. for, the animals are at least free to roans about as they like and they 
can plunder or grab food whenever they are hungry. But these outcastes of 
society are held in bondage, robbed of their freedom and they are consigned to 
an existence where they have to live either in hovels or under the open sky and 
be satisfied with whatever little wholesome food they can manage to get, 
inadequate though it he to fill their hungry stomachs. Not having any choice, 
they are driven by poverty and hunger into a life of bondage, a dark bottomless 
pit from which, in a cruel exploitative society. they cannot hope to he rescued. 
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In Bandhua Mu/al Morcha case, the Supreme Court noticed the causes of 
failure of Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976. In the present case, 
the State tried to escape the liability of releasing the bonded labourers by 
saying that there were no bonded labourers in the State of Haryana.l133] The 
petitioner made a survey of some of the stone quarries in Faridabad district and 
found that there were large number of labourers from different states of the 
country who were working under 'inhuman and intolerable conditions' and 
many of them were bonded labourers. The petitioner described in the letter, 
which was treated by the Supreme Court as writ petition, that there was 
violation of the various constitutional provisions and the statutes which were 
not being implemented or observed in regard to the labourers working in those 
stone quarries. 
Thus, one of the major handicaps which impede the identification of 
bonded labour is the reluctance of the administration to admit the existence of 
bonded labour, even where it is prevalent. It is, therefore, necessary to impress 
upon the administration that it does not help to ostrich-like bury its head in the 
sand and ignore the prevalence of bonded labour, for it is not the existence of 
bonded labour which is slur on the administration but its failure to eradicate it 
and moreover, not taking the necessary steps for the purpose of wiping out this 
blot on the fair name of the State is a breach of constitutional obligation. 
The Supreme Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha case also found that there was 
violation of the various social welfare laws by the State and the workers were 
being denied of their right to have 'just and humane conditions of work'. The 
Court observed: 
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The right to live with human clig►tity enshrined in cuticle 21... Includes 
protection of health and strength of workers, nten and women, amid... Just and 
humane Co►aMtions at work and maternity relie/. 
Mere liberation of the labourers from bondage without making arrangements 
for their rehabilitation will serve no useful purpose and may even create a very 
real problem as to livelihood of the labourers so set free. There is a specific 
provision for the rehabilitation of the bonded labourers after their release from 
the bondage. [561 
Neeraja Chaudhary vs. Stine of M.P. 157  is a landmark decision of the 
Supreme Court on rehabilitation of the bonded labourers. The brief facts of this 
case were that the petitioner, a Civil Rights Correspondent of Statesman, wrote 
a letter to the Supreme Court pointing Out that about 135 labourers were 
released from bondage In 1982 from Faridabad and they were brought back to 
their respective villages in Madhya Pradesh. But they were not rehabilitated 
even after six-months of their release and they were living on the verge of 
starvation. Justice Bhagwati. speaking for the Court observed: 
It is the plainest requirement of Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution that 
benched labourers must be identified and released and on release, the), must he 
suitably rehabilitated. The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 has 
been enacted pursuant to the Directive Principles of State Policy With a View 
to ensuring basic human dignity to the bonded labourers and any failure of 
action on the part of the State Government in implementing the provisions of 
this legislation would be the clearest violation of Article 2l apart from Article 
23 of the Constitution. 
Thus, from the above observations of the Supreme Court. it is amply 
clear that it is not enough merely to identify and release labourers but it is 
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equally, perhaps. more, important that after identification and release, they 
must he properly rehabilitated. Because without rehabilitation, they would he 
driven by poverty, helplessness and despair into selfdom once again. Poverty 
and destitution are almost perennial features of Indian rural life for large 
numbers of unfortunate ill-starved humans in this country and it would be 
nothing short of cruelty and heartlessness to identify and release bonded labour 
merely to throw them at the mercy of the existing socio-economic system 
which denies to them even the basic necessities of life such as food, shelter and 
clothing. We. who have not experienced poverty and hunger, want and 
destitution, talk platitudinouly of freedom and liberty but the words have no 
meaning for a person who has not even a square meal per day. hardly a roof 
over his head and scarcely one piece of cloth to cover the shame. 
Thus, the petitioner rightly urged in Neeraju Chaudhr v case that failure 
on the part of' the state government to ensure the proper rehabilitation of' the 
freed bonded labourers amounted Co violation of' the fundamental right of the 
bonded labourers to live with human dignity under article 21 of the 
Constitution. 
In Mukesh Advani vs. State n/ M.1'.. (58( a public interest litigation was filed 
by one Mukesh Advani case, advocate, by addressing a letter to one of the 
judges of the Supreme Court and annexing thereto a cutting from the indiun 
Express dated 14 September, 1982, depicting the horned plight of bonded 
labourers working in stone quarries at Raisen in Madhya Pradesh. In the letter 
it was also alleged that the working conditions of the workers were of the 18 h` 
century vintage and not even a single legislation enacted for the welfare of 
labour was implemented or respected. 
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Asa part of the social action litigation this letter was treated by the 
Supreme Court as writ petition under article 32 of the Constitution. The Court 
directed the [)istrict Judge, Bhopal to ascertain the existence of bonded labour 
as it was alleged in the letter. The District Judge in his report submitted that 
there were no bonded labourers at relevant time but there was total absence of 
implementation of labour laws. Therefore, the Supreme Court concentrated in 
giving directions to the government for taking suitable steps for 
implementation of labour welfare legislations in their true spirit. The Supreme 
Court stressed that the labourers he protected against the unauthorized 
exploitation by paying less than the minimum. 
In Shurrkar vs. /)urgaptrr Project Lid.. [591  Calcutta [ { igh Court held that the 
State cannot deprive a worker of decent standard of life, which under article 43 
of the Constitution, the State should endeavor to secure. To do an act contrary 
to article 43. i.e., to deprive a person of' decent standard of life would be 
volatile of article 21 of the Constitution. The court pointed out that compelling 
a person to live to sub-human condition, also amounts to the taking away of 
his life not by execution of a death sentence but by a slow and gradual process 
of robbing him of all his human qualities and graces. a process which is crueler 
than sending a man to gallows. To convert human existence into animal 
existence no doubt amounts to taking away human right to life, because a man 
lives not by his mere physical existence or bread alone but by his human 
existence. 
In P. Siva swami vs. State of'A.P., (601 the Supreme Court once again stressed 
the need for effective rehabilitation of the released, bonded labourers. The 
Supreme Court pointed out that the financial assistance of rupees 738 per 
family of the freed bonded lahour was certainly inadequate for rehabilitation. 
And unless there was effective rehabilitation, the purpose of the Bonded 
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Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 would fail and the steps taken by the 
Supreme Court is rendered ineffective and there would be mounting 
frustration. 
In P.Bhaskara. Vijayakumar vs. Sate, 1611 it was held that imposition of 
rigorous imprisonment with hard labour attached to it does not amount to 
cxtracting "forced labour" from prisoner. It is not contrary to article 23. 
However, prisoners would be entitled to he paid for their labour under article 
21. The High Court accordingly directed the State to pay adequate wages. 
In Balrani vs. State of M.P., [62] the Supreme Court once again stressed the 
need for rehabilitating the bonded labourers. In this respect the Supreme Court 
issued certain directions to the central government and its officials to release 
adequate funds to meet its liability under the scheme trained under the Bonded 
Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976. The Court further directed that collector 
and such other officers who have been assigned the responsibility of 
supervising rehabilitation shall ensure that the full amount intended for the 
freed labourers reaches them. 
In Public Union for Civil Liberties vs. State of TN. [63] the Supreme Court 
noticed that no significant progress has been made by the authorities concerned 
and it is not unlikely that the attitude of the authorities concerned is not 
enthusiastic as one would expect in a matter of such significance. The Supreme 
Court once again issued certain directions for prompt compliance by the State 
governments. It was directed that berated labour should be identified and 
suitably rehabilitated. Their existing debt should he extinguished. They should 
be provided employment as agricultural workers. As a part of a rehabilitation 
package, the Court directed to provide adequate shelter, food, education to 
their children and medical facilities to the bonded labour and their families. It 
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was further directed that regular inspection should he made by the Labour 
Commissioner and the report of the District Magistrate should he sent to the 
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee. Criminal proceeding should be initiated 
against the employer contractor exploiting bonded labourers. Thus, from the 
analysis of various above mentioned cases it is evident that the judiciary has 
shown deep concern for the basic human rights of the bonded htbourers and 
issued the suitable directions for ensuring the protection and promotion of their 
human right to live with human dignity. 
(b) Protection of Children from Exploitation 
Children as a class constitutes the weakest and most vulnerable and defenseless 
section of human society. It is also the duty of the State to protect and promote 
their human rights with a view to ensuring Lull development of their 
personality and with human dignity. otherwise, the right to life and liberty 
would become meaningless fur them. In spite of the specific constitutional 
mandate that the tender age of the children is not to be abused and they are not 
to be forced by economic necessity to avocations unsuited to their age and 
strength {641 and that the children below the age of fourteen years of age are 
not to be employed in any factory, mine or other hazardous concern, the child 
labour exists in almost all parts of the country. Their tender age and strength is 
exploited. They are denied the right to live with human dignity. The judiciary 
in India has shown its deep concern for the human rights of these children. In 
People's Union fbr Democratic Rights v. Union ut India case, the Supreme 
Court observed: "Construction work is clearly a hazardous occupation and it is 
absolutely essential that the employment of children under the age of 14 years 
must be prohibited in every type of construction work. 	This is a 
constitutional prohibition which even if not followed up by appropriate 
Legislation, must operate propriovigore. 
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The echo of this observation came again from the Supreme Court in Labourers 
Working on Salal Hydro Project v. State of J&K case, the Supreme Court once 
again held that "construction work" is a 'hazardous employment' and no child 
below the age of 14 years of age he allowed to be employed in it. The Supreme 
Court did notice in this case that as long as there is poverty and destitution in 
our country, it will be virtually difficult to eradicate child labour. But if we 
want to ensure that children should also enjoy human rights, then an attempt 
has to be made to reduce, if not eliminate, the incidence of child labour, 
particularly from the hazardous concerns. Otherwise, the Constitution will 
have no meaning to these children. 
In M.C. Mehra vs. State of Tamil Nadu,[651 the Supreme Court while keeping 
the interest of the children, as also the constitutional mandate in view held that 
employment connected with manufacturing process in the match factory is not 
to be given to children. They can, however, be employed in packing process 
and the packing must be done in area away from the place of manufacture. The 
Court also directed that at least 60 percentage of the prescribed minimum 
wage, for adult employee doing the same job, to be given to child in view of 
special adaptability of child's tender had to such work. Keeping in view the 
basic human rights of the children, the Court directed that Lill such children 
should be provided with facilities for recreation and medical attention and that 
they should be provided basic diet during the working period. Protection of 
children against moral and material abandonment is yet another constitutional 
goal, which has to be achieved before all children are given the right to live 
with human dignity. Children should be given opportunities and facilities to 
develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. Social 
activists and the judiciary have contributed a lot in this sphere. 
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In L.ukslrnni Kant Pantie vs. Union of I►►dice. (66} a letter was written by an 
advocate to the judges of the Supreme Court complaining about the 
malpractices by some social organizations and other Voluntary agencies 
engaged in offering Indian children in adoption to foreign parents. The 
Supreme Court treated this letter as a writ petition in the nature of public 
interest litigation. There was of uniform law governing the inter-country 
adoption. Only abortive attempts were made by the Parliament in 1972 and 
1980 to enact the uniform law of adoption. After observing the absence of legal 
framework in the area of inter-country adoption and failure of the Parliament to 
enact law in this regard. the Supreme Court formulated the guidelines and 
norms which must be observed in permitting inter-country adoption. The 
guidelines and the norms for preventing the nwral and material abandonment 
of children by going into the wrong hands were framed by the Supreme Court 
with such meticulous details which even a consummate draftsman would have, 
perhaps. missed. The anxiety of the Supreme Court in framing the detailed 
norms and guidelines was to protect and safeguard the interest and welfare of 
the children of the country and protect their human rights which are the 
eloquent aim of the various constitutional provisions. 
Thus, the Supreme Court laid down a law 1671 governing the inter-
country adoption. in other words, the Supreme Court filled the vacuum created 
by the absence of any Parliamentary legislation in regard to the uniform 
adoption law. 1681 
The Supreme Court has also shown its concern for the protection of children 
from exploitation in jails. In Sheela Barse vs. Union of India arse, a writ 
petition by way of public interest litigation was filed under article 32 of the 
Constitution' by a social worker seeking the release of children below the age 
of 16 years of age, detained in jails in different states of the country, 
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production of complete information of children in jails, information as to the 
existence of juvenile courts, homes and schools and for a direction that the 
District Judges should visit jails or sub-jails within their jurisdiction to ensure 
that children are properly looked after when in custody as also for a direction 
to the State Legal Aid Boards to appoint duty counsel to ensure availability of 
legal protection for children as and when they are involved in criminal cases 
and are proceeded against. 
The Supreme Court with a view to protect children from exploitation in jails 
pointed out that "it is an elementary requirement of any civilized society and it 
has been so provided in various statutes concerning children that children 
should not be confined in jail because in carceration in jail has it dehumanizing 
effect and it is harmful to the growth and development of children. 
In S/teela Barse vs. Secretary. Children Aid Society, (69) the petitioner had 
made grievance about the working of Observation llome managed and 
maintained by the Children's Aid Society which was registered under the 
Societies Registration Act. I860.The Supreme Court observed: " Children in 
Observation Homes should not be made to stay for long and as long as they are 
there, they should be kept occupied and the occupation should be congenial 
and intended to bring about adaptability in life aimed at bringing about a self-
confidence and picking of humane virtues". 
The Supreme Court while laying stress on the need to look after the various 
problems of the children pointed out that if there he no proper growth of 
children of today, the future of the country will be dark. It is the obligation of 
every generation to bring up children, who will be the citizens of tomorrow, in 
a proper way. If a child goes wrong for want of proper attention, training and 
guidance. it will indeed he a deficiency of the society and the Government. The 
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Supreme Court observed: " Every society must, therefore, devote full attention 
to ensure that children are properly cared for and brought up in a proper 
atmosphere where they could receive adequate training, education and 
guidance in order that they may be able to have their rightful place in the 
society when they grow up. 
The Parliament also gave a clarion call and in pursuance of the Supreme Court 
judgments' in Sheela Barse case, it enacted the Juvenile Justice Act. 1986. [701 
In the prefatory note to the Statement of objects and reasons, it was stated that 
a review of the working of the existing Children Acts would indicate that much 
greater attention is required to he paid to children who may be found 
institutions of' social maladministration, delinquency or neglect. The justice 
system as available for adults is not considered suitable for being applied to 
juveniles. It is also necessary that a uniform juvenile justice system should be 
available throughout the country which should make adequate provision for 
dealing with all aspects in the changing social. cultural and economic situation 
in the country. There is also need for larger involvement of informal system 
and community based welfare agencies in the care, protection, treatment and 
rehabilitation of' such juveniles. [71 1 
In S.C. Legal Aid Committee vs. Union of India 1721 the Supreme Court again 
showed its concern for providing relief to delinquent children detained in jails. 
The State governments which had not framed rules to carry out purposes of' 
Juvenile Justice Act, were directed to frame such rules before 7 April. 1989 
and being them in force immediately. A Committee was also set up to make 
draft scheme for working out modalities for enforcing the provisions of the 
Act. 
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In Gauruv Jain vs. Union of India. [731 the Supreme Court showed its concern 
For the children born to prostitutes. In order to protect them from exploitation 
the Court issued various directions including that these children be separated 
from their mothers and be allowed to mingle with other children so as to 
become part of the Society. The Supreme Court also constituted a Committee 
to examine this problem and asked the Committee to submit its report to the 
Court on the basis of which further orders could be made. In yet another case 
of VishvIleel vs. Union of India, [74] in puhlic interest litigation, the petitioner 
alleged the sexual exploitation of children and flesh trade. The petitioner 
sought directions to CSI to enquire into the matter. However, the Supreme 
Court held that CEI enquiry is neither possible nor practicable. Me. Court 
issued directions to State governments and Union Territories to prevent such 
exploitation in view of articles 23(1) and 39(f) of the Constitution. 
In Union Carbide Corporation. vs. Union of India, [7i] the Supreme Court 
took cognizance of the possible impact of Bhopal gas leak disaster on persons 
and children horn to exposed mothers who may become symptomatic in future. 
The Court directed Union of India to obtain appropriate medical group 
insurance cover to take care of compensation for such prospective victims. The 
Court also ordered the premium to be paid from settlement fund. 
In Madan Gopal Kakkad vs. Naval Dubev, [76] the Court expressed its deep 
concern on the sexual assaults on female children and recommended that 
deterrent punishment should he awarded in such cases. 
5.5 Right to Live in Healthy Environment 
The Indian Constitution is perhaps one of the rare Constitutions of the world 
which reflects the human rights approach to environment protection through 
various constitutional mandates. [77] In India the concern for environment 
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protection has not only been raised to the status of fundamental law of the land, 
but it is also wedded with the human rights approach and it is now well settled 
that it is the basic human right of every individual to live in pollution free 
environment with full human dignity. The Constitution of India obligates the 
"State" as well as "citizens" to "protect' and "improve" the environment. 
There is no doubt that living in a polluted atmosphere or environment is like 
dying every moment. The problem of environmental pollution has posed the 
highest threat to the very existence of human beings. After all it is an 
established fact that there exists a vital link between life and environment. The 
Permanent Peoples' Tribunal regards the "anti-humanitarian effect of industrial 
and environmental hazards not as an unavoidable part of the exiting industrial 
system, but rather a pervasive and organized violation of the most fundamental 
rights of humanity. For, most among them are the right to life, health, 
expression and access to justice. 
Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees a fundamental right to life, a 
life of dignity, to be Lived iii a proper environment, free of danger of decease 
and infection. The talk of human rights and maintaining the dignity of every 
person would become meaningless unless they are secured with the minimum 
livable environment. The judicial grammar of interpretation has made "right to 
live in healthy environment as the sanctum wnc!orum of human rights. 
Rarlanr Municipality vs. Vardichand (78J is a monumental judgment where the 
Supreme Court followed the activist approach and provided flesh to the dry 
bones of statutory provisions. In this case the residents of a locality within the 
limits of Rarl<nn Municipality tormented by stretch and stink caused by open 
drains and public excretion by nearby slum-dwellers moved the Magistrate 
under section 133 of Criminal Procedure Code to require the Municipality to 
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do its duty towards the member of the public. The Magistrate gave directions 
to Municipality to draft a plan within six months for removing nuisance. In 
appeal, Session Court reversed the order. The High Court approved the order 
of Magistrate. In further appeal, the Supreme Court also affirmed the order of 
the Magistrate. 
The Supreme Court also rejected the plea of the Municipality of insufficiency 
of funds. The court pointed out that the financial inability cannot validly 
exonerate the Municipality from statutory liability and it has no juridical base. 
The court further observed: "Even as human rights under Part III of the 
Constitution have to he respected by the state regardless of budgetary 
provision". [79] 
The right to life and personal liberty includes the right to live with decency and 
dignity. In this context the court pointed out that the grievous failure of local 
authorities to provide the basic amenity of public conveniences drives the 
miserable slum-dwellers to ease in the streets, on the sly for a time, and openly 
thereafter, because under Natures pressure, bashfulness becomes a luxury and 
dignity a difficult art. The court observed: Decency and dignity are non-
negotiable facets of human rights and are a first charge on local self-governing 
bodies". 
Thus, from the above mentioned observations of the Supreme Court it is 
evident that it impliedly treated the right to live in a healthy environment as a 
part of article 21. 
R.I. and E. Kendra vs. Stare of UP, I50 is a landmark case which 
demonstrates the activist role of the Supreme Court with regard to 
environmental issues. In this case, the Supreme Court entertained 
environmental complaints alleging that the operation of lime-stone quarries in 
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the Himalayan range of Mussoorie resulted in degradation of the environment 
affecting ecological balance. The Supreme Court entertained the writ petition 
under article 32 regarding the environmental issues and ordered the closure of 
sonic of these quarries on the ground that their operation was upsetting the 
ecological balance. In other words, the Supreme Court read, and rightly so, 
article 48-A into article 21 of the Constitution and regarded the right to live in 
a healthy environment as a part of life and personal liberty of the people. 
M.C. Mehra vs. Union of India 1811 is yet another significant case where again 
the Supreme Court has considered the impact of polluting the healthy 
environment by poisonous gas leakage and thereby affecting the life and 
liberty of the people. This case came up before the Supreme Court as a result 
of the leakage of Oleum gas from the Shriram Chemical Plant in Delhi which 
affected the health of large number of people and even one person died. 
Applications were filed by the Delhi Legal Aid and Advice Board and Delhi 
Bar Association for the award of compensation to persons who were affected 
on account of escape of oleum gas and suffered harm to their life and liberty. A 
preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of 
Shriram that since there was no claim for compensation originally made in the 
writ petition, so this should not be considered by the Court. The Supreme 
Court rejected the preliminary objection of the learned counsel and observed: 
These applications for compensation are for the enforcement of the 
fundamental right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution and while 
dealing with such applications, we cannot adopt a hyper technical approach 
which would defeat the ends of justice.... If this court is prepared to accept a 
letter complaining of violation of the fundamental right of an individual or a 
class or individuals who cannot approach the court for justice, there is no 
reason why these application.s. for compensation which have been made far the 
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enforcement of the fundamental right of persons affected by oleum gas leak 
under Article 21 should not be entertained. Thus, from the above observations 
of the Supreme Court, it becomes amply clear that the court treated the right to 
live in a healthy environment, as fundamental right under article 21 of the 
Constitution. 
In T. Damodhar Rao vs. SO. Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad, [82] Justice 
P.N. Chaudhry of Andhra Pradesh High Court observed: 
"It would he reasonable to hold that the enjrwrneni of life and its 
attainment and fulfillment guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution embrace 
the protection and preservation of nature's gift without which the life cannot he 
enjoyed. There can be no reason why practice of violent extinguishment of life 
alone should be regarded as violation of An. 21 of the Constitution. The slow 
poisoning by the polluted wino sphere caused by environmental pollution and 
spoilation should also be treated as amounting to violation of Art. 21 of the 
Corutitution ". 
In Kinkri Devi v. State of Himaclsal Pradesh, [83] the court pointed out that if 
effective .steps for the protection of environment are not taken with the utmost 
expedition, there will not only he a total neglect and failure on the part of the 
administration to attend an urgent task in the national interest but also a 
violation of fundamental right under article 21 of the Constitution. The court 
further observed that the judicial organ of the state cannot remain a silent 
spectator if there is a complaint for environmental pollution. To ensure the 
attainment of the constitutional goat of the protection and improvement of 
environment and to protect the people inhabiting the vulnerable areas from the 
hazardous consequences. with due regard to their life, liberty and property. the 
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court will be left with no alternative but to intervene effectively by issuing 
appropriate writs, orders or clirectic)i►s. 
In L.K Koulu'al vs. State, 1841 the Rajasthan I ugh Court observed: 
"Maintenance of health, 1)reser►'ution of the sanitation and environment 
_%oils tit'ithii the purview of :1 r1. 2 l of the Coiisti1auun as it adversely affect the 
life of the citizen and it amounts to slow poisoning and reducing the life of the 
citizen because of the hazards created, if not checked". 
In a 1C. Melita vs. Union of Itd10. [851 which is popularly known as Ganga 
Water Pollution case, the Supreme Court considered the problem of pollution 
of Ganga Water by the affluent discharge from the tanneries. The Supreme 
Court directed the owners of the tanneries to establish the primary treatment 
plants so as to prevent the pollution of the Ganga Water which is being used by 
large number of people of the country. The polluted vv ater affects the health 
and life of the people. The court observed that the financial capacity of the 
tanneries should he considered as irrelevant while requiring them to establish 
the treatment plants. 
In Chat-an lid Salm v`. Union of India, 1861 the Supreme Court while 
upholding the validity of the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) 
Act, 1985 held: 
In the context of our national dimensions of human rights, right to life, 
liberty, pollution free air and water is guaranteed by the Constitution under 
articles 21, 48-A and 51-A (g,). It is the duty of the State to take effective steps 
to protect the guaranteed constitutional rights. 
The above observations of the Supreme Court put it beyond doubt that right to 
live in healthy environment is our fundamental right under article 21 and has to 
252 
he read with article 4S-A and 51- A(g) thereby putting Obligation on the State 
as well as citizens to protect and improve it. 
In F.K Hussain vs. Union of lndia,[S7] the KeraIa High Court pointed out that 
the right to sweet water and the right to free air are attributes of the right to life, 
for, those are basic cicmwnt5 which sustain life itself. 
In Subhash Kuntar v. Suite of Bihar, 1881  the Supreme Courtt once again 
reiterated: 
"Right to live is a fundamental right under article 21 of the Constitution 
and it includes the right of enjoyment of pollution-free water and air for full 
enjoyment of life. If anything endangers or impairs that quality of life. in 
derogation of laws, a citizen has right to have recourse to Article 32 of the 
Constitution for removing the pollution of water or air which may be 
detrimental to the quality of life". In MC Mehta v. Union of India case, the 
Supreme Court took note of environmental pollution due to stone crushing 
activities in and around Delhi, Faiidabad and Ballabgarh complexes. The court 
was conscious that environmental changes are the inevitable consequences of 
industrial development in our country. but at the same time the quality of 
environment cannot be permitted to be damaged by polluting the air, water and 
land to such an extent that it becomes a health hazard lot the residents of the 
area. Showing deep concern to the environment, the court reiterated that "every 
citizen has a right to fresh air and to live in pollution free environment. 
Thus, the Supreme Court once again treated it as violation of article 21 
of the Constitution and passed the order in absohne terms under article 32 
directing the stone crushing unit's to stop their activities in those areas. The 
Court further directed the government to rehabilitate these stone crushers in 
'brushing zone" within the period of six months. 
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In PA. Jacob vs. Supdt.o[ Police Kotlava,n 89] the Court took cognizance of 
noise pollution when it observed: "Compulsory exposure of unwilling persons 
to dangerous and disastrous levels of noise. would amount to a clear 
infringement of their constitutional guarantee ot'right to life under article 2L, 
Right to life comprehends right to safe environment, including safe air quality, 
safe from noise". 
In M.0 Mehta v. Union of India case, the Supreme Court rightly pointed 
out that law is a regulator of human conduct, but no law can indeed effectively 
work unless there is an clement of acceptance by the people in society. For 
this, the dissemination oF information, which is foundation of a democratic 
system, is necessary. It is, therefore, necessary to keep the citizens informed 
about their duty as also about the Obligations of the State. Accordingly, the 
Court directed: 
(a) To enforce as a condition of licence of all cinema hall storing 
cinemas and video parlors duty to exhibit free of cost at least two 
slides/messages on environment in each show undertaken by them, 
(b) To show every day by cinema halls information film of short 
duration on environment and pollution. 
(c) To telecast and broadcast interesting programmes of 5 to7 minutes 
duration every day and a longer programme once a week by 
Doordarshan and All India Radio in the matter of environment and 
pollution. 
(d) To make environment a compulsory subject in schools, colleges and 
universities for general growth of awareness. It is submitted that 
these directions are in consonance with Principle 1.0 of the Rio-
Declaration of 1992 on Environment and Development which calls 
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on States to make: information w idelR available so as to facilitate and 
encourage public awareness and participation. 
In Tariiii Bharat Singh v. Union of India, (901 the Supreme Court directed the 
State Government, in particular, Police Administration to provide protection to 
environmental activities against any physical threats by the vested interests and 
to ensure that none of the activities and workers of the petitioner are subjected 
to any intimidation and hindrance in their activity. 
In Dr. K.0 Ma/hotru vs. State of MV, 191 j once again the Court reiterated that 
right to life under article 21 includes right to live with human dignity, health 
and bare necessities of life. To ensure public health and saf'ctvv is the duty of the 
State under the constitutional mandate of articles 2l , 39 and 47. In this case 
open drainage was endangering public health and the petitioner sought 
enforcement of measures to ensure public health and safety against the 
Municipal Corporation. The Court directed Corporation to take necessary 
measures to eradicate the menace caused by the open drainage. 
Thus, from the perusal of the above mentioned cases it is evident that 
judicial activism has led to the development of a new "environmental human 
rights jurisprudence" in India. Justice Ilolmes has rightly remarked that "life of 
the law has not been logic", it has been experience and the judges of the Court 
are men and their heart also bleed when calamities like the Bhopal gas leak 
incident occur. 
Concluding Remarks 
The right to enforce Human Rights as provided under the Constitution of India 
is constitutionally protected. Article 226 empowers the High Courts to issue 
writs for enforcement of such rights. Similarly Article 32 of the Constitution 
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gives the same powers to the Supreme Court. A new approach has emerged in 
the form of Public interest Litigation (I'll_) with the objective to bring justice 
within the reach of the poor and the disadvantageous Section of' the society. In 
the recent past the judges of the I ligh Courts and the Supreme Court have from 
time to time given far reaching and innovative judgments' to protect the 
Human Rights. Public Interest Litigation has heralded a new era of Human 
Rights promotion and protection in India. The greatest contribution of Public 
Interest Litigation has been to enhance the accountability of the Governments 
towards the Human Rights of the poor. Public Interest Litigation has 
undoubtedly produced astonishing results which were unthinkable two decades 
ago. Public Interest Litigation has rendered a signal service in the areas of 
development of compensatory jurisprudence for human Rights violation. 
Environmental protection, bonded labour eradication and prohibition of Child 
Labour and many others. A review of the decisions of the Indian Judiciary 
regarding the protection of human Rights indicates that the judiciary has been 
playing a role of savior in situations where the executive and legislature have 
failed to address the problems of the people. The Supreme Court has come 
forward to take corrective measures and provide necessary directions to the 
executive and legislature. However while taking note of the contributions of 
judiciary one must not forget that the judicial pronouncements cannot be a 
protective umbrella for inefficiency and laxity of executive and legislature. It is 
the foremost duty of the society and all its organs to provide justice and correct 
institutional and human errors affecting basic needs, dignity and liberty of 
human beings. Fortunately India has pro-active judiciary. It can thus be aspired 
that in the tines ahead, people's right to live, as a true human beings will 
further he strengthened. From the perusal ref' the above contribution it is evident 
that the Indian Judiciary has been very sensitive and alive to the protection of 
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the I fuman Rights of the people. It has, through judicial activism forged new 
tools and devised new 286 remedies for the purpose of vindicating the most 
precious of the precious Human Right to Life and Personal Liberty. 
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Chapter -VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND 
SUGGESTIONS 
CONCLI:SIONS AND SU (;(;ESTIONS 
Judicial activism rS not an anomaly. It is an indispensable aspect of the 
dynamics of a constitutional court. It is a Cour1ter-rnajoritarian check on 
democracy. Judicial activism, however, does not mean governance by the 
judiciary. Judicial activism must also function within the limits of the judicial 
process. Within those limit~. it performs the function of stigmatizing, as well as 
legitimizing, the actions of the other bodies of government more often 
legitimising than stigmatizing. The words remain the same, but they acquire 
new meaning as the experience of a nation unfolds and the Supreme Court 
gives continuity of life and expression to the open-textured expressions in the 
Constitution, to keep the Constitution abreast of the times. The major criticism 
of iadicial Actir ►,m is that it o tr 	n,t autional as the authority Of lcgi laltise 
and e\ecutive i1, usurped by the judiciary which is not elected by the people. 
The judiciar has encroached apan the jurisdictions of the c\ccutivc and 
1Dzz1,laturc and other independent and .ru1onun1oru hodie . Through judicial 
Activism the Judiciary sometimes enters an area where it has no expertise and 
competence. In some instances Public interest litigations may be misused t'or 
populism by individuals and groups. Judicial Activism may upset the 
constitutional system of separation uf powers alon`, with checks and 
balances. It cannot be denied that the opinion of' a single Judge is essentially a 
subjective opinion. It cannot be as objective as a decision made around 500 
parliamentarians. What is necessary is that each organ of government should 
discharge its duty duly and according to the constitution and when this 
happens the courts will also find no reason to interfere in the activities of 
other departments of government. It is %,cry important to note that it must not 
lead the government bV judiciary. Frequent confrontation between the 
Legislature. Executive and the Judiciary will also damage our well established 
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democratic system of eovernance. Members of both the institution have sworn 
to uphold the constitution, which alone is supreme. Both aides will maintain 
and respect the line of demarcation of power under the constitution and will 
not allow a conflict to develop between them. The judiciary is the weakest 
body of the state. It becomes strong only when people repose faith in it. Such 
faith constitutes the legitimacy of the Court and of Judicial Activism. Courts 
must continuously strive to sustain their legitimacy. Courts do not have to bow 
to public pressure, but rather they should stand firm against public pressure. 
What sustains legitimacy of judicial activism is not its submission to populism, 
but its capacity to withstand such pressure without sacrificing impartiality and 
objectivity. Courts must not only be fair, they must appear to be fair. Such 
inarticulate and diffused consensus about the impartiality and integrity of the 
judiciary is the source of the Court's legitimacy_ How is the Court's legitimacy 
sustained? The myth created by the black letter law tradition, that judges do not 
make law but merely finds it or interprets it, sought to immunize the judges 
from responsibility for their decisions. Mythologization of the judges also 
contributed to sustaining legitimacy. Those myths or devices are of no help in 
sustaining the legitimacy of judicial activism. We must expose certain myths. 
Similarly, we must de-mythologize the judiciary by declaring that a 
constitutional court is a political institution. It is political because it determines 
the limits of the powers of other bodies of government. Being political need 
not mean being partisan or unprincipled. The Court is political in much the 
same way as the President of India is political in his appointment of a Prime 
Minister or in the exercise of his discretion. Another de-mythologization is to 
admit that judges are human beings, and are as fallible as other human beings. 
If we have good judges, then we also have bad judges. Judges . re sure to have 
their predilections and those predilections arc bound to influence their 
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judgments. The advantage of such de-invthologization is that people accept 
that judges, like other human beings, are not infallible. The courts themselves 
have imposed restraints on their own powers in order to minimize the chances 
of vagaries arising out of subjective lapses or prejudices cif' the judges. The 
courts are bound to follow previous precedents, they are bound to follow the 
decisions of the higher courts. and they are bound to Follow certain rules of 
interpretation. Further, decisions of courts are reasoned and are often subject to 
appeal or review. These restrictions ensure that any lapse will be minimum. 
Critiquing the judgments of the courts Would further act to correct 
objectionable judgments. Through such restrictions, the courts sustain their 
legitimacy. Since the Indian Supreme Court introduced public interest 
litigation and began an era of socio-economic rights adjudication two decades 
ago, the term "judicial activism" has repeatedly Found its way into evaluations 
of the Court's practice. Yet, no methodology has emerged that allows us to do 
justice to the term and to the nature of the Court's decision-making. Central to 
a large part of the argument in this study. one may hope to gain a deeper 
insight into judicial behavior in the Indian Supreme Court, and understanding 
judicial behavior, as Judge Richard Posner recently reminded us, "is a key to 
legal reform." 
The Judiciary cannot take over the functions of the Executive. The Courts 
themselves must display prudence and moderation and he conscious of the 
need for comity of instrumentalities as basic to good governance. Judicial 
activism has to he welcomed and its implications assimilated in letter and 
spirit. An activist Court is surely far more effective than it legal positivist 
conservative Court to protect the Society against legislative adventurism and 
executive tyranny. When our chosen representatives have failed to give us a 
welfare state, let it spring from the Judiciary. The power of judicial review is 
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recognized as part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution. The activist 
role of the Judiciary is implicit in the said power. Judicial activism is a sine qua 
non of democracy because without an alert and enlightened judiciary, the 
democracy will be reduced to an empty shell. Judicial activism in its totality 
cannot be banned. It is obvious that under a constilution. a fundamental feature 
of which is the rule of law, there cannot be any restraint upon judicial activism 
in matters in which the legality of executive orders and administrative actions 
is questioned. The courts are the only forum for those wronged by 
administrative excesses and executive arbitrariness. Study observed that there 
is a requirement for a pro-active role of judges and relevant legal professionals 
for the strategic utilization of judicial activism for ensuring the people's access 
to justice. 
There is a lack of understanding and scholarship in India on the concept and 
application of' judicial activism and protection of human rights. The Judges 
cannot act arbitrarily rather they should act judicially. When the judges 
approach the law going beyond the two persons or two parties of the case or 
suit effectively, then it is called 'Judicial Activism'. Judicial Activism can be 
the best tool for the protection of human rights but the State is the main culprit 
for the violation of human rights. Existing poor mechanism of the protection of 
Human Rights in India and breaking down of the 'Rule of Law are great 
problems for a sound judicial activism. Disappearance, cross-fire are regularly 
being traditionalized and girls are being victimized in the safe custody which 
are the gross violation of human rights. Sometimes someone is detained 
unlawfully and at last the court says that you are free now' which cannot be a 
good practice of judicial activism. However. Judges are in better place to be an 
activist of human rights. Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is well established in 
India. It should not be confined only in the fundamental rights -- part 111 of the 
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Constitution of India. The scope of judicial activism should he practiced in 
each organ of human rights. 
Recently the country has seen instances of beneficial judicial activism to a 
great extent. high profile politician Shibu Soren has been convicted for a 
murder committed in 1994. Tinsel world cclehrit\ Sanjay Daft of Gandhigiri 
fame has been convicted of offences under the Arnis Act committed in 1993. 
Navjyot Sidhu. an ex-cricketer with it gift of the gab has been convicted for a 
road rage killing committed 1 ti years ago. Finally and most reassuringly for the 
public, the Delhi High Court has reversed it perverse decision of a lower court 
in the notorious case of murder of Jessica Lull some seven years ago. Manu 
Sharma's acquittal was a patent miscarriage of justice and there was it shrill 
public outcry. On appeal, The f ugh Court has convicted Sharma, despite Rain 
Jethmalani's last minute pyro-techniques on behalf of Sharma. No doubt the 
mills of God (or justice) grind slowly "hut they do so exceedingly small". 
Whatever he the criticisms against judicial activism, it cannot he disputed that 
judicial activism has done a lot to ameliorate the conditions of the masses in 
the country. It has set right it number of wrongs committed by the states as well 
as by individuals. The common people arc very often denied the protection of 
law due to delayed functioning of the Courts, also called judicial inertia or 
judicial tardiness. Judicial activism has started the process to remove these 
occasional aberrations too. '['his can be furthered only by honest and forthright 
judicial activism and not by running down the judiciary in the eyes of the 
public. The greatest asset and the strongest %\capon in the armoury of the 
judiciary is the confidence it commands and the faith it inspires in the minds of 
the people in its capacity to do even-handed justice and keep the scales in 
balance in any dispute. 
?b7 
The Chief Justice of India (Retd.) Adarsh Sen Anand has realized that the teal 
source of strength of the judiciary lies in the public confidence in it and the 
judges have to ensure that this confidence is not lost. As Justice J.S. Verma has 
referred'. "Judicial activism is a sharp-edged tool which has to be used as a 
scalpel by a skilful surgeon to cure the malady. Not as a Rampuri knife which 
can kill °' 
Judicial activism is a noble concept and a necessary tool for attaining 
justice and achieving social transformation. In carrying out their constitutional 
interpretative role, courts must therefore employ modes of interpretation that 
are consistent with an activist approach to the interpretation of the 
Constitution. It is only those modes of interpretation that take into account the 
purposes or objects of the Constitution the context and the overarching 
principles on which the Constitution was founded: as well as the values 
underlying the inclusion of a particular right in the Constitution- that are truly 
consistent with art activist nature of interpreting the Constitution. These modes 
include the broad, liberal approach and the contextual, purposive approach. 
However, it must he emphasized that an activist approach to the interpretation 
of the Constitution .should not he construed as permitting the courts to do as 
they please. In carrying out their constitutional interpretative role, courts must 
avoid overstepping their judicial boundaries and venture into the realm of the 
Legislature and the Executive, as that would be tantamount to usurping the 
legislative functions of the two political arms of government. Of course it has 
been argued that courts that employ judicial activism in carrying out their 
statutory interpretative roles are undemocratic as unelected judges may 
interfere with laws or policies of democratically elected governments. Without 
wishing to open up a debate on how the so-called elected legislators have at 
times abused their elected status and numbers to enact laws or come up with 
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policies that may not in themselves pass the real test of democracy due to the 
politicization of issues that legislators are at times obsessed with in the 
legislative process: it suffices to state that the element of being elected alone 
does not make all the difference. For instance, are judges who are elected (such 
as those in some states in the United States of America) tiree to interfere with 
laws or tamper with government policies as they pleas.. just because they were 
elected'' Obviously the answer is no. 
Therefore. the sheer fact of being elected or their numbers alone does not give 
the Executive and the Legislature the exclusive prerogative of enacting any 
laws, without the watchful eye of the courts. If' that was the case, then the 
framers of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa and that of Nigeria, as 
it is in other countries, would not have subjected the Legislative and other 
powers of these two political arms of government to the Constitution and the 
jurisdiction of the courts. Additionally. although the concept of judicial 
activism has been criticized in favour of the concept of judicial restraint in that 
the latter conforms to the democratic concept of separation of powers as 
compared to the former: it must be pointed out that undue reliance on the rigid 
concept of judicial restraint may not only defeat the ends of justice, but equally 
ignores another important aspect of democracy- the principle of' "checks and 
balances" which courts are constitutionally mandated to perform in order to 
check legislative encroachment or excesses as well as executive abuse. 
Moreover, judicial restraint, with its emphasis on the literal interpretation of' 
legislation, translates into sterility and rigidity in the interpretation of' the 
Constitution, whilst the Constitution itself is dynamic. 
In must be remembered that the literal rule has its basis in the assumption that 
words used in legislation are used with precision because "such is the skill of 
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parliamentary draftsmen that most statutory enactments are expressed in 
language which is clear and unambiguous and gives rise to no serious 
controversy". Unfortunately, it is on the basis of this assumption that advocates 
of the concept of judicial restraint argue that the function of a court is to look 
for the intention of Parliament from the sole medium of the words used in a 
stature and no more. I lowever, the search for the intention of Parliament is not 
as easy as portrayed by the literal approach to the construction of legislation, 
because if such was the case then the need for courts and judging would have 
been superfluous. If it is accepted that laws are neither sufficiently detailed to 
be able to cover every possible situation, nor is it politically feasible to avoid 
contradictions or inconsistencies in a Constitution especially considering that a 
Constitution is a product of political compromise, often hastily and broadly 
drafted, vague and insufficiently explicit- then it should also he accepted that 
the employment of judicial activism, whilst respecting the legislative 
supremacy of Parliament and the policy making autonomy of the Executive, 
has the potential to eliminate the uncertainties, absurdities, technicalities, 
ambiguities, or the inconsistencies inherent in the Constitution, and that 
ultimately judicial activism is a necessary tool for courts to attain justice and 
achieve social transformation, through their interpretation of the Constitution, 
as well as socioeconomic rights vis-'a-vis gnvemment policies. without 
necessarily usurping the legislative functions of Parliament and the Executive. 
The recognition of inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
the citizens is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. A new 
epoch for the individual. the protection of his human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and the evolution of contemporary human rights jurisprudence 
started after the Second World War and are still continuing. The main reasons 
for this historic development were the unprecedented cruelty and horrors of the 
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Second World War. Ever since the end of the Second World War, promoting 
the respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
everywhere in the world has become major concern of the international 
community. The United Nations has made a matchless contribution in this 
regard. The United Nations has set out the international standard for the 
protection and promotion of human rights. OF course, the pre-Second World 
War developments had already laid down the t"oundation for the development 
of human rights. 
The human rights provisions run "like a golden thread" through the entire UN 
Charter. And much of the credit for this goes to the various determined non-
governmental organizations at the San Francisco Conference. The concern of 
the United Nations for the protection and promotion of human rights is very 
much evident from the fact that United Nations Charter makes repeated 
reference to human rights and fundamental freedoms. In the Preamble, the 
people of the United Nations expressed their determination "to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of' human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small'. The protection 
of human rights is one of' the main objectives of' the United Nations. This is 
further evident from the purposes of the United Nations which are proclaimed 
in article I of the U.N. Charter. Article 1(3) of the U.N. Charter specifically 
highlights that one of the purposes of the U.N. is to promote and encourage 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race sex, language or religion. It is important to note here that 
all the members of the United Nations have taken pledge to take joint and 
separate action in co-operation with the Organization to achieve the purposes 
of United Nations. It was left to the General Assembly and the Economic and 
Social Council to take appropriate steps for the realization of human rights and 
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fundamental freedoms for all. The Economic and Social Council has 
established the "Human Rights Commission'', the "Commission on the Status 
of Women" and the "Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities". All these U.N. bodies have done very well in the 
area of protection and promotion of human rights of the people In order to 
make them more effective in their functioning it is suggested that they should 
meet more frequently and perhaps for longer periods. They should be more 
ready to undertake public debate on the human rights situation in individual 
countries. 
It is submitted that the repealed references to human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the various provisions of the C.N. Charter and particularly in the 
preamble and purposes of the Charter, creates a hinding obligation on all the 
States to respect, protect and promote the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The violation of human rights and other fundamental freedoms is no 
longer a matter which is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
concerned Member State. In the modem world ii would be quite absurd to say 
or assert that massive or systematic violation of human rights or fundamental 
freedoms by the State of its own nationals is a matter within its exclusive 
"domestic jurisdiction". In other words, the U.N. Charter, by in corpurating the 
human rights clauses in it, has internationalized the human rights issue. Any 
nation or member State violating the human rights can be said to be violating 
the U.N. Charter. However, the main drawback of the United Nations was that 
it did not create any independent enforcement mechanism. Nor did it define the 
"human rights" and "fundamental freedoms". Though the International Court 
of Justice is an integral part of the Chaner, yet there is no provision which 
grants any right to the individual to file a petition against the violation of the 
human rights. To some extent this drawback has been removed by adopting the 
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"1503procedure" as a result of the resolution of the Economic and Social 
Council in 1970. But the confidentiality aspect of the "1503 procedure" has 
been one of the greatest defects. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the first landmark in 
contemporary history in the development of the concept of human rights. The 
very fact that it was adopted by a big majority and without any directs 
opposition shows that it was are mark able achievement. One of the most 
important features of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is that it not 
only gave contents to the various human rights and fundamental freedoms, but 
it also contained in it all the 'three generations" of human rights, i.e.. civil and 
political rights: economic, social and cultural rights and the collective rights. It 
also set forth, in general terms, the admissible limitations. This means that if 
any State imposes ally restrictions which are outside the scope of the 
Declaration then that would amount to violation of the Declaration. The 
omission of right to "protection of minorities" in the Declaration is a surprising 
one. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was passed by are solution of 
the General Assembly and originally it was thought that it did not create any 
binding obligation on the States. But in our submission, it has become, over the 
years, not only a part of customary international law but also it has all the 
attribute of juscogens. Whatever may be the legal status and significance of the 
Declaration, however, it cannot he denied that it provided the basic philosophy 
for many legally binding international instruments including the two 
Covenants. Another importance of the Declaration is that it formed the basis 
for enacting regional Conventions of Human Rights such as European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 and American 
Convention on Human Rights, 1969. The Declaration has also influenced the 
drafting of various Constitutions of the world and Indian Constitution is one of 
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them -.So much so that even the judges of the International Court of Justice 
have made the principles of the Ueclaration as the basis for their opinion. 
It was rightly realized that economic, social and cultural rights cannot 
he ensured without economic and technical assistance, education and planning. 
Therefore. taking the realistic view. the State Parties ratifyingthe International 
Covenant on Economic .Social and Cultural Rights, undertook to take steps "to 
the maximum of its available resources" in order to achieve" progressively the 
full realization" of these rights. Since each State will invariably face different 
problems and since no two states are likely to have the same "available 
resources", different criteria will have to be applied to different states in 
determining whether they are living up to their treaty obligation. The Covenant 
not merely lists the .economic, social and cultural rights. but it also describes 
and defines them in considerable detail and set out the steps that should be 
taken to achieve their realization. Power has also been given to the States to 
impose limitations on the enjoyment of these economic, social and cultural 
rights but such limitations on the enjoyment of these rights have to be 
compatible with the economic, social and cultural rights and for promoting the 
general welfare of the people. 
The measure of implementation contained in Part 1V of the Covenant is 
"periodic reports" system. The Covenant does not establish any inter-state or 
individual complaint system. It is worth noting that the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights imposes an "immediate obligation" on the State Parties 
ratifying it, "to respect and ensure" the rights it proclaims and to take whatever 
other measures are required to achieve that goal. The ensuring of civil and 
political rights cannot he postionied indefinitely and as such there is no 
difficulty which comes in the way of their implementation. Further, merely 
declaring or announcing civil and political rights of the people without an 
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"effective remedy will be like a "rope of' sand" which in no way can help in 
achieving the Obligations of the States under the Charter of the United 
Nation,, i.e., to promote universal respect for, and ohscr%ance 0f' human rights 
and freedoms. Therefore, the Covenant rightly contains a provision under 
which the State Parties undertake to ensure all persons "effective remedy" 
against violation of their rights or freedoms notwithstanding that the violation 
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
The rights enshrined in the Covenant are in more detail as compared to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights but they are not absolute rights. They 
are also subject to certain limitations which the State may impose. Ilowever, to 
ensure that these limitations may not abrogate the rights given in the Covenant, 
different zrounds on which the limitations can he imposed have also been 
mentioned in the Covenant. It may also he mentioned that while the Universal 
Declaration of I Inman Rights does not deal with the question of minorities, the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights specifically deals with it and protects 
the rights of the minorities. 
The implementation measure provided under the Covenant is the "Reporting 
Procedure". The State Parties are required to submit their reports to the Human 
Rights Committee on the progress they have made in the employment of these 
rights. In this way, the measures adopted by each State Party for ensuring civil 
and political rights to its people, are brought to the notice of the international 
community. However, no individual petition can he entertained under the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. To meet this requirement, Optional 
Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has been enacted and the 
individuals of those States Parties which have ratit'ied it can file the individual 
complaint as well. 
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It is submitted that it is beyond any doubt that all the civil and political rights 
are inherent important rights of the people which must be ensured to them. 
Therefore, it is desirable that the Optional Protocol should not remain merely 
as "Optional" but it should he ratified by all the State Parties to the Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. 
Similarly, the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights aiming at the abolition of death penalty Should also be ratified by all the 
State Parties to the Covenant. In India death sentence is imposed under the law 
only in "rarest of rare" cases and at different times the Courts have also shown 
trends for its abolition. It is, therefore, suggested that India too should ratify 
this. 
Whatever may be the status of the Covenants and the Optional Protocols, they 
remain the most important international instruments relating to human rights. 
The late Secretary General of' the United Nations, U Thant, rightly stressed the 
importance of the adoption of the International Covenants in the following 
words: 
"Today's decisions are the culmination and the outcome of' sustained 
and complex preparatory work to which the United Nations has devoted 
itself since 1947. It was then decided that human rights and fundamental 
freedoms which had been referred to in general terms in the Charter and 
which were soon to be proclaimed "standards of achievement" in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights must he made the subject 
matter of legally binding obligations in international treaties ....in the 
philosophy of the United Nations. respect for human rights is one of the 
main foundations of freedom, justice and peace in the world .." 
It is true that the International Covenants and Optional Protocols constitute a 
positive, effective and realistic step towards the international protection of the 
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individual. They embody principles which profoundly affect the relationship 
between man and man, between the citizen and his state and between State and 
state. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants should 
be used as a shield for the protection and promotion of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of the individual without any discrimination or 
distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex. language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, properly, birth or other status of that 
dignity to which man is born. 
When the General Assembly adopted and proclaimed the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the Indian Constitution was in the process of 
making in the Constituent Assembly. Viewed from the Indian standpoint, 
human rights have been synthesized, as it were, into an integrated fabric by the 
preambular promise and various Constitutional clauses of the National Charter 
of 1950. In other words, the tryst to make the India's Constitution a viable 
instrument of the Indian People's salvation, and to secure all persons basic 
human rights, is implicit from the preambular promise, fundamental rights, and 
directive principles of state policy, fundamcnlal duties and various other 
provisions of the Constitution. Most of the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms declared in the Universal Declaration of human Rights and the two 
Covenants are the building blocks of the rights enshrined in the Indian 
Constitution. 
The preamble to the Constitution of India concisely sets out quintessence of 
human rights which represents the aspiration of the people, 'who have 
established the Constitution. From the preamble to the Constihrtion, it is 
evident that India is a "sovereign, socialist. secular, democratic Republic'. It 
contains the objectives of securing every citizen. justice of social, economic 
and political; Liberrry' of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; Equality 
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of status and opportunity: and to promote among them all Fraternity assuring 
the dignity of the individual and unity and integrity of the Nation". The spirit 
of brotherhood assuring the dignity of the individual and unity and integrity of 
the nation is sought to be achieved by abolition of un touch ability, Abolition 
of titles, prohibition of traffic in human beings and many other provisions. 
It may be noted that the preamble to the Con>titution of India assures all 
among other things "dignity of the individual". I luman rights are part and 
parcel of human dignity. The importance of the human dignity as an essential 
aspect of the human rights is well exanlplified by its inclusion in the Universal 
Declaration of I luman Rights as well as in they two Covenants. Part III of the 
Constitution contains a long list of fundamental rights given to the people in 
India which represent the basic rights of the people. Most of the human rights 
which find their reflection in the Indian Constitution. such as, right to equality, 
right to freedoms and right to life constitute the "basic structure" of the Indian 
Constitution and hence they cannot be abrogated even by a constitutional 
amendment. The principle of reasonableness, which is an essential element of 
equality or non-arbitrariness, pervades article 1-4 of the Constitution, like a 
brooding omnipresence. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and 
ensures fairness and equal treatment to all which is an essential aspect of 
human rights; The right to life and personal liberty is most fundamental of all 
basic human rights. It has been assured to all persons in India under article 21 
of the Constitution. It can be taken away only by "procedure established by 
law". Through the dynamics of judicial Mutation in the interpretation of article 
21 of the Constitution, it has been given the widest possible meaning. It is now 
well established that "law" as well as the "procedure" must be "just, fair and 
reasonable" before a person could be deprived of his life or personal liberty. In 
other words, through judicial interpretation. "substantive due process" as well 
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as "procedural due process" have become an integral part of the Indian 
Constitution. The right to 'live' does not mean merely physical existence but it 
includes within its ambit the "right to live with human dignity. In order to 
make human rights a living reality for the people of India. the judiciary has 
interpreted in article ? 1 various unenumerated rights. 
The essence of all these developments has been briefly enunciated by the 
Supreme Court as under: 
The preamble sets the human tone and temper of the Founding 
Document and highlights justice, equality and the dignity of the 
individual. Article 14 interdicts arbitrary treatment. discriminatory 
dealings and capricious cruelty. Article 19 prescribes restrictions on free 
movement unless in the interests of the general public. Article 21 after 
the Landmark case in Mcu►eku Gandhi (AI.R. 1978 S.C. 597), followed 
by Sunil Rnn•aa (AI.R. 1978 S.C. 1675) is the sanctuary of human values, 
prescribes fair procedure and forbids barbarities, punitive or processual. 
Such is the apercu. if we may generalise. 
Article 22 provides protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. It 
prescribes the minimum procedure which must he followed whenever any 
person is arrested or detained. The Indian Constitution permits the enactment 
of preventive detention laws in certain circumstances. However, the 
protections are also provided in article 22 (4) to (7) of the Constitution in case 
a person is detained under any preventive detention law. It may be noted that 
ever since 1950, i.e., from the date of the commencement of Constitution. India 
had preventive detention law except for two brief caps between January 1970 
and May 1971 and then from March 1977 till October 1980 when the President 
of India promulgated the National Security Ordinance, 1980. When the people 
of India experienced the gravest abuse of the preventive detention power and 
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violation of human rights during 1975 emergency in utter disregard of law and 
when even the judicial attitude was not in favour of the detainees, the then 
prevailing preventive detention law ' Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 
1971" (MISA) was repealed and article 22 (4) to (7) was amended so as to 
provide more effective protection to the detainees in future. These changes 
were brought by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act. 1978 which 
provided that the changes in article 22 (4) to (7) shad come into force as and 
when official notification is issued by the Government of India. Now more 
than sixteen years have gone but the govcmment has not brought into force the 
amended provisions of article 2? One baits to understand as to why the 
government has not issued such a notification till date. If the government is 
serious about the violation of human rights of the people during the preventive 
detention, then it is-suggested that the amended clauses of article 22 should be 
brought into force without any further delay. In this regard even the judicial 
attitude has also not been so encouraging. It has refused to issue mandamus to 
the government for the enforcement of amended article 22 (4) to (7) of the 
Constitution. 
No doubt, the Supreme Court has upheld X201 the Constitutional validity of the 
Terrorist and Disrurtive Activities (Prevention) Act, 19X7, popularly known as 
"TADA" preventive detention law. but it was considered as a "black law" and a 
large number of human rights violations were alleged under this preventive 
detention law. So much so that even the Home Minister Of the country 
conceded that TADA was used by the police in cases where the normal laws of 
the land could be applied. It was as good an admission as any that the 
draconian law was misused extensively. TADA was a convenient sledge 
hammer with which every "undesirable activity could be squashed TADA has 
been used against the agitating farmers, petty criminals, minors, women, trade 
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unionists and political opponents and thus their human rights have been 
violated. People belonging to the minority communities have come in for 
special attention. Since the onus of providing one's innocence lay on the 
victim, the jingle "fill it, shut it and forget it" very well applied to jails housing 
the TADA detenues. It may be noted that this Act was passed and supposed to 
be a temporary measure to deal with people like Punjab militants who operated 
beyond the pale of normal laws but over the years its use had been fully 
supplanted by its misuse. If there had been it breakdown of the judicial process 
which has rendered the regular laws at the land useless, the remedy did not lie 
in laws like TADA. There is need for strengthening the general policing 
system itself. With the large number of human rights violations.' under TADA, 
it had become a shame on our Constitutional democratic Republic where the 
human rights are of great Importance and must be protected in all cases. It was 
for this reason that the Parliament was forced not to extend it further. Now 
government has prevailed good sense and TADA is replaced. 
Freedom from exploitation, tight to freedom of religion and protection to the 
minorities by protecting their cultural and educational rights, has also been 
guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the painful gap between preachment 
and performance can be best stated in the Following words of Tolstoy: 
The abolition of Slavery has gone on for a long time. Rome abolished 
Slavery. America abolished it and we did but only the words were 
abolished, not the things.  
The bonded labour is still found in different parts of the country. However, the 
steps taken by the government and the judicial attitude in their identification, 
liberation and rehabilitation are on the happy note, 
The talk of human rights and declaring them as fundamental rights will be 
meaningless unless they can be enforced hy" effective machinery". If there is 
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no effective remedy against the violation of human rights, there are no 
effective human rights in the real sense. Article 32 of the Constitution provides 
an effective remedy against the violation of any of the fundamental rights. The 
Supreme Court has been conferred with the power to issue any order, direction 
or writ for the enforcement of the fundamental right. Thus, this constitutes a 
very important provision of the Indian Constitution. 
Another positive feature of' the Indian Constitution is that even during the 
emergency, the right to move to the Court for the enforcement of articles 20 
and 21, which confer the basic human rights, cannot be suspended. This 
safeguard is against the possibility of misuse of the power during the period of 
emergency. 
The Indian Constitution also contains a separate Part IV dealing with directive 
principles of state policy. This part of' the ('on1titutio►1 represents the "second 
generation" of human rights, i.e., economic, social and cultural rights. Though 
these directive principles of state policy are not enforceable yet it is the duty of 
all the three organs of' the state of apply them in the making of' laws. They 
serve as the guidelines for actions, on the part of all the three organs of the 
State. If the state takes any action which is contrary to the directive principles 
of state policy then the same may be declared as uflConstltutloflal. Though the 
Constitution contains a specific provision for free and compulsory education 
for children until they complete the age Of' fourteen years and this provision 
was supposed to be implemented within ten years from the commencement of 
the Constitution, yet it has not been implemented in its true spirit. It is 
suggested that this provision should be implemented in its true spirit and 
primary education must contain torrid about the human rights, because 
education lend dignity to a man. It seeks to build up the personality of the pupil 
by assisting his physical. intellectual, moral and emotional development. If the 
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children are made aware about the human rights then it will help in protecting 
and promoting the human rights of the future generation. 
In 1976, the Indian Constitution incorporated a specific provision for the 
protection and improvement of the environment. Thus. Indian Constitution is 
one of the very few constitution~ of the world in which the protection of the 
environment has been raised to the status of constitutional law. Irl other words. 
the Indian Constitution also contains provisions relating to the "third 
generation" of human rights which are very important not only from the 
individual point of view but also from the point of view of the community at 
large. 
It is worth noting that the Indian Constitution also put certain fundamental 
duties on the citizens of the country. The basic aim of these duties is to protect 
the human rights of the people and to enable other people to enjoy the benefit 
of Part III of the Constitution. 
India can feel proud of its independent judicial system. In fact, the 
independence of judiciary is the "live %\ ire" of our judicial system. The Indian 
Judiciary, particularly the Apex Court. has shown a lot of judicial activism and 
it has been performing positive and creati\'e function in the securing and 
promoting human rights to the people. The Supreme Court and the High Courts 
can pass any order, direction Or issue writ of any kind in appropriate cases. 
The Supreme Court can pass an order or decree which may be necessary for 
doing "complete justice" in any cause or matter before it. The judiciary has 
used these powers and interpreted the various constitutional provisions so as to 
ensure the protection of human rights to the people. 
One of the most important outcome of the judicial activism has been that the 
phrase "procedure established by law" in article ? 1 dealing with right to life 
and personal liberty has been interpreted to mean that both "procedure" as well 
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as "law" should be "just, fair and reasonable'. The Court rightly read articles 
14 and 19 of' the Constitution in article 21 in order to make the "procedure" 
under "procedure established by law" as "just. fair and reasonable". It was this 
new approach which has been applied by the ,judiciary to protect the human 
rights of the people. In this regard the following observations of Justice 
Krishna lyer are worth noting: 
The high value of' human dignity and the worth of human person enshrined in 
art. 21 read with arts. 14 and 19, obligates the State not to incarcerate except 
under law which is just. fair and reasonable in processual essence. 
The Apex Court, from A.K Gopalan to Kartar Singh through Ntancka Gandhi 
case has adopted a new approach to the expression "procedure established by 
law" which has marked water shed in the history of development of human 
rights In our country. This approach provides protection not only against 
executive action but also against legislation and any law, which deprives the 
person of' his human right, would he invalid unless it prescribes a procedure for 
such deprivation which is "reasonable, fair and just". 
Another important development which has come from the judicial platform 
through judicial activism is the "public, interest litigation'. Justice was only 
remote and theoretical proposition for the mass of' illiterate, underprivileged 
and exploited persons before public interest litigation Was made as a part of our 
constitutional jurisprudence through judicial activism. This new approach has 
given relief to the prisoners, under trials, workers, bonded labourers, women, 
children and many others who earlier- could not approach the Supreme Court 
due to ignorance of their rights or economic utr any other disability. The public 
interest litigation has not only liberalized the rule cif locus stands but it has also 
made possible to police the corridors of' power and prevented violation of 
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human rights. The importance of public interest litigation has rightly been 
explained by Justice Bhagwati in the following words: 
Public interest litigation is not in the nature of adversary litigation but it is a 
challenge and an opportunity to the government and its officers to make basic 
human rights meaningful to the deprived and vulnerable section of the 
community. 
Thus, the highest judiciary has used the instrument of' public interest 
litigation to allow the public spirited persons to come forward and become God 
Fathers for the protection of human rights of the poor and ignorant. The 
judiciary has also been very cautious in entertaining public interest litigations. 
from case to case it has evolved various principles. Frivolous or vexatious writ 
petitions in the name of public interest litigations, filed inala rule and arising 
out of enemity between the parties have not been allowed. In short, the 
concept of public interest litigation which has been fostered by judicial 
activism has become an increasingly important one setting up valuable and 
respectable records especially in the arena of human rights and particularly for 
the "unrepresented and under-represented." 
Personal liberty and human dignity are the most cherished values of our 
constitutional jurisprudence. They are the necessary epitomes which help in the 
development of an individual's personality and in the realization of human 
rights. The right to life under article 21 of' the Constitution means right to live 
with human dignity and free from all kinds of exploitations. Article 23 also 
prohibits traffic in human beings and he ''qctr or forced labour. But still various 
instances of bonded labour have been brought to the focus of' the Courts. 
Article 23 of the Constitution strikes at forced labour in whatever form it may 
manifest itself, because it is violative of human dignity and is contrary to basic 
human values. The Supreme Court from Bairclhera Mukti Murcha case to 
285 
Public Union for Civil Liberties has shown deep concern for the basic human 
rights of the bonded labourers and issued Suitable directions for ensuring the 
protection and promotion of their human rights to live with human dignity. 
Children constitute the weakest and most vulnerable section of human society. 
They become easy target for violation Of their human rights. The judiciary in 
India has shown deep concern for the protection of human rights of these 
children. The Court has directed that the children below the age of 14 years 
should not be employed in hazardcw, industries which threaten their life 
because of their tender age. 'l'he court has protected them from exploitation 
through the practice of inter-country adoption. They have been protected from 
exploitation in jail because incarceration in jail has a dehumanizing effect and 
it is harmful to the growth and development of children. The Court has also 
shown deep concern to the children of prostitute~. and prevented them from 
sexual assault. 
The judiciary has also followed the human rights approach to environment 
protection through various constitutional mandates. It has been rightly held that 
right to live in healthy environ merit is a part of right to life under article 21 of 
the Constitution. The Supreme Court has rightly observed: 
"In the context of our national dimensions of human rights, right to life, 
liberty, pollution free air and water is guaranteed by the Constitution under 
articles 21. 48-A and 51-A (g). It is the duty of the State to take effective steps 
to protect the guaranteed constitutional rights". 
The Supreme Court has also laid stress on the environmental education at all 
levels and thus judicial activism has led to the development of a new 
"environmental human rights jurisprudence" in India. 
The talk of human rights would become meaningless unless a person is 
provided with legal aid to enable him to have access to justice in case of 
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violation of his human rights. This is at formidable challenge in a country of 
India's size and heterogeneity where more than half of the population is steeped 
in poverty, destitution and illiteracy. The judiciary has again played an 
important role and expanded the scope of legal aid and held that it must be held 
to be implicit in article 21 of the Constitution and thus enforceable in the Court 
of law. It is a necessary .sine qua non of justice and where it is not provided. 
injustice is likely to result and undeniably every act of injustice corrodes the 
very foundation of democracy and rule of law. It has been rightly held that 
right to free legal aid is not conditional upon the application of the accused for 
such assistance. It is obligatory on the Magistrate or the Session Judge to 
inform the accused that he is entitled to free legal service at state expense. 
Otherwise, it would be mockery of legal aid if it were to be tell to a poor, 
ignorant and illiterate accused to ask for free legal aid. Further, competent 
advocates capable of handling complex cases and not the raw entrants to bar 
should be appointed as aniicus curiae. 
In most of the countries, human rights violations are generally due to police 
atrocities in one form or the other. The judicial activism has not only protected 
the human rights of the people in such cases but it has also led to the 
development of "exemplary compensation jurisprudence". 
In our submission_ whenever human rights violation takes place due to the 
atrocities by police, military or paramilitary forces then the persons involved 
for the violation of human rights or responsible for such atrocities should be 
personally held liable to pay the compensation to the victims. This will have 
some deterrent effect on them. In tuost of the case in which the Supreme 
Court has granted compensation to the victim of violation of human rights, it 
was left open to the government to initiate appropriate action against the guilty 
officials. It is submitted that it should not be left open to the government to 
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recover the amount of compensation front the guilty Officials. In fact he should 
be made "personally liable'. 
From the perusal of the various judicial decisions in which the Court has 
shown its judicial wisdom for protecting the people Irani violation of their 
human rights, it appears that everything is in order In India. However, the 
Court has itself admitted openly that it is heart-rending to note that day in and 
day out we come across with the news of blood curdling incidents of police 
brutality and atrocities. alleged to have been committed, in utter disregard and 
in all breaches of humanitarian law and universal human rights as well as In 
total negation of the Constitutional guarantees and human decency. 
A judicial system which provides for independent judges reveals, perhaps 
better than any other institution, the perfect equilibrium between liberty of the 
individual and the power of the State. We are proud of fact that the Court in 
India are sentinels on the qui-vile and guardians of human rights and common 
man looks upon them as' their protectors. The judges who man the Courts have 
to come far word openly whenever any act of violation of human rights is 
brought to their knowledge. Even the government officials should take steps in 
protecting and promoting the human rights and whenever any human rights 
violation is brought to their notice, they should intervene immediately to 
protect such violation of human rights. 
It is also becoming increasingly evident that human rights observance is a 'sine 
quo non' of economic development as well as an integral part of good 
governance and democratic development and "National Human Rights 
Institutions" are a necessary corollary of the democratic machinery of the 
government. They are a means of democratic empowerment for those who are 
less powerful and less advantaged. 
In India various abortive attempts have been made from 1968 to 1989 to 
establish the institution of Lokpal (Ombudsman) in the centre by introducing 
different Bills in the Parliament. After massive public movement led by Anna 
Hazare the present government passed the Lokpal Bill from both house of the 
parliament and it is with the President for ascent. It is heartening to note that 
some states have established the Lok Avukta at their own state level. 
However, in order to meet the national as well as international demand for the 
constitution of Human Rights Commission, the Indian Parliament passed "The 
Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993`. The National Human Rights 
Commission has already been established. But [he States have yet to establish 
'State Human Rights Commissions'. It is suggested that ' State Human Rights 
Commissions" should also be established at the earliest. Because it may not be 
possible for one single Human Rights Institution to deal with all the complaints 
of human rights violation. In a very short span of time the National Human 
Rights Commission has been receiving many complaints of human rights 
violation from all parts of the country and its work load has already increased 
beyond proportions. Thus, it becomes all the more necessary to establish "State 
Human Rights Commissions" at the earliest. 
The present National human Rights Commission, with Justice Ranganath 
Misra as its Chairperson, has already started showing positive results. When 
Amnesty International criticized India on the question of human rights 
violation, particularly in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and in North-Eastern 
States, Justice Ranganath Misra rightly advised the government to allow 
Amnesty to send its team to those states to see how the law is operating there 
amidst the chaos created by terrorists and sub-versionists. His approach, it is 
submitted, is not merely moralistic but a[ao it is pragmatic and transparently 
honest. Justice Misra wanted Amnesty to visit Kashmir and see the plight of 
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the victims who do not figurcin its assessments of "the criminality of Indian 
State'. They are the terrorists victims-civil, military and paramilitary, besides 
hapless citizens. Justice Misra has ,one to the extent of saying that if the 
government does not ask the Amnesty International to visit Kashmir, he would 
extend a "personal invitation" to its members to colic and see how 
Commission functions. The approach of the Chairperson of the Commission is 
open and positive and it must he welcomed. 
Militancy is a violent curse. Its votaries choose their time and target. They kill. 
maim incapacitate and disappear. Those who have to take stock of the situation 
after such incidents are expected to react ti ith restraint. They ought to allow 
the legal system to absorb the shocks of the tragedies and act according to the 
provisions in the rule book. 
Many a time in human history, great societies have crumbled into oblivion 
through their failure to realize the significance of crisis situations operating 
within them. In this regard Justice Pandian has rightly remarked: 
"True, our is a country which stands tallest even in troubled times, the 
country that clings to fundamental principle', Of human rights, the 
country that cherishes its constitutional heritage and rejects simple 
solutions that comp rotated the value~ that lie at the root of our 
democratic system. 
We have number of policies, programs and planned activities undertaken by 
the government for human rights protection. It is also to he understood that 
human rights protection becomes it priority need due to the acts of all of us that 
is the human beings. It may be said that the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms recognized by the Indian ('onstitution and relevant laws are being 
protected enforced by the forward looking legislature, dynamic executive and 
by the independent judiciary. 
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Judicial activism is not opium but a pervasive power and a 'brooding 
omnipresence'. Even on environmental conservation and right to education, 
bonded labour, gender justice, p.tedo- justice and free legal aid while in state 
custody, judicial activism has enlivened life and liberty and made the court a 
power at the service of the people. The judge is no 'ineffectual angel' in the 
presence of rank injustice nor indeed is he it knight errant adventuring for 
pleasure into forbidden fields. Law jurisprudence to uphold rights and liberties 
necessitates the adoption of it different approach by the judiciary, while 
grappling with issues of public importance. The court looks to the provisions 
of the constitution for guidance. Part IV of the constitution, which contains the 
Directive Principles of State Policy, is ol specific importance while dealing 
with public law litigation. Let us look at a final instance. Article 37 of the 
Indian Constitution states that the principles enshrined in Part IV is 
fundamental for the governance of the country and the state is duty-bound to 
implement them. In practice, however sufficient effort has not been initiated to 
implement most of these principles. Article 45 is a case in point. It required the 
state to set up within 10 years a system to provide free and compulsory 
education to all children below 14 years. After more than 30 years beyond the 
prescribed 10-year period. when the Supreme Court realized that this objective 
remained unfulfilled, it considered the right to education an element of the 
right to life guaranteed by Article 21 and directed its compliance. When 
dereliction of constitutional obligations and gross violations of human rights 
are brought to the notice of the court, it is expected to act and act purposively 
and positively to provide relief, real and not illusory, to the parties who seek 
enforcement of their fundamental right. We must pay heed to Justice Cardozo's 
wise observation that the philosophy of common law has at its heart, the 
philosophy of pragmatism. Its thrust is relative, not absolute. Judges must not 
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throw to the winds the ad v antages of consistency and uniformity to do justice 
in the particular case. The judge's task is particularly difficult in the field of 
public interest litigation. That is because in a large number of such cases the 
material is wanting and whatever little material is placed, is usually unfiltered. 
The entire proceeding tends to become inquisitorial in character with the judge, 
or judges. playing a pro-active, participatory role. The role of the judiciary is 
extremely delicate in such cases because it must not appear to be playing to the 
gallery or playing a role which may he described as partisan. Great care must 
be taken to ensure that while the judge or judges play a participatory role, they 
do not appear to be entering the arena or give the impression of bias to the 
opposite party. It must also be realized that the position of the opposite party in 
such cases is precarious, in that, it has to meet with al(e`gations, which are 
incomplete and often half-baked. Therefore, while in public interest litigations 
the opposite party is always at the receiving end, a fair chance to put forth its 
defense must be ensured to such a party. and the judge or judges hearing such 
cases, not give the impression that they have prejudged that issue. That is the 
caution which the judge or judge, must administer unto himself/herself and 
exercise jurisdiction. It i5 indeed true that. Of late. ivany issues that can be 
described as socio-political or religio-political or eco-political arc brought to 
court. Some of them do have far-reaching consequences and affect the social 
fabric of the nation. Courts have, fortunately, while trying to steer clear of 
areas falling within the political thickets, not hesitated to exercise jurisdiction 
in appropriate cases. The courts have taken up causes of the poor. the 
underprivileged and the exploited, often acting on newspaper reports. 
Upholding, the rule of law, it has made human rights accessible to some of the 
most marginalized sections of the Indian citizenry. And this is no mean 
achievement. There can be no doubt that the judiciary should he in the 
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forefront of humanity's repudiation of such acts of terror perpetrated on certain 
segments of the citizen. In fact, judges by their oath are obliged to do so. In the 
conscientious exercise of that discretion by juddgges, Ties the guarantee of the 
proper governance of the country as it democratic nature of equal citizens 
whose rights and freedoms are effectively protected by the rule of law. 
Besides. there is need for good governance and effective cooperation 
with governmental organizations in implementing programmes for the 
protection of human rights in India. Last but not the least, there is need for a 
broad-based and united people's movement along with effective jurisprudence 
to act promptly on matters that affect the masses. 
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Appendix 1 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Preamble 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights 
cif all members of' the human fai»hy is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace 
in the world. Whereas disregard and contempt f'cn- human rights have resulted in 
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of it 
world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of' speech and belief and 
freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of' the 
common people, 
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last 
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should he 
protected by the rule of law. W 'hereas it is essential to promote the development of 
friendly relations between nations, 
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person 
and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social 
progress and better standards of' life in larger freedom, 
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with 
the United Nations, the promotion of' universal respect f'or and observance of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
Whereas a common understanding of' these rights and Freedoms is of the greatest 
importance for the full realization of this pledge, 
Now, therefore. 
The General Assembly. 
Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Ilunman Rights as it common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and 
every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by 
teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by 
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and 
effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States 
themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction. 
Article I 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignit} and rights. They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and Should act towards one another in it spirit of 
brotherhood. 
Article 2 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms Set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, Such as race, colour, ,ex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, 
jurisdictional or international status ot the country or territory to which a person 
belongs, whether it is independent, trust. non-self-governing or under any other 
limitation of sovereignty. 
Article 3 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security cat person. 
Article 4 
No one shall he held in slavery or servitude: slavery and the slave trade shall be 
prohibited in all their forms. 
Article 5 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
Article 6 
f:\eryone has the right to recognition everywhere ati a person before the law. 
Article 7 
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal 
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination 
in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination. 
Article 8 
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals 
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law. 
Article 9 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. 
Article 10 
Everyone is entitled in lull equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent 
and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any 
criminal charge against him. 
Article 11 
I. Everyone charged with it penal offence has the right to he presumed innocent 
until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the 
guarantees necessary for his defense. 
2. No one shall he held guilty Of any penal oft*ence can account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a penal Offence, under national or international 
law. at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed 
than the one that was applicable at the time the penal off -once was committed. 
Article 12 
No one shall he subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home 
or correspondence. nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the 
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
Article 13 
1. Everyone has the right to treedom of movement and residence within the 
borders oti each State. 
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country. including his own, and to return to 
his country. 
Article 14 
1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution. 
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from 
non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations. 
Article 15 
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to 
change his nationality. 
Article 16 
1. Men and women of full age. without any limitation due to race, nationality or 
religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal 
rights as to marriage, during marriage and at Its dissolution. 
2. Marriage shall he entered into only with the free and full consent of the 
intending spouses. 
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State. 
Article 17 
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well its in association with 
others. 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
Article 18 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought. conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
Article 19 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression: this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
Article 20 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association. 
Article 21 
I. Everyone has the right to take hart in the `1uverninent of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives. 
2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country. 
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will 
shall he expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting 
procedures. 
Article 22 
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security' and is entitled to 
realization. through national ct tort arid international co-operation and in 
accordance with the organization and resources of each State. of the economic, 
social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of 
his personality. 
Article 23 
1. Everyone has the ri,:ht to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. 
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. 
3. Everyone who works has the right to lust and tavourablc remuneration ensuring 
for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity. and 
supplemented, it' necessary. by Other means of social protection. 
4. Everyone has the right to fr)rn) and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests. 
Article 24 
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of 
working hours and periodic holidays with pay. 
Article 25 
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of' living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his t'a►uily. including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness. disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood 
in circumstances beyond his control. 
~. A1otherhuud and Ehil dhood .►rC entitled lei ape 1al care and atisist ui e. All 
children, whether born in or out ul edlock, shall enjoy the same social protection. 
Article 26 
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall he free, at least in the 
elementary and fundamental staves. Elementary education shall he compulsory. 
Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher 
education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. 
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and 
to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall 
promote understanding. tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or 
religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the 
maintenance of peace. 
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind cif education that shall he given to 
their children. 
Article 27 
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, 
to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of' the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the 
author. 
Article 28 
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can he full\ rcalired. 
Article 29 
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible. 
?. 
 
In the exercise of his rights and f'reedonn,, everyone shall he subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely f -ur the purpose of' securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the 
just requirements of morality. public order and the general welfare in a democratic 
society. 
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations. 
Article 30 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity ur to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction cif any of the rights and treedonts set forth herein. 
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CttA1'IF:R I 
PRELIMINARY 
1. Short title, extent and commencement 
(1) This Act may be called the Proecni of Human Rights Act. 
1993.' 
(2) It extends to the whole of India. 
Provided that it shall apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir only 
in so far as it pertains to the matters relatable to any of the entries 
enumerated in List I or List Ill in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution 
as applicable to that State 
(3) It shalt be deemed to have come into force on the 28th day of 
September, 1993. 
2. Definitions 
(1) 	In this Act, unless the context utherwtse requires- 
(a) "armed forces' means the naval rnilit~try an;l air forces and 
includes any other armed forces of the Union: 
(b) "Chairperson ' means the Chairperson of the Commission 
or of the State Commission, as the case may be; 
(c) "Commission" means the National I iuman Rights 
Commission under section 3. 
(d) "human rights" means the rights relating to life. liberty, 
equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the 
Constitution or embodiec in the International Covenants 
and enforceable by courts in India. 
(e) "Human Rights Court" means the Human Rights Court 
specified under section 30: 
(() 
	
	"International Covenants" means the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social arid Cultural rights adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on the 16th 
Amended vide Protection of Human Rights lAmenci:nent) Act. 2006 (No. 43 of 2006) 
December. 1966 (arid such other Covenant or 
Convention adopted by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations as the Centrai Government 
may: by notification. spec,fv I' 
(c) "Member ineans a Memoer of the Commission or 
of the State Commission. as the case may bet; 
(h) "National Commission for Minorities means the 
National Commission for Minorities constituted 
under section 3 of the National Commission for 
Minorities Act. 1992; 
(i) "National Commission for the Scheduled Castes' 
means the National Commission for the Scheduled 43 of 2006 
Castes referred to in Article 338 of the Constitution'; 
(ia) `National Commission for the Scheduled Tribes 
means the National Commission for the Scheduled 43 of 2006 
Tribes referrad to in Article 338A of the Constitution2 ; 
(j) "National Commission for Women" means the 
National Commission for Women constituted under 20 of 1990 
section 3 of the National Commission for Women 
Act. 1990; 
(k) Notification" means a notification published in the 
official Gazette; 
(1) 	"Prescribed' means prescribed by rules made under 
this Act; 
(m) Public servant' shall have the meaning assigned 	45 of 1860 
to it in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. 
(n) 'State Commission" means a State Human Rights 
Commission constituted under section 21. 
(2) Any reference in this Act to a '.aw, which is not in force 
in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. shall, in relation to that State. 
be construed as a referer.ce to a corresponding law, if any. in force 
in that State 
Added by Act 43 of 2006 
Subs. by Act 413 of 2006 
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CHAPTF.R II 
THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMISSION 
3. Constitution of a National human Rights Commission 
(1) The Central Government shall const'.iute a body to be known 
as the National Human Rights Commission to exercise the powers conferred 
upon, and to perform the functions assigned to it. under this Act. 
(2) The Commission shall consist of: 
(a) a Chairperson who has been a Chief Justice of the 
Supren;e Court. 
(b) one Member who is or has been, a Judge of the Supreme 
Court. 
(c) one Member who is, or has been. the Chief Justice of a 
High Court: 
(a) two Members to be appointed from amongst persons 
having knowledge of, or practical experience in, matters 
relating to human rights. 
(3) The Chairperson of the National Commission for Minorities, 
'(the National Commission for the Scheduled Castes. the National Commission 
for the Scheduled Tribes[and the National Commission for Women shall 
be deemed to be Members of the Commission for the discharge of functions 
specified in clauses (b) to (j) of section 12 
(4) There shall be a Secretary-General who shall be the Chief 
Executive Officer of the Commission and shall exercise such powers and 
discharge such functions of the Commission2 [except judicial functions and 
the power to make regulations under section 40 B[. as may be delegated 
to him by the Commission or the Chairperson as the case may be 
Subs. by Act 43 of 2006 .`or The National Commission to -the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes 
Subs by Act 43 of 2006 for 	it rr,ay delegate :o fun, 
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(5) The headquarters of the Commission shall be at Delhi and the 
Commission may. with the previous approval of the Central Government. 
establish offices at other places in India. 
4. Appointment of Chairperson and other Members 
(1) The Chairperson and the Memners shall be appointed by the 
President by warrant under his hand and seal. 
Provided that every appointment under this sub-section shall be made 
after obtaining the recommendations of a Committee consisting of– 
(a) The Prime Minister — Chairperson 
(b) Speaker of the House of the People -- Member 
(c) Minister in-charge of the Ministry of Horne Affairs in the 
Government of India — Member 
(d) Leader of the Opposition in the House of the People -- Member 
(e) Leader of the Opposition in the Council of States — Member 
(f) Deputy Chairman of the Council of States -- Member 
Provided further that rio sitting Judge of the Supreme Court or sitting 
Chief Justice of a High Court shall be appointed except after consultation 
with the Chief Justice of India 
(2) No appointment of a Chairperson or a Member shall be invalid 
merely by reason of any [vacancy of any member in the Committee referred 
to in the first proviso to sub-section (1112 
S. Resignation and removal of Chairperson and Members' 
(1) The Chairperson or any Member may, by notice ir: writing under 
his hand addressed to the President of India. resign his office 
(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), the Chairperson or 
any Member shall only be removed from his office by order of the President 
of India on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity after the 
Supreme Court. on reference being made to it by the President, has, on 
inquiry held in accordance with the procedure prescribed in that behalf by 
Subs. by Act 43 of 2006 for "other members 
Subs. by Act 43 of 2006 for 'vacancy in the Co:nminve" 
• Subs by Act 43 of 2006 
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the Supreme Court. reported that the Chairperson or the Member, as the 
case may be. ought on any such ground to be removed 
(3) Notwithstanding anything it sub-section (2), the President may, 
by order, remove from office the Chairperson or any Member if the 
Chairperson or such Member, as the case may be- 
(a) is adjudged an insolvent, or 
(b) engages during his term of office in any paid employment outside 
the duties of his office; or 
(c) is unfit to continue in office by reason of infirmity of mind or 
body; or 
(d) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; 
or 
(e) is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for an offence which 
in the opinion of the President involves moral turpitude. 
6. Term of office of Chairperson and Members' 
(1) A person appointed as Chairperson shall hold office for a term 
of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office or until he 
attains the age of seventy years. whichever is earlier. 
(2) A person appointed as a Member shall hold office for a term 
of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office and shall 
be -eligible for re-appointment for another term of five years. 
Provided that no Member shall hold office after he has attained the 
age of seventy years. 	 r 
(3) On ceasing to hold office, a Chairperson or a Member shall be 
ineligible for further employment under the Government of India or under 
the Government o! any State 
7. Member to act as Chairperson or to discharge his -functions 
in certain circumstances 
(1) 	In the event o the occurrence of any vacancy in the office of 
the Chairperson by reason of his death, resignation or otherwise. the 
' Subs. by Act 43 of 2006 
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President may. by notification. authorise one of the Members to act as the 
Chairperson until the appointment of a new Chairperson to fill such 
vacancy. 
(2) When the Chairperson is unable to discharge his functions owing 
to absence on leave or otherwise, such one of the Members as the President 
may, by notification. authorise in this behalf. shall discharge the functions 
of the Chairperson until the date on which the Chairperson resumes his 
duties. 
8. Terms and conditions of service of Chairperson and 
Members 
The salaries and allowances payable to, and other terms and 
conditions of service of, the' [Chairperson arid] Members shall be such as 
may be prescribed. 
Provided that neither the salary and allowances nor the other terms 
and.conditions of service of [the Chairperson or) a Member shall be varied 
to his disadvantage after his appointment 
9. Vacancies, etc., not to invalidate the proceedings of the 
Commission 
No act or proceedings of the Commission shah be questioned or shall 
be invalidated merely on the ground of existence of any vacancy or defect 
in the constitution of the Comm;ssion 
10. Procedure to be regulated by the Commission 
(1) The Commission shall meet at such time and place as the 
Chairperson may think fit. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made 
thereunder, the Commission shall have the power to lay down by regulations 
its own procedure'. 
inserted by Act 43 of 2UU6 
Inserted by Act 43 of 2006 
Subs by Act 43 of 2006 
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(3) All orders and decisions of the Commission shall be authenticated 
by the Secretary-General or any other officer of the Commission duly 
authorised by the Chairperson in t:nis behalf 
1I. Officers and other staff of the Commission 
(1) The Central Government shall make available to the Commission: 
(a) an, officer of the rank of the Secretary to the Government 
of India who shall be the Secretary-General of the 
Commission. and 
(b) such police and investigative staff under an officer not 
below the rank of a Director General of Police and such 
other officers and staff as may be necessary for the efficient 
performance of the functions of the Commission. 
(2) Subject to such rules as may be made by the Central Government 
in this behalf, the Commission may appoint such other administrative, 
technical and scientific staff as it may consider necessary. 
(3) The salaries, allowances and conditions of service of the officers 
and other staff appointed under sub-section (2) shall be such as may be 
prescribed 
7 
Ct <Awnat 111 
FUNCTIONS AND POWERS 
OF THE COMMISSION 
12. Functions of the Commission 
The Commissioi; stiail perform a.l or any of the following functions, 
namely: - 
(a) 	inquire, suo motu or on a petition presented to it by a victim 
or any person on his behalf for on a direction or order of any 
court, into complaint of 
(i) violation of human rights or abetment thereof; or 
(ii) negligence in the prevention of such violation. 
by a public servant: 
(b) 	intervene in any proceeding involving any allegation of violation 
of human rights pending before a court with the approval of such 
court; 
(c}2  visit, notwithstanding anything contained to any other law for the 
time being in force. any Jail or other institution under the control 
of the State Government. where persons are detained or lodged 
for purposes of treatment. reformation or protection, for the 
study of the living conditions of the inmates thereof and make 
recommendations thereon to the Government; 
(d) review the safeguards provided by or under the Constitution or 
any law for the time being in force for the protection of human 
nghts and recommend measures for their effective implementation; 
(e) review the factors, including acts of terrorism that inhibit the 
enjoyment of human rights and recommend appropriate remedial 
measures: 
Inserted by Act 43 of 2000 
7 Sub. by Act 43 of 2006 
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(f) study treaties and other international instruments on human 
rights and make recommendations (or their effective 
implementation; 
(g) unc:ertake and promote research in the field of human rights; 
(h) spread human rights literacy among various sections of society 
and promote awareness of the safeguards available for the 
protection of these rights through publications, the media, 
seminars and other available means. 
(i) encourage the efforts of non-governmental organisations and 
institutions working in the field of human rights: 
0) 	such other functions as it may consider necessary for the 
protection of human rights 
13. Powers relating to inquiries 
(1) The Commission shall, while inquiring into complaints under this 
Act, have all the powers of a civil court trying a suit under the Code of 
Civil Procedure, 1908, and in particular in respect of the following matters, 
namely : 
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and 
examining there on oath; 
(b) discovery and production of any document. 
(c) receiving evidence on affidavits; 
(d) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court 
or office: 
(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or 
documents; 
(f) any other matter which may be prescribed. 
(2) The Commission shall have power to require any person, subject 
to any privilege which may be claimed by that person under any law for 
the time being in force, to furnish information on such points or matters 
as, in the opinion of the Commission, may be useful for, or relevant to, 
the subject matter of the inquiry and any person so required shall be deemed 
M 
to be legally bound to furnish such information within the meaning of section 
176 and section 177 of the Indian Penal Code. 
(3) The Commission or any other officer. not below the rank of a 
Gazetted Officer, specially authorised in this behalf by the Commission may 
enter any building or place where the Commission has reason to believe 
that any document relating to the subject matter of the inquiry may be found, 
and may seize any such document or take extracts or copies therefrom 
subject to the provisions of section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1973, in so far as it may be applicable. 
(4) The Commission shall be deemed to be a civil court and when 
any offence as is described in section 175. section 178,.section 179, section 
180 or section 228 of the Indian Penal Code is committed in the view or 
presence of the Commission, the Commission may, after recording the facts 
constituting the offence and the statement of the accused as provided for 
.n the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973. forward the case to a Magistrate 
having jurisdiction to try the same and the Magistrate to whom any such 
case is forwarded shall proceed to hear the complaint against the accused 
as if the case has been forwarded to him under section 346 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure. 1973 
(5) Every proceeding before the Commission shall be deemed to be 
a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for 
the purposes of section 196. of the Indian Penal Code, and the Commission 
shall he deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of section 195 and 
Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
(6)' Where the Commission considers it necessary or expedient so 
to do, it may. by order. transfer any complaint filed or pending before it 
to the State Commission of the State from which the complaint arises, for 
disposal in accordance with the provisions of this Act, 
Provided that no such complaint shall be transferred unless the same 
is one respecting which the State Commission has jurisdiction to entertain 
the same. 
• Inserted by Act 43 of 2006 
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(7) 	Every complaint transferred under sub-section(6) shall be dealt 
with and disposed of by the State Commission as if it were a complaint 
initially filed before it 
14. Investigation 
(1) 	The Cann)issiOn rnay. 1c' the tr .rpose c>` cnducting any 
investigation pertaining to the inquiry, utilise the services of any officer or 
investigation agency of the Central Government or any State Government 
with the concurrence of the Central Gcverrunen: or the State Government. 
as the case may be. 
(2) 	For the purpose of investigating into any matter pertaining to 
the inquiry, any officer or agency whose services are utilised under sub-
section (1) may, subject to the direction and control of the Commission:- 
(a) summon and enforce the attendance of any person and examine 
him; 
(b) require the discovery and production of any document; and 
(c) requisition any public record or copy thereof from any office. 
(3) The provisions of section 15 shall apply in relation to any 
statement made by a person before any officer or agency whose services 
are utilised under sub-section (1) as they apply in relation to any statement 
made by a person in the course of giving evidence before the Commission. 
(4) The officer or agency whose services are utilised under sub-
section (1) shall investigate into any matter pertaining to the inquiry and 
submit a report thereon to the Commission within such period as may be 
specified by the Commission in this behalf. 
(5) The Commission shall satisfy itself about the correctness of the 
facts stated and the conclusion, if any, arrived at in the report submitted 
to it under sub-section (4) and for this purpose the Commission may make 
such inquiry (including the examination of the person or persons who 
conducted or assisted in the investigation) as it thinks fit. 
Inserted by Act 43 of 2006 
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15. Statement made by persons to the Commission 
No statement nude by a person in the course of giving evidence before 
the Commission shall subject him to. or be used against him ;n. any civil 
or criminal proceeding ex.:ept a prosecution for giving false evidence by 
such statement: 
Provided that the stateinent:- 
(a) is made in reply to the question which he is required by the 
Commission to answer- or 
(b) is relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry. 
16. Persons likely to be prejudicially affected to be heard 
If, at any stage of the inquiry, the Commission:- 
(a) considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person: 
or 
(b) is of the opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to 
be prejudicially affected by the inquiry. 
it shall give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in 
the inquiry and to produce evidence in his cefence: 
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply where the credit of 
a witness is being impeached. 
12 
CNAt>1FR IV 
PROCEDURE 
17. Inquiry into complaints 
The Commission while inquiring into the complaints of violations of 
human rights may-- 
U) 	call for information or report from the Central Government or 
any State Government or any other authority or organisation subordinate 
thereto within such time as may be specified by it 
Provided that- 
(a) if the information or report is not received within the time 
stipulated by the Commission, it may proceed to inquire into the 
complaint on its own: 
(b) if, or receipt of information or report, the Commission is 
satisfied either that no further inquiry is required or that the 
required action has been initiated or taken by the concerned 
Government or authority it may not proceed with the complaint 
and inform the complainant accordingly:' 
(ii) 	without prejudice to anything contained in clause (i), if it 
considers necessary. having regard to the nature of the complaint, initiate 
an inquiry. 
18. Steps during and after inquiry' 
(The Commission may take any of the following steps during or upon 
the completion of an inquiry held under this Act, namely:- 
a) where the inquiry discloses the commission of violation of human 
rights or negligence in the prevention of violation of human rights or 
abetment thereof by a public servant. it may recommend to the concerned 
Government or authority - 
(i) 	to make payment of compensation or damages to the complainant 
Subs. by Act 43 of 2006 
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or to the victim or the members of his family as the Commission 
may consider necessary: 
(ii) to initiate proceedings for prosecution or such other suitable 
action as the Commission may deem fit against the concerned 
person or persons: 
(iii) to take such further action as it may think fit: 
(b) approach the Supreme Court or the High Court concerned for 
such directions, orders or writs as that Court may deem necessary: 
(c) recommend to the concerned Government or authority at any 
stage of the inquiry for the grant of such immediate interim relief to the 
victim or the members of his family as the Commission may consider 
necessary: 
(d) subject to the provisions of clause (e), provide a copy of the 
inquiry report to the petitioner or his representative; 
(e) the Commission shall send a copy of its inquiry report together 
with its recommendations to the concerned Gc,ernfnent or authority and 
the concerned Government or authority shall, w:tfr:n a period of one month, 
or such further time as the Commission may al ow. forward its comments 
on the report, including the action taken or proposed to be taken thereon, 
to the Commission: 
(f) the Commission shall publish its Inquiry report together with the 
comments of the concerned Government or auttrority, if any, and the action 
taken or proposed to be taken by the concerned Government or authority 
on the recommendations of the Commiss:on.j' 
19. Procedure with respect to armed forces 
(1) 	Nolwithstarrcliract anything contained in this Act. while dealing 
with complaints of violation of human rights by members of the armed 
forces. the Commission shall adopt the following procedure, namely 
(a) 	it may, either on its own motion or on receipt of a petition, seek 
a report from the Central Government, 
' Subs. by Act 43 of 2006 
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(b) 	after the receipt of the report, it may, either not proceed with 
the complaint or. as the case may be, make its recommendations 
to that Government. 
(2) The Central Government shall inform the Commission of the 
action taken on the recommendations within three months or such further 
time as the Commission may allow. 
(3) The Commission shall publish its report together with its 
recommendations made to the Central Government and the action taken 
by that Government on such recommendations. 
(4) The Commission shall provide a copy of the report published 
under sub-section (3) to the petitioner or his representative. 
20. Annual and special reports of the Commission 
(1) The Commission shall submit are annual report to the Central 
Government and to the State Government concerned and may at any time 
submit special reports on any matter which, in its opinion, is of such urgency 
or. importance that it should not be deferred till submission of the annual 
report. 
(2) The Central Government and the State Government, as the case 
may be. shall cause the annual and special reports of the Commission to 
be laid before each House of Parliament or the State Legislature respectively. 
as the case may be. along with a memorandum of action taken or proposed 
to be taken on the recommendations of the Commission and the reasons 
for non-acceptance of the recommendations, if any. 
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CHAPTER V 
STATE HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMISSIONS 
21. Constitution of State Human Rights Commissions 
(1) A State Government may const:iute a body to be known as the 
................ I ..... (name of the State) Human Rights Commission to exercise 
the powers conferred upon. and to perform the functions assigned to. a 
State Commission under this chapter. 
(2)' (The State Commission shall, with effect from such date as the 
State Government may by notification specify, consist of— 
(a) a .Chairperson who has been a Chief Justice of a High Court; 
(b) one Member who is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court or 
District Judge in the State with a minimum of seven years 
experience as District Judge: 
(c) one Member to be appointed from amongst persons having 
knowledge of, or practi.al experience in, matters relating to 
human rights]: 
(3) There shall be a Secretary who shall be the Chief Executive 
Officer of the State Commission and shall exercise such powers and 
discharge such functions of the State Commission as it may delegate to him 
(4) The headquarters of the State Commission shall be at such place 
as the State Government may, by notification. specify. 
(5) A State Commission may inquire into violation of human rights 
only in respect of matters relatable to any of the entries enumerated in List 
I1 and List Ill in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution: 
Subs by Act 43 of 2006 
Provided that if any such matter is already being inquired into by the 
Commission or any other Commission duly constituted under any law for 
the time being in force, the State Commission shall not inquire into the 
said matter: 
Provided further that in relation to the Jarnmu and Kashmir Human 
Rights Commission, this sub-section shall have effect as if for-the words 
and figures "List 11 and List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution", 
the words and figures "List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution 
as applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and in respect of matters 
in relation to which the Legislature of that State has power to make laws" 
had been substituted. 
(6) (Two or more State Governments may, with the consent of a 
Chairperson or Member of a State Commission. appoint such Chairperson 
or, as the case may be, such Member of another State Commission 
simultaneously if such Chairperson or Member consents to such 
appointment: 
Provided that every appointment made under this sub-section shall 
be made after obtaining the recommendations of the Committee referred 
to in sub-section(1) of section 22 in respect of the State for which a 
common Chairperson of Member, or both, as the case may be, is to be 
appointed.]' 
22. Appointment of Chairperson and (Mernbersf of State 
Commission 
(1) The Chairperson and IMembersl2 shall be appointed by the 
Governor by warrant under his hand and seal 
Provided that every appointment under this sub-section shall be made 
after obtaining the recornrriendatien of , Committee consisting of 
(a) the Chief Minister -- Chairperson 
(b) Speaker of the Legislative Assembly — Member 
Subs. by Act 43 of 2006 
Subs. by Act 43 of 2006 for "other Merntx:rs' 
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(c) Minister in-charge of the Department of Home. in that State - 
Member 
(d) Leader of the Opposition in the Leqislat:ve Assembly — Member 
Provided further that where there is a Legislative Council in a State, 
the Chairman of that Council and the Leader of the Opposition in that 
Council shall also be members of the Committee 
Provided also that no sitting Judge of a High Court or a sitting District 
Judge shall be appointed except after consultation with the Chief Justice 
of the High Court of the concerned State. 
(2) No appointment of a Chairperson or a Member of the State 
Commission shall be invalid merely by reason of (any vacancy of any 
Member in the Committee referred to in sub-section(1)1. t 
23. [Resignation and Removal of Chairperson or a Member of 
the State Commissionjl 
't(1) The Chairperson or a Member of a State Commission may. 
by notice in writing under his hand addressed to the Governor, resign his 
office 
(1A) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), the Chairperson or 
any Member of the State Commission shall only be removed from his office 
by order of the President on the ground of proved misbehaviour or 
incapacity after the Supreme Court, on a reference being made to it by 
the President, has. on inquiry held in accordance with the procedure 
prescribed in that behalf by the Supreme Court. reported that the 
Chairperson or such Member. as the case may be. ought on any such ground 
to be removed.] 
(2) 	Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (IA), the President may 
by order remove from office the Chairperson or any (Memberl4 if the 
Chairperson or such (Member], as the case may be - 
(a) 	is adjudged an insolvent; or 
Subs. by Act 43 of 2006 for ' any vacancy in the Committee 
2 Subs by Act 43 of 2006 for ' Removal of a member of the State Commission 
Subs by Act 43 of 2006 
Subs by Act 43 of 2006 for 'ocher member° 
S Subs by Act 43 of 2006 for other rnember 
(b) engages during his term of office in any paid employment outside 
the duties of his office: or 
(c) is unfit to continue in office by reason of infirmity of mind or 
body; or 
(d) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; 
or 
(e) is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for an offence which 
in the opinion of the President involves moral turpitude. 
24. Term of office of (Chairperson and)' Members of the State 
Commission 
(1) A person appointed as Chairperson shall hold office for a term 
of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office or until he 
attains the age of seventy years, whichever is earlier, 
(2) A person appointed as a Member shall hold office for a term 
of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office and shall 
be eligible for re-appointment for another term of five years: 
Provided that no Member shall hold office after he has attained the 
age of seventy years. 
(3) On ceasing to hold office, a Chairperson or a Member shall be 
ineligible for further employment under the Government of a State or under 
the Government of India 
25. Member to act as Chairperson or to discharge his functions 
in certain circumstances 
(1) In the event of the occurrence of any vacancy in the office of 
the Chairperson by reason of his death, resignation or otherwise, the 
Governor may, by notification, authorise one of the Members to act as the 
Chairperson until the appointment of a new Chairperson to fill such 
vacancy. 
' Inserted by Act 43 of 2006 
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(2) When the Chairperson is unable to discharge his functions owing 
to absence on leave or otherwise. such one of the Members as the Governor 
may. by notification. authorise in this behalf, shall discharge the functions 
of the Chairperson untii the date on which the Cha~rtzerson resumes his 
duties. 
26. (Terms and conditions of service of Chairperson and 
Members of the State Commissions 
The salaries and 3llcowances payable to, and other terms and 
conditions of service of, the Chairperson and Members shall be such as may 
be prescribed by the State Government: 
Provided that neither the salary and allowances nor the other terms 
and conditions of service of the Chairperson or a Member shall be varied 
to his disadvantage after his appotntmen, J' 
27. Officers and other staff of the State Commission 
(1) The State Government shall make available .o the Commission 
(a) an officer not below the rank of a Secretary to the State 
Government who shall be the Secretary of the State Commission; 
and 
(b) such police and investigative staff under an officer not below the 
rank of an Inspector General of Police and such other officers 
and staff as may be necessary for the efficient performance of 
the functions of the State Commission. 
(2) subject to such rules as may he made by the State Government 
in this behalf, the State Commission may appoint such other addministrative, 
technical and scientific staff as it may consider necessary. 
(3) The salaries, allowances and conditions of service of the officers 
and other staff appointed under sub-section (2) shall be such as may be 
prescribed by the State Government. 
' Subs. by Act 43 of 2000 
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28. Annual and special reports of State Commission 
(1) The State Commission shall submit an annual report to the State 
Government and may at any time submit special reports on any mailer 
which, in its opinion, is of such urgency or importance that it should not 
be deferred till submission of the annual report. 
(2) The State Government shall cause the annual and special reports 
of the State Commission to be laid before each House of State Legislature 
where it consists of two Houses. or where such Legislature consists of one 
House, before that House along with a memorandum of action taker1 or 
proposed to be taken on the recommendations of the State Commission 
and the reasons for nonacceptance of the recommendations, if any 
29. Application of certain provisions relating to National 
Human Rights Commission to State Commissions 
The provisions of sections 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 
shall apply to a State Commission and shall have effect, subject to the 
following modifications, namely:- 
(a) references to "Commission" shall be construed as references to. 
"State Commission"; 
(b) in section 10, in sub-section (3), for the word "Secretary 
General', the word "Secretary" shall be substituted; 
(c) in section 12. clause (f) shall be omitted; 
(d) in section 17. in clause (i), the words "Central Government or 
any" shall be omitted; 
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CHAPTrA V1 
HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS 
30. For the purpose of providing speecy trial of offences arising out of 
violation of human rights, the State Government may, with the concurrence 
of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification, specify for each 
district a Court of Session to be a Human Rights Court to try the said 
offences. 
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply if 
(a) a Court of Session is already specified as a special court. or 
(b) a special court is already constituted, for such offences under any 
other law for ti e 'fine being in force. 
31. Special Public Prosecutor 
For every Hurmar; Rights Court. the Ste Government shall, by 
not;fication, specify a Public Prosecutcr or appoint an advocate who has 
been in practice as an advocate for not less than seven years, as a Special 
Public Prosecutor for the purpose of conducting cases in that Court. 
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CHAPTER VII 
FINANCE, ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT 
32. Grants by the Central Government 
(1) The Central Government 4ha: after due appropriation made by 
Parliament by law in this behalf, pay to the Commission by way of grants 
such sums of money as the Central Government may think fit for being 
utilised for the purposes of this Act. 
(2) The Commission may spend such sums as it thinks fit for 
performing the functions under this Act, and such sums shalt be treated 
as expenditure payable out of the grants referrer tolr. sab-section (1;. 
33. Grants by the State Government 
(1) The State Government shall, after due appropriation made by 
Legislature by law in this behalf, pay to the State Commission by way of 
grants such sums of money as the State Government may think fit for being 
utilised for the purposes of this Act. 
(2) The State Commission may spend such sums as it thinks fit for 
performing the functions under Chapter V. and such sums shalt be treated 
as expenditure payable out of the grants referred to in sub-section (1). 
34. Accounts and Audit 
(1) The Comrriirsrem s;la:i mau;tajr. prcpper drcQ,Irifs a:id other 
relevant records and prepare an annual statement of accounts in such form 
as may be prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General of India. 
(2) The Accounts of the Commission shall be audited by the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General at such intervals as may be specified by 
him and any expenditure incurred in connection with such audit shall be 
payable by the Commission to the Comptroller and Auditor-General. 
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(3) The Comptroller and Auditor General or any person appointed 
by him in connection with the audit of the accounts of the Commrsion under 
this Act shall have the some rights and privileges and the authority in 
connection with such audit as the Comptroller and Auditor-General 
generally has in connection with the audit of Government accounts and. 
in particular, shall have the right to demand the production of books. 
accounts, connected vouchers and other documents and papers and to 
inspect any of the offices of the Commission 
(4) The accounts of the Commission as certified by the Comptroller 
and Auditor-General or any other person appoir;ted by him in this behalf, 
together with the audit report thereon shall be forwarded annually to the 
Central Government by the Commission and the Central Government shall 
cause the audit report to be laid as soon as may be after it is received before 
each House of Parliament. 
35. Accounts and Audit of State Co►nmission 
(1) The State Commission shall maintain proper accounts and other 
relevant records and prepare an annual statement of accounts in such form 
as may be prescribed by the State Government in consultation with the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General of India. 
(2) The accounts of the State Commission shall be audited by the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General at such intervals as may be specified by 
him and any expenditure incurred in connection with such audit shall be 
payable by the State Commission to the Comptroller and Auditor- General. 
(3) The Comptroller and Auditor-General or any person appointed 
by him in connection uwrth the audit of the accounts of the State Commission 
under this Act shall have the same rights and privileges and the authority 
in connection with such audit as the Comptroller and Auditor-General 
generally has in connection with the audit of Government accounts and. 
in particular, shall have the right to demand the production of books, 
accounts, connected vouchers and other documents and papers and to 
inspect any of the offices of the State Commission. 
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(4) The accounts of the State Commission, as certified by the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General or any other person appointed by him 
in this behalf. together with the audit report thereon. shall be forwarded 
annually to the State Government by the State Commission and the State 
Government shalt cause the audit report to be laid. as soon as may be after 
it is received, before the State Legislature. 
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CIAt rEk VIII 
MISCELLANEOUS 
36. Matters not subject to jurisdiction of the Commission 
(1) The Commission shall not inquire in:u any matter which is 
pending before a State Commission or any other Commission duly 
constituted under any law for the time being in force. 
(2) The Commission or the State Commission shall not inquire into 
any matter after the expiry of one year from the date on which the act 
constituting violation of human rights is alleged to have been commited. 
37. Constitution of special investigation teams 
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time 
being in force, where the Government considers it necessary so to do, it 
may constitute one or more special investigation teams, consisting of such 
police officers as it thinks necessary for purposes of investigation and 
prosecution of offences arising out of violations of human rights 
38. Protection of action taken in good faith 
No suit or other legal proceeding steal! ire against the Central 
Government, State Government. Commission. the State Commission or 
any Member thereof or any person acting under the direction either of the 
Central Government, State Government. Commission or the State 
Commission in respect of anything which is in good faith done or intended 
to be done in pursuance of this Act or of any rules or any order made 
thereunder or in respect of the publication by or under the authority of the 
Central Government, State Government. Commission or the State 
Commission of any report paper or proceedings. 
39. Members and officers to be public servants 
Every Member of the Commission. State ; or rniss:or, ar.d every 
officer appointed or authorised by the Commission or the State Commission 
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to exercise functions under this Act shall be deemed to be a public servant 
withrr. the rrwar.ing of section n 21 of the Indian. Penal Code 
40. Power of Central Government to make rules 
;1) 	The Central Government may. by :;.oti`.ication. make rules to 
carry out the provisions of this Act. 
(2) 	In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following 
matters namely :- 
(a) the salaries and allowances and other terms and conditions of 
service of the (Chairperson and Members]' under section 8, 
(b) the conditions subject to which other administrative, technical 
and scientific staff may be appointed by the Commission and 
the salaries and allowances of officers and other staff under sub-. 
section (3) of section 11: 
(c) any other power of a civil court required to be prescribed under 
clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 13;  
(d) the form in which the annual statement of accounts is to be 
prepared by the Commission under sib-section (I ) of section 
34; and 
(e) any other matter which has to be. or may be. prescribed. 
(3) Every rule made under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be 
after it is made, before each House of Parliament. while it is in session, 
for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session 
or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session 
immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both 
Houses agree in making ar.y modification in the rule or both Houses agree 
that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only 
in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so however, 
that any such modification, or annulment shall be without prejudice to the 
validity of anything previously done under that rule. 
: Subs. by Act 43 of 2006 for "members" 
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40 A. Power to make rules retrospectively—The power to make 
rules under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 40 shall include the power 
to make such rules or any of them retrospectively from a date not earlier 
than the date on which this Act received the assent of the President. but 
no such retrospective effect shall be given to any such rule so as to 
prejudicially affect the interests of any person to whom such rule may be 
applicable. 
Power of Commission to make Regulations' 
2[40(B) (1) Subject to the provisions et this Act and the rules made 
thereunder, the Commission may. with the previous approval of the Central 
Government, by notification, make regulations to carry out the provisions 
of this Act. 
(2) 	In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing power, such regulations may provide for all or any of the following 
matters, namely:- 
(a) the procedure to be followed by the Commission under sub-
section(2) of Section 10. 
(b) the returns and statistics to be furnished by the State 
Commission; 
(c) any other matter which has to be. or may be. specified by 
regulations. 
(3) Every regulation made by the Commission under this Act shall 
be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, 
while it is in session for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised 
in one session or in two or more successive sessions. and if, before the 
expiry of the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree 
in making any modification in the regulations or both Houses agree that 
the regulation should not be made, the regulation shall thereafter have effect 
only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so 
however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice 
to the validity of anything previously done under that regulation.I 
• inxuted by Act 43 of 2(O6 
2 Insert'd by Act 43 of 2006 
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41. Power of State Government to make rules 
(1) The State Government may. by notification, make rules to carry 
out the provisions of this Act. 
(2) 	In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following 
matters, namely : 
(a) the salaries and allowances and other terms and conditions of 
service of the Chairperson and Members under section .26; 
(b) the conditions subject to which other administrative, technical 
and scientific staff may be appointed by the State Commission 
and the salaries and allowances of officers and other staff under 
sub-section (3) of section 27: 
(c) the form in which the annual statement of accounts is to be 
prepared under sub-section (1; of section 35. 
(3) Every rule made by the State Government under this section shall 
be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of the State 
Legislature where it consists of two Houses, or where such Legislature 
consists of one House. before that Flouse. 
42. Power to remove difficulties 
(1) If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this 
Act, the Central Government, may by order published in the Official 
Gazette. make such provisions, not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Act as appear to it to be necessary or expedient for removing the difficulty. 
Provided that no such order shall be made after the expiry of the period 
of two years from the date of commencement of this Act. 
(2) Every order made under this section shall, as soon as may be 
after it is made, be laid before each house of Parliament. 
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43. Repeal and Savings 
;1) The Protector of Human Rights Ordinance, 1993 is hereby 
repealed. 
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal. anything done or any action taken 
under the said Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been done or taken under 
the corresponding provisions of this Act. 
0 
